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Preface 
There exists much literature on agricultural planning, but there is a serious lack of 
detailed information in particular areas. This is also true for Indonesia. 
I hope that this analysis of the situation in Indonesia may give a foundation on 
which to build the country's agricultural policy. Most of the material is from my own 
experience and represents the situation up to 1964. As the study is also for a doctoral 
thesis, some compromise has been necessary in the contents and the manner of presen-
tation. 
Although the official Indonesian place-names may now be preferred, English names 
have been used for both the Prewar and Postwar Periods. The name Indonesia has 
been used in preference to the Netherlands East Indies or Dutch East Indies. 
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1 Introduction 
Due to the usually fertile soil (especially in Java), the prevailing warm and moist 
climate well-suited to agriculture, and the industriousness of the farmers, just before 
World War II Indonesia was practically self-supporting in primary articles of food, 
especially rice, Indonesia's staple. Since 1957, rice imports have risen to an average of 
about 1,000,000 tons, or 8 procent of the consumption, and it has cost the government 
about 100 million US dollars a year: a substantial drain on its foreign exchange 
holdings.1 
Another fact is that Indonesia still depends on agriculture for over 60 percent of her 
foreign exchange earnings. After the war output of agricultural export crops, with the 
exception of rubber, decreased. But, unfortunately, in the last few years rubber 
production, Indonesia's main export commodity, normally accounting for a third to a 
half of its export earnings, also shows a decline. 
The rapidly growing population of Java, and the impossibility to expand the agri-
cultural area, have resulted in a further decline of the average farm size since World 
War II. As non-agricultural activities have shown themselves unable to absorb the 
increase of Java's population, the pressure on agricultural land in this island has be-
come more and more severe. 
Against this background, the need for replacement of food imports, for greater 
export of agricultural products and for a relief in the population pressure on land in 
Java, this study of prospects for increasing agricultural production has been under-
taken. 
The present study will focus its attention on specific measures taken, or to be taken, by 
the government to solve the problems outlined above. It also attempts to analyse why 
the government's efforts have, or have not, been up to expectations, to arrive at some 
basic conclusions. Next, the question of how effectively the government had used its 
agricultural resources is dealt with. Finally the author will try to indicate the perspec-
tives for agricultural development in Indonesia. As two thirds of its population is con-
centrated in Java and the data for this island are more complete than those for the 
other islands, this study is primarily concerned with Java. 
1
 Import of rice seems to have declined during 1965 and 1966. Rice output has been about 10 million 
tons in both years and it is possible that the time will come soon when the goal of selfsufficiency in 
rice production will be reached. Rice import for 1965 was 796,000 tons and for 1966 (up to 30 Sep-
tember) 223,000 tons. See D. H. PENNY and D. THALIB, Survey of recent development, Bull. Indon. 
Econ. Stud. 6, Febr. 1967, pp. 25-26. 
1 
Agriculture in Indonesia has two aspects: the usually small-scale peasant agriculture 
and the estate agriculture. 
Peasant farming varies between the extensive type of shifting cultivation and the 
most intensive culture as exemplified by double cropping in Java and Bali. The con-
cept of a small holding is a relative one, especially before the enactment of the Basic 
Agrarian Law of I9602: the smallholder in one area of Indonesia may be considered a 
fairly large farmer in another area, depending on the local agricultural pattern, the 
crop or crops involved, the amount of available arable land and the type of land 
tenure. Generally hired labour is little used and not much capital is involved. 
The peasant primarily produces basic food commodities for himself and his family. 
Besides that, he produces cash crops for local and export markets, depending on 
regional circumstances. For local marketing only surpluses are sold, which generally 
are small. Also the total amount of cash crop product per farmer is usually small. 
Nevertheless, the number of farmers is so great that their combined surpluses may be 
substantial. 
Several crops raised by the farmers, both for consumption and for export are 
further processed by the farmer himself or in factories which purchase the crop. If 
such processing requires little, if any, capital or technical knowledge (as copra), this is 
done by the peasants themselves. If processing needs more capital and wider technical 
knowledge, the crude product is sold to processing enterprises, sometimes through a 
dealer. Examples are the remilling enterprises for the peasant's rubber and the pro-
cessing of cassava-flour. 
The large-scale production of world commodities on so-called estates is a commer-
cial enterprise. Land, usually comprising a fairly large area, is obtained by renting 
uncultivated 'waste land' on a regular long-term basis or by purchasing it (in the old 
days) from the government (so-called 'particuliere landerijen'). Here labour is normally 
paid in money and substantial capital is employed. Estate agriculture, as a rule, is not 
limited to the cultivation of crops: in most cases, the crude product is processed in a 
factory connected with the estate. On the whole, modern and scientifically established 
methods of cultivation and processing are used. The estates produce cash crops for the 
international markets. 
Another form of estate agriculture occurs in the production of sugar. Here the 
enterprise owns only the factory (mill) and rents its land from the farmers. Thus it 
would be better if the word factory be used here instead of estates. The same applies 
to a number of enterprises which process tobacco and other annual crops (such as 
cassava). The figures of production area and other economic data of the crops grown 
for these factories are included in the tables for the estate crops. 
This study is primarily based on data collected from various publications, especially 
those of the Central Bureau of Statistics. But these statistics are not all equally reliable 
or complete. For example, no sufficiently detailed studies on the national income and 
8
 The size of agricultural landholdings is restricted by this law. 
2 
its composition were available. Data from the population census, conducted in Octo-
ber 1961 are still being processed and only some of its results could be included. 
Results of the agricultural census, executed in October 1963, were even more difficult 
to obtain. There are good data on production in particular sectors, on some elements 
of the balance of payments and on retail prices in Djakarta, compiled by the Central 
Bureau of Statistics. Some of the gaps could be filled by the author's own reports on 
the aspects of agricultural development planning which he drew up since he joined the 
Indonesian State Planning Bureau in 19523. 
Although technical, political, social and other problems will be touched, the nature of 
this study is primarily economic. The problems of agricultural development are its 
central objective, and therefore agricultural considerations play a decisive role. Of 
course the author feels the limitations of such a presentation, but readers who are 
interested in Indonesian agricultural development in a broader context should consult 
other studies. The most important are included in the bibliography. 
As to the set-up of this publication the following scheme has been followed. 
Chapter 2 gives in brief the theoretical background of why agriculture should be 
developed and how this applies to the Indonesian situation. The next three chapters 
contain a brief description to the historical development of agriculture in Indonesia 
since 1815 up till now: Chapter 3 indicates the development of the whole of Indonesia 
with special emphasis on the islands outside Java (the so-called Outer Islands), 
Chapter 4 is focussed on the agricultural development in Java, and Chapter 5 treats 
the effects of population pressure in Java. 
Chapters 6 to 9 describe the approaches, the policies and the measures adopted by 
the government to face the problems after World War II as outlined in the previous 
chapters. They briefly discuss the successive agricultural development plans launched 
after World War II (Chapter 6) and the measures to relieve pressure on land in Java 
by agricultural resettlement (Chapter 7); the attempts to increase agricultural exports 
and the rehabilitation of the sugar factories as an example are given in Chapter 8, 
whereas Chapter 9 discusses the measures to improve peasant's agriculture with 
special attention to rice production. 
Chapter 10 analyses the significance of the failure of the agrarian policy of the 
Indonesian government to overall agricultural development in Java. 
Chapter 11 identifies the need to integrate the agricultural development of Java in 
the economic development of the whole of Indonesia. 
Finally Chapter 12 summarizes the main conclusions of the study. 
3
 Most of these short studies are issued as Reports of the State Planning Bureau, which was abolished 
in 1959. These reports may be obtained at the Biro FINEK (Economic and Financial Bureau), 
Sekretariat Negara, Djakarta. 
Because Indonesia has experienced a persistent inflation since World War II, exchange 
rates for hard currency have presented a problem. Since no exact data on this subject 
are available (the official rates do not represent the actual situation on the free market), 
it was attempted to make an estimate, though it is only a rough one for the years after 
1960. The result is given in Table 1, which also includes a period before World War II. 
Table 1. Exchange rates of the US dollar} 
before 1934 
1934/1936 
1936/1940 
1945/1949 
1949a 
1950 
1951 
1952s 
1953 
1954 
Official 
rate 
2.50 
1.50 
1.80 
2.65 
3.80 
3.80 
3.80 
11.40 
11.40 
11.40 
Free market 
rate 
19.00 
19.50 
16.25 
20.00 
25.00 
28.00 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
19594 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
Official 
rate 
11.40 
11.40 
11.40 
11.40 
45.00 
45.00 
45.00 
45.00 
250.00 
250.00 
Free market 
rate 
30.00 
32.00 
40.00 
60.00 
75.00 
100.00 
150.00 
250.00 
500.00 
2,500.00 
10,000.00 20,000.00 
'Before World War II expressed in Dutch guilders. 
'From September 20,1949. 
"From February 4,1952. 
'From August 25,1959. 
Source: Several publications. 
2 Theoretical and factual starting points 
The reasons for improving agriculture in developing countries have been discussed in 
detail by various authors4. Their standpoints can be briefly described by the following 
arguments, drawn up by MOSHER5. 
"Firstly, because it produces the food, much of the fiber, and many of the other indus-
trial raw materials on which a rising level of living depends." 
"Secondly, because it is such a large segment of the total production of each people 
that it needs to be made as efficient as possible." 
"Thirdly, because in early stages of industrialization a great deal of industrial equip-
ment needs to be imported and for many countries the export of agricultural products 
is an important potential earner of foreign exchange." 
"Fourthly, because every kind of development depends upon investment, and most of 
this investment has to be financed by domestic savings. Since for many countries 
agriculture is the largest industry, it must be sufficiently productive to allow for the 
accumulation of capital out of agricultural earnings. This capital is needed both in 
making agriculture still more productive and in financing investment in other types of 
industry that the country needs." 
"Fifthly, because if non-agricultural industry is to develop in a country it has to be 
able to sell its product. It has to be able to sell most of its products within the country. 
Most of the potential domestic purchases of industrial products get their livelihood 
from agriculture. If the net income of farmers are not high enough to allow them the 
purchase of industrial products in the form of consumer goods, the non-agricultural 
industries cannot prosper." 
Though the economic plans for developing countries have invariably recognized the 
strategic role of agriculture, it is industry which has been expected to constitute the 
most dynamic element in economic growth. However, the experience in many coun-
tries has shown that they will not become genuinely industrialized without solving at 
the same time the agricultural problems. In the present social and economic setting of 
the world, economic development requires complementary growth in all major sectors 
of society and economy, which is not possible if industrialization means an increased 
4
 J. H. L. JOOSTEN, Landbouwontwikkeling en macro-economische orde, Landbouwk. Tijdschr. 76 
(1964), pp. 122-124. See also: J. W. MELLOR, The economics of agricultural development, Ithaca, NY, 
1966. A comprehensive literature study on this subject is given by J. GrrriNGER, The literature of 
agricultural planning, Washington DC, 1966. 
5
 A. T. MOSHER, Agricultural development, The Agricultural Development Council, New York 
1963 (mimeographed), pp. 3-4. 
burden for the farmers. But it is becoming more and more clear that there will not be 
a rapid economic development if there is not an expanded market for the increased 
produce, which only a developing non-agricultural sector can sustain. This means 
that, if an industrial sector is to emerge and further sustain itself, the agricultural 
sector must also increase its total output, right from the beginning. 
But experience in some developing countries has shown that domestic food pro-
duction failed to keep pace with the growth in population, or that supplies of raw 
materials for the newly established industries did not come forth in sufficient quanti-
ties. In some countries agricultural exports have even fallen short of the moderate 
growth in world demand. Foreign exchange expenditures on imported food and 
materials have increased and in some cases export earnings have declined. Industrial 
growth has consequently been impeded, either by the recurrent need to restrain 
domestic expenditures in order to dampen inflationary pressure on urban food 
supplies, or by shortages of imported capital equipment and industrial materials. It is 
a reflection of these experiences that current plans have generally given special atten-
tion to agricultural development, and, in particular, to food production and the for-
eign exchange implications of agricultural growth. 
It should, however, be kept in mind, that in several countries the development of the 
economy has been retarded not only by economic disparities but also by poor ad-
ministration, political unrest and political ideologies. 
Table 2. Estimated income of Indonesians, by source (1939). 
Dfl. x 1,000,000 
Java + Outer Indo-
Madura Provin- nesia 
% of total 
Foodcrops 
Export crops 
Livestock incl. poultry 
Fisheries 
Forestry 
Plantations + mines, 
wages 
Ditto, rent 
Manufacturing 
Government 
Trade 
Communications 
Services 
House rent 
Professions 
518 
31 
71 
10 
5 
78 
22 
225 
98 
105 
21 
35 
70 
16 
ces 
258 
127 
32 
7 
8 
73 
75 
54 
30 
8 
11 
30 
4 
Java + Outer Indo-
Madura Provin- nesia 
ces 
%from Amount 
rural from ru-
sector ralsector 
776 
158 
103 
17 
13 
151 
22 
300 
152 
135 
29 
46 
100 
20 
39.7 
2.4 
5.4 
0.8 
0.4 
6.0 
1.7 
17.2 
7.5 
8.0 
1.6 
2.7 
5.4 
1.2 
36.0 
17.7 
4.4 
1.0 
1.1 
10.2 
10.5 
7.5 
4.2 
1.1 
1.5 
4.2 
0.6 
38.4 
7.8 
5.1 
0.8 
0.6 
7.5 
1.1 
14.9 
7.5 
6.7 
1.4 
2.3 
4.9 
1.0 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
90 
66 
80 
50 
80 
776 
158 
103 
17 
13 
151 
22 
270 
101 
108 
23 
80 
sia, ^ ollmidan^euanSnmf^^ tax bu r d en and economic development in Indone-
tax. g "•ly34'pp- 567>- Included are only the Indonesians paying no income 
We know that there are severe limitations on the capacity of developing countries 
to do everything at once in view of the complementary nature of agricultural and 
industrial growth. But it is precisely this consideration which underscores the impor-
tance of developing agriculture in such a way as to both minimize its demand upon 
resources most needed for industrial development and maximize its net contribution 
to the capital required for general economic growth. 
But it would be erroneous to suppose, that most developing countries did not 
recognize the importance of using their agricultural resources as effectively as possible. 
There is no question about the political, sociological and economic importance of 
a large and serious program for increasing domestic agricultural production. The 
trouble, however, is that in meeting the objectives for which they are working, the 
governments forget the crucial position of the farmer himself in achieving agri-
cultural development. In the end it is the farmer who has to realize the wanted increased 
production on his farm. 
The central problem which determines the decisions of the government is not that 
the developing countries should increase domestic food production and agricultural 
exports, but how to accomplish an identity of purpose and common responsibility 
between the government and the farmers in this respect. 
Primarily due to the non-existence of a clear-cut doctrinal concept of the govern-
ments' agrarian policy in many of the developing countries as regards the policital 
attitude towards the farmers, their efforts to achieve rapid agricultural development 
have been greatly wasted. This study on agricultural development in Indonesia will 
attempt to clarify this point. 
Indonesia is one of the countries in which agriculture plays an important role in the 
economy (see Tables 2 and 3). This importance can be shown by several figures such as 
its share in national income, employment pattern and exports, which are illustrated in 
the following pages. 
In making a detailed analysis of the Indonesian economy as earlier explained, we are 
hampered by unreliable estimates of the national income and its composition. But 
we are justified in using them, since we are more interested in their trends than in the 
absolute figures. 
According to PAAUW6, POLAK is considered to be the first who attempted to calculate 
the Indonesian national income figures for the period before the second world war. 
His efforts have been succeeded by NEUMARK and others after World War II. 
PAAUW himself made a comparative study of POLAK'S and NEUMARK'S national 
income figures and came to the following conclusions: "There had been a significant 
shift resulting in part from the structural change in the economy induced by the 
declining role of private foreign enterprises as well as by differential rates of economic 
' D. S. PAAUW, The tax burden and economic development in Indonesia, Ekonomi dan Keuangan 7, 
1954, pp. 566-569. 
Table 3. National income by source, Indonesia, 1952. 
Agriculture 
peasant food crops 
peasant export crops 
estate crops 
livestock 
fisheries 
forestry 
total agriculture 
export duties and statistical tax 
net agriculture 
Mining 
Industry 
Transport and communications 
Trade, banking and insurance 
Hotels, restaurants and catering 
Entertainment industries 
Private building and construction 
Rent 
Free professions 
Domestic service 
Central government, including defence 
Local government 
Government, income from property, excl. 
estates 
Net domestic product at factor cost 
Source: Ekonomi dan Keuangan 7,1954, p. 568. 
National income 
in 1000 US $ 
30,054 
7,650 
2,823 
3,132 
2,688 
1,246 
47,592 
1,507 
46,085 
1,846 
6,700 
2,492 
10,943 
224 
168 
945 
5,300 
500 
550 
4,055 
1,250 
581 
81,639 
% from rural 
sector 
100 
100 
75 
100 
100 
100 
37 
33 
50 
-
varies 
-
-
33 
80 
-
50 
67 
67 
-
-
Amount from 
rural sector 
30,054 
7,650 
2,117 
3,132 
2,688 
1,246 
46,886 
558 
46,328 
609 
3,350 
-
6,586 
-
-
315 
4,240 
-
275 
2,703 
833 
-
65,240 
Table 4. Value of agricultural exports of Indonesia, 1894-1940. 
1894 
1913 
1928 
1933 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
Total exports in 
million guilders 
154 
419 
1,237 
306 
660 
426 
495 
593 
Source: A. Vm. Colonial 
Percentage of total from 
Java and 
Madura 
82 
65 
58 
50 
35 
43 
46 
40 
Outer Pro-
vinces 
18 
35 
42 
50 
65 
57 
54 
60 
agricultural production. London, 1946, p. 
Percentage of total from 
estates 
89 
76 
65 
59 
54 
60 
63 
63 
24. 
peasants 
11 
24 
35 
41 
46 
40 
37 
37 
Table S. Estimates of national Income of Indonesia, 1958-1962, by source, at 1960 prices (in 1000 mil-
lion rupiah). 
Agriculture: 
farm foodcrops 
farm non foodcrops 
estate crops 
animal husbandry 
forestry + hunting 
fishing 
total agriculture etc. 
Mining + quarrying 
Manufacturing: 
large establishment + 
medium establishment 
small establishment 
Construction 
Electricity + gas 
Transport + communications: 
railroad transport 
air transport 
communication 
other transport 
Wholesale + retail trade 
Banking + other financial intermediaries: 
banking 
cooperative credit 
societies 
others 
Ownership of dwellings 
Public administration + defence 
Services: 
personal services 
community services 
recreational services 
Net domestic product 
Net investment income from abroad 
Net national product 
1958 
124.3 
26.6 
12.9 
17.3 
8.1 
5.7 
194.9 
9.7 
21.5 
29.8 
6.8 
0.8 
0.7 
0.2 
0.3 
10.3 
57.8 
2.4 
0.1 
0.3 
7.2 
25.6 
13.7 
7.1 
0.4 
389.6 
3.1 
386.5 
1959 
127.9 
29.5 
12.6 
17.4 
8.4 
6.4 
202.2 
10.8 
20.5 
28.3 
7.1 
0.9 
0.8 
0.3 
0.4 
10.9 
56.4 
2.5 
0.1 
0.3 
7.3 
20.7 
14.1 
7.4 
0.4 
391.4 
3.5 
387.9 
1960 
132.0 
26.9 
11.7 
18.1 
9.0 
6.4 
204.1 
12.0 
19.4 
28.7 
7.1 
0.9 
0.9 
0.3 
0.4 
11.6 
59.2 
2.6 
0.1 
0.6 
7.4 
16.1 
14.3 
7.4 
0.4 
393.7 
3.0 
390.7 
1961 
129.6 
26.6 
11.7 
18.7 
9.4 
7.5 
203.5 
12.2 
21.5 
31.3 
7.2 
1.0 
0.9 
0.3 
0.4 
11.9 
68.2 
3.4 
0.1 
0.6 
7.6 
17.8 
14.5 
7.6 
0.4 
410.4 
3.9 
406.5 
1962 
140.1 
30.0 
10.5 
18.0 
8.8 
7.6 
215.0 
12.9 
21.5 
30.0 
7.5 
1.0 
1.0 
0.3 
0.4 
12.2 
62.7 
2.8 
0.1 
0.4 
7.9 
8.9 
15.1 
7.8 
0.4 
407.9 
4.5 
403.4 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, preliminary data. 
progress in the rural and non-rural sectors. In 1952, 81 % of the total national income 
as computed by NEUMARK originated in the rural sector, while in 1939 the amount 
from this sector was 68 %". 
But the terms rural and non-rural are not identical to the terms agriculture and 
non-agriculture. Therefore an attempt has been made to calculate the contribution of 
agriculture. 
A breakdown by industrial origin was computed by POLAK only for the ethnic 
group of Indonesians, since income arising from the other groups is based on income 
tax data. 
He also estimated that the total value of agriculture, excluding the estates, amounted 
to DF 1,067 millions in 1939. Assuming that the total value of the exports is equal to 
that of the production of the estates and that there were no substantial changes in 
stocks of those products (which for 1939, the beginning of the World War II, was a 
reasonable assumption) we arrive at a total value of agricultural production in that 
year of DF 1,377 millions, or 46.9 % of the national income, as calculated from Table 
4. NEUMARK'S calculations in 1952 resulted in agriculture contributed to 50.7% of 
the national income. POLAK'S and NEUMARK'S figures indicate that the share of agricul-
ture increased from 46.9% in 1939 to 50.7% in 1952. This trend continued, as indi-
cated by further national income studies made by the State Planning Bureau and the 
Central Bureau of Statistics for the years 1953 to 1962 (see Tables 5 and 6): in 1962 it 
was 53.5% (on basis of 1960 prices), and 58.4% (on current prices). 
The place of agriculture in the economy is also shown by the number of professional 
workers in this field. The only reliable data available on the size of population, the 
Table 6. Percentage distribution of national product by source 1958-1962, at 1960 prices. 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 
^
r i c u I t u r e
 50.4 52.1 52.3 50.1 53.3 
Mining + quarrying 2.5 2 8 3 1 3 0 3.2 
Manufacturing
 1 3 3 1 2 g ^ 1 3 Q 1 2 8 
£° n S t - U C t , 0 n 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 
E.ectnaty + gas
 0 2 Q 2 0 2 Q1 
transport* communication -in , , , , , , 74 
Wholesale + retailtrade £% ** *£ ^ 155 
Banking + other financial intermediaries 0 7 OR O'R i n 0 8 
Ownershipofdwellings J J J " J " 
Public administration + defence
 66 5 3 . 2 2 
Services , , *-1 *• 
5-5 5.7 5.7 5.5 5.8 
Net domestic product
 1 m o ,„ , „ , , 
Netinvestmentincome ^ ^ 1 0 0-8 1 0 1-° 1 0 " 
Netnationalproduct . ^ ! ~°-9 " ° - 8 - 1" 0 " H 
_ ^ ^ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: CBS. see footnote Table 5. 
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Table 10. Export by economic groups1, Indonesia, 1938-1940 and 1958-1962 (million rupiahs). 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Total agricultural 
products 
473.0 
538.8 
656.7 
4,937.7 
6,841.0 
25,171.2 
21,792.9 
19,204.5 
Mineral products 
206.3 
226.3 
274.0 
4,058.9 
3,716.1 
12,511.5 
13,584.8 
11,433.0 
Other products 
7.8 
8.6 
8.2 
22.0 
55.7 
152.5 
89.8 
67.9 
Total 
687.1 
773.7 
938.9 
9,013.6 
10,612.8 
37,835.2 
35,467,5 
30,675.4 
* Excluding gold and silver. 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 133. 
Table 11. Agricultural export as a percentage of total exports for Indonesia, 1938-1940 and 1958-1962. 
1938 
68.9 
1939 
69.6 
1940 
70.0 
1958 
54.8 
1959 
64.5 
1960 
66.5 
1961 
61.5 
1962 
62.6 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963,v. 133. 
rate of growth, its composition by age and its other characteristics are from the Popu-
lation Censuses of 1930 and 1961. 
The 1930 Census figures indicate that 68.9% of the population found their living 
in the production of raw materials originating from agriculture and mining as can be 
seen in Table 7. Assuming that the workers in mining constitute about 0.3 % of the 
labour force, then in 1930 we could derive from the two figures above that about 
68.6 % of Indonesia's population made their living in agriculture. This figure is sup-
ported by GEERTZ7. The 1961 census figures indicated that 71.9% of the Indonesian 
population is engaged in agriculture as illustrated by Tables 8 and 9. 
The general conclusion is, that there are more people engaged in agriculture now 
than before World War U. 
In the export business, agricultural products still play a very important part in earning 
foreign exchange, as can be seen from the figures in Tables 10 and 11. They indicate 
that before the war about 69 % of the exports were contributed by agriculture and that 
this percentage has declined to 62-64% after the war8. Moreover, there have been 
changes within the composition of the agricultural sector not shown in this table. 
A more detailed analysis will be given later in this study. 
' C. GEERTZ, Agricultural involution. The process of ecological change in Indonesia, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1963, p. 131. 
8
 It is difficult to be more specific about the postwar period because of large annual fluctuations. 
14 
Summarizing it can be stated that the backbone of Indonesian economy was and still 
is agriculture, and that its importance has rather increased than decreased after the 
war. And as regards to export earnings, although they have slightly decreased in 
importance, they still are considerable. 
Therefore it is obvious, that a substantial part of the resources for economic 
development in Indonesia have to be derived from agriculture, and that economic 
development can be accelerated by using the agricultural resources as fully and as 
effectively as possible. To see how this has been accomplished will be discussed in 
the following chapters. 
15 
3 Short historical survey of the agricultural development in 
Indonesia 
Agriculture in Indonesia is traditionally discussed in terms of a division between 
'estate agriculture' and 'peasant agriculture'. This traditional division is followed in 
our survey of agricultural development, which is divided into two periods, namely 
before and after World War II. 
3.1 The period before World War II 
3.1.1 Estate agriculture 
The most interesting issue in Indonesian agricultural development is the contribution 
by estates. 
During the British interim administration of the Netherlands East Indies from 1811 
to 1816, a plantation system was introduced by RAFFLES. Among other things he gave 
extensive land concessions to private enterprises to develop estates employing 
indigeneous labour.9 
After the return of the East Indies to the Netherlands Government there was a 
transitional period in governmental policy, which was characterized by the struggle 
between continuing RAFFLES' policy, in which participation of private enterprises 
was to be encouraged, or to that of the Netherlands East Indies Company, which 
desired the re-introduction of compulsary labour and forced delivery in the scope of 
a state monopoly.10 In 1830 the Netherlands' government finally decided in favour of 
what ultimately became the 'Cultuurstelsel' advocated by VAN DEN BOSCH. The basis 
of this system was that the Javanese should cultivate one fifth of the village's arable 
land with export crops designated by the government, or work 66 days a year in 
9
 H. J. BOEKE, Objective and personal elements in colonial welfare policy, in: W. F. WERTHEIM, Ed., 
Indonesian economics. The concept of dualism in theory and policy, The Hague, 1961, pp. 281-282 and 
288. Also cited by A. PIM, Colonial agricultural production. The contribution made by native peasants 
and by foreign enterprise, Oxford, 1946, p. 15. See also: G. GONGGRUP, Schets ener economische 
geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indie, 1949, pp. 71-78 and C. ROBEQUAIN, Malaya, Indonesia, Borneo 
and the Philippines: A geographic, economical and political description of Malaya, the East Indies and 
the Philippines, London, 1954, p. 314. 
10
 BOEKE, op. cit. (fn. 9), pp. 281-288; PIM, op. cit. (fn. 9), pp. 15-18; GONGGRUP, op. cit. (fn. 9), pp. 
79-139; ROBEQUAIN, op. cit. (fn. 9), pp. 314-319. 
11
 BOEKE, op. cit. (fn. 9), pp. 294-299; PIM, op. cit. (fn. 9), pp. 18-20; GONGGRUP, op. cit. (fn. 9), pp. 
139-170; ROBEQUAIN, op. cit. (fn. 9), pp. 319-327. 
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government owned estates or enterprises. In return they would get a small payment 
and refund of land taxes. This forced delivery of crops resulted in restrictions on 
private enterprises.11 In 1870 the Dutch abandoned this state monopoly over Indonesia's 
agrarian resources and opened up the possibility for private entrepreneurs to acquire 
land for growing commercial crops on a large scale. This land could be obtained 
either by renting cultivated lands from the local population or, on a longterm lease, 
uncultivated 'waste land' from the government.12 
The law prohibited the sale of peasants' land (except of small urban lots) to others 
than native Indonesians. Simultaneously a bill was introduced by Minister DE WAAL 
for the gradual abolition of the 'Cultuurstelsel'. 
The opening up of Indonesia to individual commercial enterprises attracted a 
great number of 'planters'.13 The development of their estates and their distribution 
by size under the various landrights from 1875-1937 is illustrated by Table 12. 
Their total area increased from 304,000 ha in 1875 to 2,435,000 ha in 1937.14 At first, 
the estates were concentrated in Java. By the discovery of Deli (East-coast of Sumatra) 
as tobacco land this type of agriculture spread to Sumatra and then to the other 
islands. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the area occupied by estates in 
the Outer Islands even outstripped that of Java.15 Most of them were established on 
long-term contracts. Their total area reached its maximum in 1927; at that time 
approximately 3.4 million ha were under estates; of which about one million ha in 
Java and 2.4 million in the 'Outer Islands'.16 
The distribution of these estates and their planted areas are given in Table 13. It 
shows that the estates were concentrated in Java and Sumatra. Their average size in 
Sumatra was nearly 2.2 times that in Java, but the average percentage area under 
cultivation was lower. This can be explained by the need for more land for the cultiva-
tion of the Deli tobacco, which can only be grown on the east coast of Sumatra. To 
get the specific quality of this famous tabacco a land rotation of eight years is needed. 
All estates worked with hired labour. In the over-populated Java this presented no 
problem. But the increase of available labour in the rural sector and in the cities kept 
wages and working conditions low. This induced the migration of Javanese landless 
farmers and farm labourers to the Outer Provinces, especially to the eastcoast of 
Sumatra, where they could get higher wages. Because this area is sparsely populated, 
many of the estates depended almost entirely on such imported labour, either from 
Java or, as was frequently the case before the war, from south China. Therefore, the 
estates in Sumatra concentrated on special crops which require a low labour-land 
product» CUltiVatCd " S m a l k r f a n g e ° f c o m m o d i t i e s> mostly specializing in one 
12
 See footnote 11. 
"See footnote 11. 
»A^JONK E R S ) ^haartszorginlruione^een^chiedenisenperspectieL^m^ 1948, p. 68. 
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The amount of capital invested in the estates is difficult to estimate, but it is thought 
to have been considerable. Around the year 1900, total private investments in the 
Netherlands East Indies were calculated at 750 million guilders, in 1915 at 1,500 
million,18 in 1929-1930 at 4,000 million for the total capital invested in big enterprises19 
and in 1939 they amounted to 4,800 million guilders.20 How much this went to the 
estates is not known, but the preponderance of agricultural undertaking has been 
obvious.21 Roughly calculated, more than 75 % of all private investments in 1939 were 
of Dutch origin.22 
Tobacco, sugar, rubber, coffee, tea, palmoil and cinchona were the principal estate 
crops. Their success can be gauged by the exports as indicated by Table 4 under 2. 
Up to 1930 the export of agricultural products expanded considerably. Then 
followed a severe decline, due to the world-wide economic depression. Thereafter, 
exports partially recovered, a recovery interrupted by the outbreak of World War II. 
Some of the expansion could be accounted for by the increase in the number of small-
holders producing export crops, but by far the major portion was the result of estate 
activity. In 1939, the estates still produced 63% of the total agricultural exports. But 
their share was declining, as was also shown in Table 4. 
The success of the estates was mainly due to the progress of scientific methods 
applied in agriculture. The Dutch scientists in this field had become famous for the 
improvements they made in tropical agriculture. The private experiment stations of the 
estate corporations in Bogor (primarily for rubber, tea, and cinchona), Pasuruan (for 
sugarcane), Djember (for coffee), Klaten (for tobacco), Medan (for tobacco, rubber, 
and palmoil) enjoyed special fame throughout the world. Amongst their successes 
most spectacular were the revolutionary increases in yield of sugarcane23 and the 
improvement in rubber production per acre.24 
3.1.2 Peasant agriculture 
It is not possible to give an accurate picture of the development of peasants' agricul-
ture for the whole of Indonesia as prewar data for food production are available 
for Java and Madura and not for most of the 'Outer Provinces'. However, Table 14 
indicates a very rapid expansion of peasants' export crop production: its share in 
18
 ROBEQUAIN, op. cit. (fit. 9), p. 323. He mentions 750,000 florins, which the author thinks must be a 
printing error. 
19
 Big enterprises employ 50 or more workers. See: J. M. VAN DER KROEF, Economic origins of 
Indonesian nationalism, in: P. TALBOT, South Asia in the world today, Chicago, 1950, p. 177. 
20
 ROBEQUAIN, op. cit. (fn. 9), p. 323. By GONGGRIJP, op. cit. (fn. 9), p. 205, estimated at 4000 million. 
21
 ROBEQUAIN, op. cit. (fn. 9), p. 323. 
22
 VAN DER KROEF, op. cit. (fn. 19), p. 177. See also GONGGRDP, op. cit. (fn. 9), p. 205. 
23
 The most famous sugar strain was POJ 2878. 
24
 Rubber production per acre increased from 450 lb. to 4400 lb. Although the 4400 lb. per acre is 
only reached at the experimental fields the achievement is striking. See ROBEQUATN, op. cit. (fn. 9), p. 
344. 
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total export of agricultural products increased from 10.9%in 1894 to 37.4%in 1939.25 
In the sparsely populated regions outside Java, the peasant can use large areas for 
new crops without encroaching on the space needed for his own subsistence. He has 
only to make use of the 'ladangs' (shifting cultivation plots) to raise food crops as well 
as cash crops. The best example is rubber. If rubber prices are high, the peasant may 
neglect his food crops and concentrate on the rubber; when the price of this product 
declines, he may fall back on his food crops and abandon his commercial crops. 
Thus he is secured from the type of economic crisis that develops on estates.26 The 
flexibility of peasants' rubber production, its low costs and the expanding world 
demand, have resulted in a rapid increase in output. The area under smallholders' 
rubber has been estimated at 1,200,000 ha.27 More details will be covered in 3.2.2. 
It is difficult to estimate the area cultivated by other export products as ladangs are 
scattered about. It is also not known how much of this land was devoted to food crops 
as this proportion fluctuated from year to year. 
There have also been some efforts by the government to increase food production in 
the Outer Provinces. In 1910 it started the construction of irrigation works. Between 
1910 and 1938 a total of 17 million guilders was spent in these efforts. In the years 
before the war expenditures were greatly increased, especially for the migration of 
Javanese farmers to other islands. Important projects were started in the residencies of 
Palembang and Lampung of southern Sumatra as well as in Celebes. 
The inadequacy of statistical information of peasants' agriculture of the Outer 
Provinces before World War II necessitated concentrating primarily on the develop-
ments in Java, which will be treated in Chapter 4. 
3.2 The period after World War II 
3.2.1 Estate agriculture 
The postwar period, up till 1965, was characterized by a declining output of estate 
crops2*, as can be seen in Table 15. This drop is due to the decreasing 'mature' area of 
tixe planted acreage (see Table 16). Another important factor is the falling yield per 
hectare For example sugar output per hectare dropped from 162 quintal in 1938 to 
1 , T w w w ^ P° S t w a r P a c t i o n of rubber was not substantially lower 
&an tot before World War II, because immediately after the war, the areas planted 
with highly valuable new varieties had matured29 
For 1966 the goverment's targets for the main estate crops' production are set 
26
 P M , op. cit. (fit. 9),
 p . 35 recovery trom the depression of the early thirties. 
u n
S
 ^
e
"
ment
-fersPective^"dproPosalsfor US economic aid, p 68 
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higher than that of the previous years (Table 15). But it is not known whether those 
targets were really reached. 
The number of all estates and of the total acreage of planted areas also diminished, 
as is shown in Tables 17-19. In 1961 there were 1,125 estates with a total planted 
area of 852,000 ha, as against 2,395 estates with 1,171,000 ha in 1938. The quantity 
of estate products strongly declined between 1940 and 1962 (see Table 20); its value 
declined from 43 % of the total export in 1940 to 25 % in 1962 (see Table 21).30 
Table 12. Area occupied by estates under various landrights in Java and the Outer Provinces, 
1875-1937, in 1000 ha. 
Java:1 
long-term lease from princes 
in the' Vorstenlanden' 
short lease from local farmers 
long-term lease from State domain 
government estates 
total 
Outer Provinces: 
agricultural concessions 
long-term lease from State domain 
total 
Total 
1875 
230.0 
10.0 
23.6 
0.6 
264.2 
39.7 
0.5 
40.2 
304.4 
1890 
249.4 
75.2 
264.0 
1.0 
589.6 
343.0 
52.3 
395.3 
984.9 
1905 
234.1 
120.0 
544.0 
1.8 
899.9 
546.8 
223.9 
770.7 
1670.6 
1920 
224.5 
208.8 
660.5 
14.9 
1108.7 
1146.5 
877.1 
2023.6 
3132.3 
1927 
75.0 
226.8 
662.6 
15.8 
980.2 
1344.0 
1106.7 
2450.7 
3430.9 
1935 
51.6 
52.0 
609.4 
18.0 
731.0 
1124.6 
720.7 
1845.3 
2576.3 
1937 
60.4 
93.9 
595.8 
20.5 
770.6 
1063.6 
600.8 
1664.4 
2435.0 
1
 Excluding the so-called 'particuliere landerijen' (large private estates). 
Source: see footnote 14. 
Table 13. Number of estates and planted areas in Indonesia (1938). 
Number of 
Java 
Sumatra 
Borneo 
Celebes 
Moluccas 
Lesser Sundalsls. 
Indonesia 
estates 
1,187 
607 
200 
220 
149 
39 
2,402 
Total area 
in ha 
1.079.2021 
1,249,850 
61.794 
42,991 
36,742 
14,795 
2,485,104 
Average size 
in ha 
909 
2,509 
309 
195 
245 
379 
1,035 
Total area 
planted in ha 
597,865 
515,887 
17,813 
21,796 
14,441 
3,119 
1,170,891 
Average size 
of planted 
area per 
estate in ha 
504 
850 
89 
99 
97 
80 
487 
Average per-
centage 
planted of 
total area 
55.4 
41.3 
28.8 
50.7 
39.5 
21.1 
47.1 
* Including the so-called 'particuliere landerijen* (large private estates). 
Source: C. J. J. VAN HAL and C. VAN DE KOPPEL. De landbouw in den Indischen Archipel, Vol. 1 
(1946) 392. 
1
 See Bull. Indon. Econ. Studies 5,1966 and 6,1967. 
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Table 14. Percentage of estates' and smallholders'' production in the total agricultural export of Indone-
sia, 1894-1939. 
1894 
1902 
1906 
1910 
1917 
1921 
1925 
1927 
1929 
1932 
1934 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
Java and Madura 
estate 
94.3 
90.4 
90.2 
84.2 
91.6 
88.8 
86.1 
88.2 
82.3 
77.1 
79.9 
73.2 
75.4 
76.9 
82.4 
small-
holders 
5.7 
9.6 
9.8 
15.8 
8.4 
11.2 
13.9 
11.8 
17.7 
22.9 
20.1 
26.8 
24.6 
23.1 
17.6 
Outer Provinces 
estate 
67.7 
48.7 
43.5 
30.0 
62.4 
56.4 
40.6 
46.8 
41.0 
48.0 
51.2 
56.0 
42.8 
48.0 
45.5 
small-
holders 
32.3 
51.3 
56.5 
70.0 
37.6 
43.6 
59.4 
53.2 
59.0 
52.0 
48.8 
44.0 
57.2 
52.0 
54.5 
Indonesia 
estate 
89.1 
79.7 
79.7 
72.7 
83.1 
79.4 
63.3 
68.7 
63.5 
64.2 
64.7 
63.3 
54.2 
60.3 
62.6 
small-
holders 
10.9 
20.3 
20.3 
27.3 
16.9 
20.6 
36.7 
31.3 
36.5 
35.8 
35.3 
36.7 
45.8 
39.7 
37.4 
Source: see footnote 14. 
Table 15. Production of main estate crops in Indonesia, in 1QQQ
 metric tons> m8-1940, 1958-1966. 
46 
68 
Cane sugar8 
Hevea rubber 
Coffee 
Tea 
Oilpalm products 275 
Tobacco 35 
Hard fibres 33 
Cinchona bark 11 
Cocoa 2 
1938 1939 1940 
1400 1576 1607 
175 198 283 
58 
71 
297 
35 
36 
12 
2 
39 
69 
260 
21 
39 
16 
2 
1958 
771 
243 
13 
49 
183 
6 
28 
4 
1 
1959 
855 
224 
19 
44 
171 
7 
23 
4 
1 
1960 
672 
219 
18 
46 
174 
7 
20 
4 
1 
1961 
651 
229 
19 
43 
180 
8 
17 
3 
1 
1962 
585 
217 
12 
47 
174 
8 
9 
2 
1 
1963 
650 
216 
18 
39 
181 
10 
4 
2 
1 
1964 
649 
213 
7 
46 
195 
7 
4 
_ 
-
196519661 
790 825 
213 211 
14 21 
48 48 
189 220 
5 
— — 
-
1
 Targets. • Including peasant cane processed by the factories 
™moZal mdPlanted °real °feState* <•" Citation, Indonesia, 1938-1940 and 1957-1961 
Total area 
Planted area 
Hired from principalities 
1938 1939 
2485.1 
1170.9 
45.2 
1940 
2495.8 2491.4 
1206.1 1197.7 
48.1 42.5 
1957 1958 
1818.9 1803.3 
841.8 826.9 
3.7 4.1 
1
 Including 'hired from principalities'. 
1
 For the year 1961 in accordance with the Agrarian law no. 5,1960. 
Source: Statisticalpocketbook of Indonesia 1963, pp. 80-81. 
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1959 
1700.4 
828.7 
4.1 
1960 19612 
1704.3 1723.8 
841.8 851.6 
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Table 18. Total and planted area of estates in exploitation in different regions, 1961 ( X 1000 ha). 
Java and Madura 
Sumatra 
Borneo 
Celebes 
Moluccas and West Irian 
Lesser Sunda Islands 
Source: 
Table 19. Number 
Sugarcane 
Hevea rubber 
Coffee 
Tea 
Cinchona 
Coca 
Oilpalm 
Fibre crops 
Tobacco 
Ficus rubber 
Gutta percha 
Coconutpalm 
Kapok 
Pepper 
Cocoa 
Nutmeg 
Essential oils 
Cassava 
Total 
X T _ i -
Total area 
626.7 
1030.3 
35.6 
11.9 
8.9 
10.9 
Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, pp. 80-81 
of estates in exploitation in Indonesia, by crops, 
1938 
97 
1202 
401 
337 
107 
38 
60 
(44) 
87 
70 
3 
665 
211 
43 
52 
34 
103 
(28) 
2402 
1939 
102 
1119 
377 
337 
110 
37 
66 
(36) 
88 
68 
3 
680 
206 
38 
50 
32 
88 
(35) 
2401 
1940 
100 
1221 
369 
338 
108 
39 
64 
(33) 
78 
69 
3 
684 
208 
39 
50 
35 
93 
(40) 
2395 
1958 
54 
746 
174 
168 
51 
49 
49 
8 
39 
4 
1 
111 
46 
8 
13 
13 
4 
2 
1541 
Planted area 
385.5 
438.8 
10.9 
8.3 
5.7 
2.4 
1938-1940 and 1958-1962. 
1959 
54 
742 
175 
161 
51 
44 
50 
7 
40 
4 
1 
114 
48 
8 
13 
12 
5 
2 
1135 
1960 
53 
746 
172 
161 
44 
41 
49 
9 
41 
2 
1 
122 
51 
9 
11 
12 
3 
3 
1146 
1961 
54 
730 
158 
142 
34 
30 
47 
7 
36 
0 
1 
112 
42 
7 
11 
7 
2 
3 
1125 
1962 
54 
732 
153 
148 
32 
29 
46 
6 
-
N
°
t eS :
 & 1 £ K E £ L « » » «"»« ^ ° - * the Total; numbers between 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 82. 
Table 20. Export from Indonesia by main economic
 grouPs in million kgs, 1938-1940 and 1958-1962. 
Estate products Farm products Mineral products 
1938 2 1571 
: : So0 
1940 , W « 1,287-° 7-468-3 ^ • O 1,021.0 7,690.8 
lilt uli 778-3 15,284.5 
1960 5897 I , 0 5 8 > ° 12>179-0 
1961 '
 5 9 5 '4
 953
-
4
 14.291.8 
1962 <;-'„ 1 '153-7 15,964.5 565.0 
Source: Statisticalpocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 133. 
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Reconstruction is proceeding slowly and with difficulty. As has been said before, 
estates' export earnings failed to expand or even to maintain their output after the 
war. This failure can be attributed to a number of factors. 
From the outbreak of World War II until 1957, the position of the foreign-owned 
enterprises was increasingly uncertain and the re-investment program sharply di-
minished. Another problem was that during the Japanese occupation, from 1942-
1945, large areas of estate lands were given to the peasants. Especially on the east-
coast of Sumatra, which was a rice-importing region before the war, the Japanese 
encouraged the local population to grow food. Another factor was the Indonesian 
government's reluctance to remove squatters from the state plantations. Furthermore 
it did not undertake vigourously the rehabilitation program for rubber and other 
estate crop, after taking over the foreign estates. Difficulties in developing adequate 
management and administration were another important factor. When most of the 
Dutch experts departed in 1958, less experienced Indonesians had to carry on, whereas 
labour troubles and rising costs impaired the reconstruction of the estates. 
The export figures of estate crops might have been considerably higher if the foreign 
exchange earnings had included losses due to smuggling and underinvoicing. The 
falling rupiah earnings in the legitimate export trade and the burden of uncertainty 
from chronic inflation resulted in loss of confidence in the rupiah which, in turn, led 
to an increase in these disagreeable practices. This situation will continue so long as 
there is no basic financial reform to check inflation. 
The crops found primarily in estates of the 1960's (oilpalm products, cinchona, 
cocoa, hard fibre, tea and sugar) were also primarily estate crops during the 1930's. 
With regard to the present estate crops, the most important change in recent years has 
been the sharp decline in export of centrifugal sugar, which reflects curtailed planting 
and destruction of factories during the Japanese occupation and thereafter.31 The 
problem of sugar will be dealt with in Chapters 4 and 8. 
3.2.2 Peasant agriculture 
On peasants' non-food crops only figures for the period after 1957 are available. 
Before the war the area under peasants' rubber was estimated at 1,200,000 ha; it has 
increased to 1,300, 000 ha at the present time. 
For the crops other than rubber, the total harvested area increased from 2,400,000 
ha in 1957 to 2,501,000 ha in 1961, an increase of 4%. The greater part of these farm 
lands is cultivated with coconut: in 1961 about 1,666,000 ha (see Tables 22 and 23). 
The development of the production of peasants' non-food crops can be seen in 
Table 24: rubber and tea production show a continuous increase, while the production 
of other crops fluctuates from year to year. 
5 ^ 7 o S X ! * ' SmaUh0!der * tIOpical expor t CT°P Production, Food Research Institute 
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The main peasant export crops are rubber and copra, while sugar, tobacco, tea, 
cassava, pepper and kapok are relatively minor export products. Since the crops other 
than rubber, copra and pepper are primarily Javanese crops, they will be dealt with in 
Chapter 4, in the Javanese situation. The development of rubber, copra and pepper 
are as follows. 
Rubber. After 1950, peasants' production has expanded relatively more than before 
World War II, because government policy generally favoured the smallholder above 
further development of the estate agricultural system. 
The development of smallholders' rubber export after the war is shown by Table 25. 
The main production areas of peasants' rubber are West Borneo, South and East 
Borneo, Palembang, East Sumatra, Djambi, Tapanuli and Lampung. Their relative 
importance can be seen in Table 26. 
The rapid expansion of peasant rubber was possible because a large part of the 
peasant acreage was tapped practically without recourse to outside labour. Such is the 
case in Palembang and West Borneo. But even where tapping is done by hired labour, 
as in the case of Djambi, it is generally carried out on some kind of share basis, in-
volving hardly any cash expenditure. Only the purchase of coagulants, the hire of 
a mangle and local transport to the market involve small cash costs. The owner of the 
larger smallholdings frequently has to rely on outside labour, but because it is only 
used for tapping (again often on a share basis), his cultivation and overhead costs 
remain small. 
This low cost and, as indicated earlier, the flexibility to return to growing his own 
food when rubber prices are low, are the main reasons why peasant rubber is more 
suited to respond to the fluctuating world demand of natural rubber in the postwar 
period. However, this low production cost is partly counterbalanced by the relatively 
low yield. Between 1952-1959, dry rubber output of peasants varied between 320 and 
395 kg per ha as against 538 to 755 kg per ha for estates. In addition, smallholders' 
rubber is generally of a lower quality.32 
The export figures show the growing importance of the peasant rubber and the 
lead over estate production. The peasants' proportion increased from 40% in 1920 to 
49% in 1939. In 1949, it had increased to 60%, to 63% in 1957 and to 70% in 1962. 
The year 1965, however, showed a decline to 60 %.33 Although the export of peasants' 
rubber had developed rapidly after World War II, there are strong indications that its 
future position as the main foreign exchange earner will be threatened. This is based 
on the high proportion of overaged trees. Though exact data on the age distribution 
3S
 See footnote 27, p. 69. 
83
 WICKIZER, op. cit. {fn. 31). For the figures till 1957 and for 1962: Statistik konjunktur 1963, p. 47. 
Rubber production and exports are of major importance to the Indonesian economy. In the period 
1950-1958 rubber has contributed between 30 to 50% of the total value of its exports as can be seen 
from Tables 27 and 28. Exports of estate products including rubber averages 65 % as compared with 
1938, excluding rubber only 41 %. More striking is the case of peasant crops; included rubber it is, 
compared with 1938,182%,andonly57%ifrubberisexcluded. 
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of peasant rubber trees are not available, a study based on an intensive field survey 
estimated that from 50 to 60 percent of smallholders' planting are no longer produc-
tive or produce so little as to be uneconomic except when rubber prices are high.34 The 
replanted acreage with high yielding trees has not been satisfactory to offset the 
declining production per hectare. Between 1959-1961 probably no more than 3% of 
the 1959 stock of smallholders' acreage was replanted; thus replanting is not suffi-
cient.35 This means that in rubber Indonesia has been living of prewar capital and is 
now in a vulnerable position. On the one hand it must do much planting to restore its 
capital, but, on the other hand, supplementation in sufficient quantities involves a 
further loss of export earnings for several years in the future. 
In addition, Malaysia, Indonesia's main competitor in natural rubber export, is 
successfully developing and planting new high yielding trees, which produce two to 
four times as much rubber per hectare.36 And at the same time synthetic rubber 
threatens to become an almost full substitute for natural rubber, and competition 
between natural and synthetic intensifies. 
Copra. The development of copra, another main peasants' export product in Indone-
sia, shows an other picture. Area and production have been more or less stable 
since 1957 as can be seen from Tables 22 and 23. But exports in 1962 dropped con-
siderably compared with the prewar figures (Table 29). This is primarily caused by an 
increase in domestic consumption: Java, before the war an exporter of this product, 
has now to import it from the Outer Islands. 
As illustrated in the figures from 1953 to 1961, copra purchased in eastern Indone-
sia, which up to 1958 was the main region and source of copra purchased by the Induk 
Koperasi Kopra Indonesia (IKKI, the Central Copra Cooperative) for export and 
domestic consumption, turned out to decline in 1958 and 1959. However, Borneo and 
other regions were growing in importance during those years (see Table 30). 
The decline, experienced by Eastern Indonesia throughout 1958, was caused by the 
revolt of the Permesta37 in Northern Celebes and also by transportation difficulties. 
In 1960-1961, after the Permesta uprising was more or less suppressed, there was 
again an increase in the export of copra from this region. In 1962 it dropped again, 
caused by more intensive smuggling (see Table 29). 
Due to all these difficulties, the short-run prospects of exports of smallholders' 
copra are declining; the long-term outlook is even bleaker, owing to overaging trees 
and insufficient replanting. Thus Indonesia is not replacing its prewar investments in 
copra too. 
Pepper. Before the war, Indonesia was the leading supplier of the world pepper market. 
Table 31 shows the decrease of the export in the postwar period. 
** US GOVERNMENT, op. cit. (fn. 27), p. 70. 
»/«</., p. 71. 
"/tod., p. 67. 
" 'Permesta' is a primarily religious group that came in revolt to the Central Government. 
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Table 22. Planted area of principal commercial farm crops, excl. rubber, Ind., 1957-1961 (x 1.000 ha).1 
Coconuts 
Coffee 
Tea 
Kapok 
Arecanuts 
Pepper 
Cloves 
Nutmeg 
Sugarcane2 
Tobacco2 
Total 
1957 
1597.1 
192.4 
60.1 
212.4 
54.9 
27.5 
29.2 
9.5 
38.0 
180.7 
2401.8 
1958 
1651.2 
198.9 
60.1 
220.1 
55.5 
33.4 
29.3 
9.0 
43.3 
178.3 
2479.1 
1959 
1561.3 
208.9 
62.9 
172.9 
53.6 
34.3 
35.3 
9.8 
43.3 
132.5 
2314.8 
1960 
1649.3 
230.8 
64.3 
138.5 
59.4 
33.7 
36.6 
10.4 
35.8 
129.0 
2387.8 
1961 
1665.9 
240.2 
64.4 
146.1 
60.0 
34.7 
43.2 
12.0 
34.6 
196.1 
2497.2 
1
 Total planted area refers to the area at the end of the year. 
8
 Harvested area. 
Source: Statisticalpocketbook of Indonesia 1963. pp. 74-77. 
Table 23. Production of principal commercial farm crops, exclusive rubber, Indonesia (1000 tons of dry 
product) (1957-1961) 
Coconuts 
Coffee 
Green tea 
Kapok 
Arecanuts 
Pepper 
Clovers 
Nutmeg 
Brown sugar 
Tobacco 
1957 
1092.8 
60.0 
22.3 
29.0 
40.5 
22.0 
5.1 
7.4 
263.8 
68.5 
1958 
1077.8 
54.1 
23.7 
28.8 
12.0 
16.8 
3.8 
4.1 
285.6 
61.0 
1959 
1169.4 
65.3 
32.1 
25.8 
41.2 
14.1 
4.7 
4.0 
283.2 
49.1 
1960 
12391 
77.6 
37.4 
20.8 
45.0 
12.2 
6.0 
5.2 
255.4 
691 
1961 
13611 
891 
37.7 
20.2 
46.6 
13.7 
7.1 
5.8 
3051 
75.9 
1
 Corrected data, supplied by the Ministry of Finance. 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963. pp. 74-77. 
The fall in pepper exports is primarily caused by smaller production. The rehabilita-
tion of white pepper, which is grown in Bangka, has not been satisfactory. Only a 
small percentage of the prewar area has been put back into production.38 Neither 
is the development of black pepper, which is grown in the Lampung area, very 
encouraging. Production has fallen through neglect, and exports have decreased 
because of transportation difficulties and high costs of marketing.39 
38
 Before World War II, white pepper was chiefly grown by Chinese farmers. During the war the 
fields were damaged and they were not fully restored thereafter, as many Chinese left the island. 
89
 Based on the author's observations in the pepper area after World War II. 
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Table 24. Main peasants' non-food production in Indonesia in 1000 metric tons, 1960-1966. 
Rubber 
Copra 
Sugarcane 
Tea 
Coffee 
Tobacco 
1960 
403 
1239 
255 
37 
78 
69 
1961 
476 
1361 
305 
37 
89 
76 
1962 
496 
1387 
184 
37 
99 
72 
1963 
490 
1379 
176 
39 
127 
81 
1964 
510 
1193 
438 
41 
80 
52 
1965 
510 
1249 
414 
42 
91 
72 
19661 
536 
1350 
433 
42 
107 
111 
1
 Targets. 
Source: Data supplied by the Ministry of Finance. 
Table. 25. Export of'smallholders''rubberfrom Indonesia, 1953-1959. 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
Export in 
1000 tons 
395.3 
495.8 
476.7 
429.3 
418.2 
377.7 
485.3 
Value in 
million US $ 
133.9 
166.4 
259.7 
206.2 
203.6 
153.2 
275.9 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
Export in 
1000 tons 
387.8 
443.8 
482.3 
-
-
_ 
Value in 
million U S 
243.2 
184.6 
196.9 
147.4 
135.2 
135.4 
Source: For the Quantities: Statistik Koniunktur, monthly survey November/December 1962, 
p. 47. For the values: Warta Biro Pusat Statistik 1 (7), December 1966, Table 8. 
Table 26. Exports of smallholders' rubber from the main production areas in Indonesia (in metric tons 
of dry rubber), 1938 and 1955-1959. 
West Borneo 
South and East Borneo 
Palembang 
East Sumatra 
Djambi 
Tapanuli 
Lampung 
Other areas 
Total reported exports 
1938 
30,354 
27,390 
23,964 
20,280 
22,206 
4,044 
5 
18,353 
146,596 
1955 
77,895 
69,627 
84,950 
58,243 
57,244 
6,077 
15,288 
95,922 
464,876 
1956 
74,168 
52,664 
77,645 
53,705 
56,283 
9,254 
28,794 
60,833 
413,346 
1957 
84,853 
62,698 
59,247 
52,881 
43,876 
8,248 
29,306 
66,047 
407,156 
1958 
82,523 
61,275 
51,767 
54,731 
35,237 
5,823 
22,216 
55,419 
368,991 
1959 
74,671 
66,954 
96,496 
64,863 
55,791 
10,366 
35,784 
69,703 
474,628 
Note: There is a discrepancy between the figures given above and those in Table 25 due to the 
fact that Table 26 reports only the exports reported to the bank. 
Sources: Report of the Bank Indonesia 1958-1959. p. 185 and 1959-1960, p. 158. After 1959 the 
publication of this bank was suspended. 
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Table 27. Production index numbers1 of principal export products, Indonesia, 1958-1961 (1938 = 100). 
Estate products 
rubber 
tea 
palm oil 
coffee 
cinchona bark 
hard fibres 
cane sugar 
tapioca flour 
tobacco leaves 
tobacco, cut 
weighed average 
(including rubber) 
weighed average 
(excluding rubber) 
Farm products2 
rubber 
coffee 
tapioca flour 
copra 
pepper 
weighed average 
(incl. rubber) 
weighed average 
(excl. rubber) 
Mining products 
crude petroleum 
tin 
bauxite 
coal 
average 
General average 
(incl. rubber) 
General average 
(excl. rubber) 
1958 
140 
60 
65 
28 
37 
30 
55 
-
17 
9 
72 
47 
252 
60 
-
24 
23 
147 
29 
218 
85 
140 
41 
185 
124 
108 
1959 
130 
55 
61 
42 
37 
24 
61 
-
15 
20 
69 
48 
325 
82 
1 
25 
53 
185 
38 
246 
79 
58 
44 
206 
137 
118 
1960 
125 
57 
62 
40 
33 
21 
48 
6 
18 
16 
65 
43 
258 
91 
-
31 
23 
155 
38 
278 
83 
161 
45 
231 
139 
128 
1961 
131 
54 
64 
41 
26 
18 
46 
-
18 
12 
65 
41 
293 
150 
-
44 
34 
182 
57 
288 
68 
171 
38 
236 
145 
131 
1
 Based on LASPEYRES formula. 
* Products for export. The export data indicate the progress of production. 
Source: Statistik Konjunktur Nov.lDec. 1962, p. 11. 
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Table 28. Shares of the principal products in the export of Indonesia, 1928,1938 and 1950-1958. 
1928 
1938 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
Rubber 
17.6 
22.6 
41.8 
51.9 
46.0 
33.0 
30.9 
46.0 
40.3 
36.0 
34.6 
Copra 
6.8 
5.7 
7.7 
10.2 
5.6 
6.9 
6.7 
4.6 
4.4 
4.4 
2.2 
Tea 
6.2 
8.3 
3.7 
2.9 
2.6 
2.9 
4.6 
3.3 
3.4 
3.1 
3.3 
Tobacco 
6.1 
3.9 
2.9 
2.2 
1.9 
2.9 
3.8 
3.0 
3.3 
3.5 
4.0 
Palm oil 
+ kernels 
0 
2.8 
3.4 
3.0 
3.3 
4.1 
3.6 
2.9 
3.4 
3.1 
3.6 
Sugar 
23.8 
6.5 
0 
0 
0 
1.2 
2.6 
2.0 
1.9 
1.8 
1.2 
Other ex-
port pro-
ducts 
39.5 
50.2 
40.5 
29.8 
40.6 
49.0 
47.8 
38.2 
43.3 
48.1 
51.1 
Source: B. NAPITUPULU, Die Probleme der indonesischen Aussenwirtschaft seit 1950, Hamburg, 
1962, p. 103. 
Table 29. Export of copra from Indonesia, 1938 and 1954-1965. 
1938 
Quantity in Value in 
1000 tons million US 5 
556.5 21.3 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
298.1 
234.4 
260.4 
297.4 
116.9 
51.4 
35.4 
39.2 
40.5 
18.2 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
Quantity in 
1000 tons 
131.2 
107.4 
156.6 
76.0 
-
-
-
Value in 
million US 
27.6 
29.1 
34.7 
14.8 
13.6 
23.5 
17.9 
Source: Compiled from several publications. 
Table 30. Copra purchased by the Copra Foundation in Indonesia (in 1000 tons net), 1953-1961. 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
East Indonesia 
406.0 
351.8 
309.7 
281.3 
107.3 
3.9 
1.5 
236.9 
237.2 
West Borneo 
55.3 
50.0 
56.1 . , 
44.2 
19.2 
43.7 
37.5 
32.0 
23.9 
Other Areas 
_ 
_. 
_ 
13.6 
7.4 
55.0 
66.3 
16.7 
8.7 
Total 
461.3 
401.8 
365.8 
339.1 
139.3 
102.6 
105.3 
285.6 
269.8 
Source: Compiled from several publications. 
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Table 31. Export of pepper from Indonesia, 1938 and 1954-1962. 
1938 
Net weight 
in 1000 tons 
54.5 
Value in 
million US ) 
4.7 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
12.9 
13.7 
19.4 
17.7 
12.7 
10.4 
8.9 
8.3 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Net weight 
in 1000 me-
tric tons 
12.6 
29.3 
12.7 
19.1 
11.0 
Value in 
million U S 
5.0 
12.1 
10.5 
15.0 
6.6 
Sources: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1941, p. 82, and Statistik Koniunktur Nov./Dec. 
1962, p. 47 and p. 51. 
Table 32. Harvested areas of most important food crops in Indonesia in 1000 ha1, averages for 1953/ 
1962, and years 1960-1963. 
Paddy 
Maize 
Cassava 
Sweet potatoes 
Peanuts 
Soybeans 
Total 
1953/1962 
6,872 
2,412 
1,207 
382 
338 
560 
11,771 
1960 
7,285 
2,640 
1,417 
394 
377 
651 
12,764 
1961 
6,858 
2,462 
1,478 
366 
365 
625 
12,154 
1962 
7,283 
3,175 
1,449 
544 
372 
594 
12,417 
1963 
6,727 
2,534 
1,559 
444 
348 
540 
12,152 
1
 No data available after 1963. 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Production of principal foodstuffs in Indonesia, 1963, pp. 1-
Table 33. Harvested areas of most important food crops in Indonesia, 1953-1962 (in 1000 ha). 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Irrigated 
paddy + 
gogoran-
tjah 
5380 
5469 
5517 
5701 
5748 
5914 
5936 
5975 
5534 
-
Non-irri-
gated 
paddy 
1085 
1144 
1053 
1001 
1050 
1076 
1217 
1310 
1273 
-
Total 
paddy 
6465 
6613 
6570 
6702 
6798 
6990 
7153 
7285 
6858 
7283 
Maize 
1969 
2518 
2042 
2232 
2087 
2702 
2290 
2640 
2462 
3175 
Cassave 
1042 
1071 
1077 
1125 
1221 
1341 
1456 
1417 
1478 
1449 
Sweet 
potatoes 
325 
285 
279 
384 
404 
449 
394 
393 
366 
544 
Peanuts 
292 
324 
298 
317 
341 
331 
364 
377 
365 
372 
Soy-
beans 
457 
525 
515 
502 
525 
594 
612 
651 
625 
594 
Sources: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 69; for 1962: Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Production of principal foodstuffs in Indonesia, 1963, pp. 1-8. 
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Table 34. Production of most important food crops in Indonesia in 1000 tons; average for 1953j 1962, 
and the period1960-1966. 
Milled rice* 
Maize kernels 
Cassava roots 
Sweet potatoes 
Shelled peanuts 
Shelled soybeans 
Average 
1953/1962 
8,009 
2,012 
9,477 
2,296 
213 
351 
1
 Preliminary figures. 
* Targets. 
1960 
8,430 
2,460 
11,376 
2,669 
256 
442 
• Ratio of dry stalk paddy: clean rice = 
1961 
7,950 
2,283 
11,190 
2,464 
252 
426 
100:52. 
1962 
8,556 
3,243 
11,386 
3,680 
261 
397 
1963 
7,628 
2,359 
11,575 
3,015 
231 
353 
1964 
8,896 
3,769 
12,223 
3,931 
261 
392 
1965* 
9,800 
2,283 
11,274 
2,724 
279 
356 
1966s 
9,986 
3,005 
10,845 
2,309 
293 
353 
Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics. Production of principal foodstuff's in Indonesia, 1963, 
pp. 1-8 for average 1953/1962; for 1960-1966: data supplied by Indonesian authorities. 
Table 35. Production of most important food crops in Indonesia, 1953-1962 (in 1000 tons). 
Irrigated Non-irri- Total Maize Cassava Sweet Peanuts Soy-
paddy + gated paddy1 (shelled) (fresh potatoes (shelled) beans 
gogoran- paddy1
 r o o t s ) ( f r e s h ( s h e l l e d ) 
ti^1 roots) 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
i 
12,655 
13,342 
12,985 
13,308 
13,242 
13,881 
14,228 
14,876 
13,935 
14,855 
1,409 
1,719 
1,447 
1,311 
1,435 
1,463 
1,722 
1,984 
1,965 
2,256 
1
 Dry stalk paddy. 
14,064 
15,061 
14,432 
14,619 
14,677 
15,344 
15,950 
16,860 
15,900 
17,212 
1,815 
2,720 
1,971 
1,965 
1,860 
2,634 
2,092 
2,460 
2,283 
3,243 
8,953 
9,569 
9,317 
9,131 
10,118 
11,278 
12,697 
11,376 
11,190 
11,386 
2,176 
2,111 
1,898 
2,638 
2,653 
3,103 
2,877 
2,670 
2,464 
3,680 
204 
248 
207 
218 
232 
232 
256 
256 
252 
261 
306 
400 
346 
357 
339-
418 
431 
443 
426 
397 
Sources: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 71; for 1962: Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Production of principal foodstuffs in Indonesia, 1963, pp. 1-8. 
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Table 36. Average yield of most important food crops in Indonesia, in 100 kg per ha, for the period 
1953J1962 (average) and the years 1960-1963. 
Paddy 
Maize 
Cassava 
Sweet potatoes 
Peanuts 
Soybeans 
Average 
1953/62 
22.41 
8.34 
75 
60 
6.30 
6.26 
1960 
23.14 
9.32 
80 
68 
6.79 
6.80 
1961 
23.19 
9.27 
76 
67 
6.91 
6.82 
1962 
23.50 
10.21 
79 
68 
6.99 
6.68 
1963 
22.68 
9.31 
74 
68 
6.63 
6.53 
Source: Central Bureau ofstatistics, Production ofprincipal foodstuffs in Indonesia, 1963,pp. 1-8. 
Table 37. Harvested areas (in 1000 ha) of principal farm food crops in different regions, 1962. 
Java and Madura 
Sumatra 
Borneo 
Celebes 
Moluccas/West Irian 
Lesser Sunda Islands 
Irrigated 
paddy + 
gogoran-
tjah 
3707 
933 
403 
498 
-
313 
Non-irri-
gated 
paddy 
384 
507 
258 
134 
7 
132 
Total 
paddy 
4091 
1440 
661 
632 
7 
445 
Maize 
2352 
85 
19 
398 
8 
281 
Cassava Sweet 
1136 
80 
33 
78 
9 
71 
pota-
toes 
350 
49 
5 
40 
9 
94 
Pea-
nuts 
293 
24 
2 
26 
2 
24 
Soy-
beans 
514 
21 
3 
8 
-
48 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 69. 
Table 38. Production of principal farm food crops in different regions, 1962 (in million kg). 
Java and Madura 
Sumatra 
Borneo 
Celebes 
Moluccas/West Irian 
Lesser Sunda Islands 
Irrigated 
paddy + 
gogoran-
tjah1 
9305 
2954 
709 
1241 
-
838 
Non irri-
gated 
paddy1 
695 
847 
287 
209 
5 
123 
Total 
paddy1 
10000 
3801 
996 
1451 
5 
961 
Maize 
(shel-
led) 
2450 
84 
14 
397 
7 
249 
Cassava Sweet Pea-
(fresh 
roots) 
8120 
1170 
333 
631 
90 
630 
pota-
toes 
(fresh 
roots) 
2000 
603 
29 
245 
31 
830 
nuts 
(shel-
led) 
202 
15 
2 
18 
1 
20 
Soy-
beans 
(shel-
led) 
337 
17 
2 
4 
-
36 
1
 Dry stalk paddy. 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 71. 
35 
- 1 
1 
o 3 
- 5. 
3 .2 
o e 
— ect 
O 9 
•a 
ct] 
u 
C M 
o 
4-* 
o  u 
•o 
a 
a 
flS o »c 
:> +- co 5 n! <L> 
» * ; > j 
§ ° n 
« P 2 
r - t > w . " * 9 
r e TJ- ^ . ~. t~: 
^ ^ • * • * " > 
(T) V > *"^ ^ ^ 
es (-4 tN <N r4 
r^ oo » w t o \ 
vo \ 6 ^o ^o ^ 
<t t f H I s , 
n r f ^ N M 
N r i N N m 
NO o »H r- „ 
« O 
05 *-* 
o 
o 
60 
a 
'5 o CO 
^' ON !C 0J » 
00
 "^  rt * ^ 
00 "A " I t ^ CJ 
r t t s o i n i o 
ON r f -^ l* - ^ od 
co QO oo t ^ h 
cN v\ cN oo p 
f ! ) oo i > P o> 
« h • " < t • » S >0 ^O * w * 
t—I T- | ,—< •—I , - ( *—I »—< T—I T - < T-( 
CO 
O 
3 
• a 
o 
<n Os Y\ NO o> 
»> « S " > r-° 
m m < N f S m 
•O NO NO —1 * * 
3 
"3, 
60 
a 
o 
t n ON en Tt* ON 
VN ^ OO \ d t ^ 
m m cN cN m 
(X, - , „
 rt _ _ 
M
 ON NO r - • * _ 
2 t j y j oo T t -H " 
a 2 2 « " " 
£ 
1 
•I 
c3 
• ^ cd O u oo' r j r~" r--' o 
^ H T-t ^ o «N 
<s <n NO —< t -
ON c4 en en —! 
N M (N IN tn 
00 ( ^ NO o \ ON 
3 
•a 
o 
p p r^  oo o 
& ?i ti "> '-0' 
t N - H cN « (Nl 
N " A NO m h 
o \ H v i t n ^ 
N M N N n 
oo en ON t o m 
18 i£? a N •"* 
ON ON O ON ON &3 
Si 
I § s
y oo ON _ . . 
i n cr» NO NO NO 
ON ON ON ON ON 
O0 o O H N 
en en NO \ o NO 
ON ON ON ON ON 
3 
O 
05 
36 
Table 40. Imports of rice in Indonesia, 1938-1940 and 1958-1964. 
Gross weight in 
1000 tons 
1938 334 
1939 278 
1940 109 
1958 921 
1959 891 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
Gross weight in 
1000 tons 
966 
1,065 
1,064 
1,070 
9001 
1
 Estimate. 
Sources: From several publications. 
Food Crops. The development of the harvested area, production and average yield of 
the most important food crops can be seen in Tables 32-36. 
The total acreage of harvested area of the main food crops in Indonesia reached its 
peak in 1960 and afterward showed a declining trend. Further, the figures stress 
again the importance of the acreage devoted to rice production (in 1963 about 55 
percent of the total acreage). 
As can be seen from Tables 37 and 38, rice is grown practically everywhere in 
Indonesia. Corn is mostly grown in Java, Celebes and the eastern Lesser Sunda Islands. 
Cassava is primarily a Java crop as are sweet potatoes, peanuts and soybeans. Paddy, 
maize, cassava, sweet potatoes, soybeans and peanuts follow in importance in the 
order in which they are listed. 
Since 1960 the area under paddy has shown a fluctuating tendency due to the weath-
er conditions, and so has production. However, average production showed a diffe-
rent trend; it went up between 1960-1962, but dropped again in 1963. 
The area under maize reached its peak in 1962 (3,175,000 ha) but dropped again to 
2,534,000 ha in 1963, with corresponding declines in production (see Tables 32 and 
34). The development of the average production shows the same picture as that of 
rice, namely arise between 1960-1962 and a drop in 1963 (See Table 36). 
The increase of average production both of rice and maize is primarily caused by the 
intensification program of the government, especially in Java. This will be dealt more 
elaborately in Chapter 9. 
Regarding the consumption of the principal food crops, Table 39 gives the quantity 
available per capita. For each of the three important groups of food crops, cereals (rice 
and maize), root crops (cassava and sweet potatoes) and pulses (peanuts and soy-
beans), it also gives the proportion of the production consumed in Indonesia. As far 
as possible account has been taken of the growth of the population. It shows that 
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these foodstuffs supply an intake of about 1900 calories per day, which is about the 
average for a country in Asia and the Far East.40 
Further we can read from this table that domestic rice production is always smaller 
than consumption, indicating the need to import rice after World War II (Table 40). 
As far as maize, sweet potatoes, peanuts and soybeans are concerned, domestic 
production has just balanced the consumption per capita. For cassava roots, there is a 
tendency to consume more and more, so that there is less available for export (see 
further Chapter 4). 
The large imported quantities of rice after the war can also be seen in Table 40. As 
to their distribution, the 1959 JUBM (Jajasan Urusan Bahan Makanan, the Food 
Foundation) figures show that about 50% went to Java, namely: 
Java 469,000 tons Celebes 42,000 tons 
Sumatra 255,000 tons Moluccas + West Irian 27,000 tons 
Borneo 86,000 tons Bali + Lesser Sunda Islands 11,000 tons 
Since World War II Indonesia has become a large importer of food instead of a small 
exporter, as was the case in 1940. The main reason has been that Java, with her 
rapidly growing population, is having difficulties in feeding herself. Java, which before 
the war exported rice to the Outer Islands, has become a food importer (primarily 
corn, among others from South Celebes), despite its fertile soil. The people on this 
island are mainly engaged in labour intensive subsistence peasant farming, handicraft 
and small scale manufacturing industries for domestic consumption. Nevertheless 
textiles and other important consumer goods have to be imported, for which the 
Outer Islands earn the foreign exchange, as the main development of agricultural 
estates and labour extensive peasant agricultural exports occur there. Here also are 
the mines, most oil fields and some highly efficient large-scale industries. Yet only 
one-third of the total Indonesian population lives scattered through these enormous 
areas. 
It is small wonder that such discrepancy in economic conditions, stresses and 
strains occurs between Java and the Outer Provinces. Therefore, the central problem of 
agriculture in the scope of economic development for the whole of Indonesia should 
be focussed on Java. If a way could be found to get economic development in Java 
moving, the back of the problem for the whole of Indonesia would be broken. 
However, before we can suggest any practical solution, we should explore more 
thoroughly why and how this development has occured in Java. This will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
The development of agriculture in Java will be discussed in the same manner as that 
of the whole of Indonesia, i.e. by making a division between 'estate' and 'peasant 
agriculture'. 
«• Direktorat Pertanian Rakjat (Agricultural Extension Service), Sumber Hydrat Arang, 1964, p. 1. 
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4 Agricultural development in Java 
4.1 The period before World War II 
4.1.1 Estate agriculture 
Before 1870 agricultural production for export was practically confined to Java. The 
main products were coffee, sugar, indigo and tobacco. There were about hundred 
estates which leased their land from the government. Their average size was 200 to 
280 ha, mostly cultivated with coffee.41 In addition, there were 150 enterprises based 
on free lease agreements with village elders; these estates were mostly cultivated with 
sugar and tobacco. In the later part of the nineteenth century estates producing 
Assam tea, rubber, and cinchona were added.42 The development of the estates after 
1870 is illustrated by Table 41. 
In 1937 7% of the cultivated area of Java was under estates, which were planted 
with various crops as shown in Table 42.43 In that year, in terms of the area devoted to 
each product, rubber ranked first, followed by tea. The estates in the hills and moun-
tains ('bergcultures') had become less important than those on the lowlands. 
Up to 1930, sugar was the most important product, occupying some 60,000 per-
manent and more than 700,000 temporary workers. The economic crisis in 1930 
reduced the area from 200,000 ha to 32,000 ha whereas labour employed was only 
a fraction of the previous force.44 In 1940, though its area rose again to about 90,000 
ha, there appeared to be no prospect of the industry recovering its former impor-
tance.45 
The estates engaged in the cultivation of coffee, tea, cocoa, palmoil, cinchona and 
rubber obtained their land from the government. For sugarcane and tobacco a 
somewhat different arrangement was made.46 The planters rented the land from village 
communities "either by registered communal agreements accepted by two thirds of 
41
 PIM, op. cit. (fit. 9), p. 18. 
42
 ROBEQUAIN, op. cit. (fn. 9), p. 332. 
43
 Ibid., p. 331-332. 
44
 PIM, op. cit. (fn. 9), p. 25. 
45
 Ibid., p. 25, and Statisticalpocketbook of Indonesia 1941, p. 40. 
4
* GEERTZ, op. cit. (fit. 7), pp. 86-87. Generally estate sugar cane was grown on the most fertile and 
best irrigated soils and it is estimated that the estates occupied 20 to 25% of the sawahs, primarily 
located in the lowlands of Central and East Java. (See ROBEQUAIN, op. cit., fn. 9, p. 332). Tobacco 
plantations were based on a similar system, but the ripening of the crops takes only a few months. 
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the co-shares for periods up to 21 £ years at a rent fixed by the government on the 
basis of the land revenue, or by similar private agreements but with no security of 
tenure beyond two crops ahead (3J years)". The lessee could occupy at most one 
third of the village land at a time, the other two thirds being at the disposal of the 
peasants. All labourers needed for the estates could be secured from surrounding 
villages. 
In addition to the landless peasant who had to earn his living by wage work, there 
Table 41. Area of estates in Java and Madura1, in 1000 ha, 1875-1937. 
Year Area Year Area 
1875 
1890 
1905 
1920 
264.2 
589.6 
899.9 
1,108.7 
1927 
1935 
1937 
980.2 
731.0 
770.6 
1
 Exclusive large private estates ('particuliere landerijen'). 
Source: See footnote 14. 
Table 42. Planted area of estate agriculture by crops in Java and Madura, 1937.1 
Crop 
Rubber 
Tea 
Coffee 
Sugarcane 
Tobacco 
Kapok 
Cinchona 
Area in 1000 ha 
222.8 
103.6 
89.2 
82.4 
29.2 
22.8 
15.2 
Crop 
Coconut 
Cocoa 
Pepper 
Nutmeg 
Other crops 
Total 
Area in 1000 ha 
7.2 
6.0 
2.4 
1.6 
2.4 
584.8 
1
 Exclusive cassava and sisal. 
Source: C. ROBEQUAIN, (seefootnote9)pp. 331-332. 
Table 43. Export of agricultural products from estates and peasant farms in Java, in 
million guilders (1931-1940). 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
Estate 
production 
234 
165 
115 
123 
102 
Peasants' 
production 
56 
49 
38 
31 
31 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
Estate 
production 
112 
175 
140 
187 
193 
Peasants' 
production 
41 
57 
42 
39 
38 
Source: Statisticalpocketbook 1941, p. 
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were owner-cultivators with such small plots that they had to supplement their income 
by occasional outside work. It was estimated that one out of every four Javanese males 
depended on estate agriculture for at least part of his income.47 
In the decade just before World War II, some of the agricultural products could be 
accounted for by peasant-produced export crops, but Table 43 indicates that by far the 
major portion was still the result of estates' activity. Until the thirties sugar was the 
main export product.48 Even after the economic crisis, it still remained an important 
crop. The value of this product exported from Java in 1937 was only slightly lower 
than that of rubber.49 
In 1939, Java was still capable of supplying a considerable share in the world's 
needs for tropical products: 13 % of the world's tea, 7 % of its rubber, 5 % of its sugar 
and 91 % of its cinchona bark.50 
Large investments made in estate agriculture initiated a process of economic devel-
opment. Roads, railroads, irrigation works, and other overhead capital works were 
constructed.51 
Estates and sugar factories provided hundreds of thousands labourers with addi-
tional income. Thousands of farmers received a cash revenue from the rent of their 
land leased to sugar and tobacco estates. Yet this all did not basically transform the 
peasant agricultural economy in Java: it remained mainly a subsistence agriculture 
with additional cash income from the purchase of cash crops, surpluses of food crops 
and employment on estates, in factories and in trade. 
4.1.2 Peasant agriculture 
The total arable areas of peasant agriculture in the period 1900-1940 are given in 
Table 44. It shows that a separation can be made between sawah's (wet cultivation) 
and dry fields. 
Wet Cultivation (Sawah's). PELZER indicated that the first European irrigation 
system was laid down in Buitenzorg (now Bogor) during the regime of Governor 
General VAN IMHOFF (1743-1750).52 According to GEERTZ in 1833, 1,270,000 ha was 
being irrigated.53 However, the great expansion occurred between 1880-1940.54 
PELZER said that the first large project was built in the 1880's in the residency of 
47
 J. E. METCALF, The agricultural economy of Indonesia, Washington, 1952, p. 50. 
4 8
 GEERTZ, op. cit. (fit. 7), p. 86. 
4 9
 ROBEQUAIN, op. cit. (fit. 9), p. 332. 
60
 N. ZINKIN, Asia and the West, New York 1952, p. 133, and Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1941, 
p. 37. 
51
 After 1910 the construction of irrigation works by the government was mainly carried out in the 
non-sugar region of Java. The irrigation works established before 1910 were concentrated in the cane 
growing areas, often with financial assistance of the sugar companies. (Professor JOOSTEN, personal 
communication). 
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Semarang, where famines were frequent. Since then irrigation systems in Java have 
been steadily enlarged. At the end of 1938 the total wet-rice area of Java and Madura 
amounted to 3,368,000 ha. Of these, 1,204,000 ha were technically irrigated, an ad-
ditional 1,500,000 ha were cared for by peasants' works, and the remaining 664,000 ha 
depended upon rain-water.55 Since 1938 the total irrigated area has not increased very 
much. 
Exact data on the introduction of big irrigation projects are difficult to obtain. A 
modern technique is necessary to harness the large rivers, a feat for which the tradi-
tional skill of the peasant is quite inadequate. 
The expansion of the sawah area also resulted in an increase of the percentage of 
land being able to produce two crops a year; this double cropping causes the data in 
the last column of Table 45 to exceed 100%. Where sufficient water is available, the 
second crop is also rice. Otherwise crops such as maize, cassava, sweet potatoes and 
soybeans are cultivated during this season. 
Notwithstanding this expansion, and the additional application of better working 
methods and new crop varieties, the increase in production could not neutralize the 
rapid population growth in Java. 
After the rice harvest the sawah's are inundated, and in that way they serve to raise 
fish, highly important as a supplement to the diet which is generally poor in proteins. 
Small fresh water fish ponds are often an adjunct to the kampong (village) and. by 
keeping these ponds well stocked the villagers always have fresh fish on hand. 
Dry field cultivation. Just before World War II, 4,500,000 ha out of 7,900,000 ha of 
cultivated land of smallholders in Java was utilized for dry field cultivation. These 
dry fields are known as tegalan; corn, cassava, peanuts, soybeans and sweet potatoes 
are the principal food crops grown there.58 They include the compounds which make 
an important contribution to agricultural production because they contain a wide 
variety of fruits and vegetables such as beans, cucumbers, melons, bananas, papayas 
and mangoes. The acreage of such gardens in Java has been estimated at about 
1,300,000 ha57 They are also useful for raising chickens.58 
u
 K. J. PELZER, Pioneer settlements in the Asiatic tropics: Studies in land utilization and agricultural 
colonization in southeastern Asia, New York, 1948, p. 54. 
" GEERTZ, op. cit. (fn. 7), p. 34. 
64
 The increasing concern with the welfare of the peasants, beginning in 1880, caused that attention 
was directed towards the problem of irrigation works. The expansion of peasant agricultural land in 
Java and the distribution between irrigated and dry fields have already been illustrated in Table 44. 
58
 PELZER, op. cit. (fit. 52), p. 54. 
•• J. J. VAN HALL and C. VAN DE KOPPEL, De landbouw in de Indische Archipel, The Hague, 1946-50 
(3 volumes) Vol. I, p. 363. 
" Ibid., p. 364. 
68
 METCALF, op. cit. {fn. 47), p. 18. According to TERRA the diet of the Javanese family is more varied 
primarily by the extreme intensification of the compounds (see GEERTZ, op. cit. fn 7, p. 96). The 
increased variation in the diet after 1915 compensates the declining consumption of rice per capita. 
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Table 44. Arable land for peasants'1 agriculture in Java and Madura, in 1000 ha (1900 to 1940). 
1900 
1921 
1924 
1927 
1930 
Sawahs 
2,700 
3,136 
3,194 
3,222 
3,274 
Dry fields 
2,900 
3,793 
3,897 
4,243 
4,372 
Total 
5,600 
6,929 
7,091 
7,465 
7,646 
1931 
1933 
1937 
1940 
Sawahs 
3,288 
3,299 
3,363 
3,384 
Dry fields 
4,370 
4,404 
4,487 
4,544 
Total 
7,658 
7,703 
7,850 
7,928 
Source: A. JONKERS, (seefootnote 14) pp. 65-66. 
Table 45. Total arable and harvested area of farm crops in Java and Madura, 1931-1940. 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
Arable area 
in 1000 ha 
7,658 
7,685 
7,703 
7,726 
7,753 
7,799 
7,850 
7,871 
7,900 
7,928 
Total harvested area 
in 1000 ha 
7,687 
7,992 
8,311 
8,011 
8,404 
8,778 
8,703 
8,768 
8,939 
9,122 
Harvested area in % 
of arable area 
100.3 
103.9 
107.9 
103.6 
108.5 
112.5 
110.9 
111.4 
113.2 
115.2 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1941: pp. 36-37. 
Table 46. Harvested areas of farm crops in Java and Madura, (1930-1940) in 1000 ha. 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
Paddy 
and 
maize 
5,584 
5,475 
5,691 
5,982 
5,579 
5,871 
6,102 
5,936 
5,966 
6,058 
6,072 
Cassava 
and 
sweet 
potatoes 
929 
955 
989 
980 
1,051 
1,126 
1,210 
1,262 
1,262 
1,323 
1,393 
Soybeans 
and 
peanuts 
653 
612 
674 
725 
707 
737 
784 
799 
837 
862 
895 
Tobacco 
150 
172 
142 
130 
168 
147 
131 
150 
147 
139 
166 
Other 
crops 
496 
473 
496 
494 
506 
523 
551 
. 556 
• 556 
557 
596 
Total 
harvested 
area 
7,812 
7,687 
7,992 
8,311 
8,011 
8,404 
8,778 
8,703 
8,768 
8,939 
9,122 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1941, p. 37. 
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Table 47. Production of principal food crops in Java and Madura, (1931-1940) in 1000 tons. 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
Stalk paddy 
from 
sawahs 
6,483 
6,884 
7,007 
6,624 
7,226 
7,476 
7,447 
7,866 
7,915 
8,477 
from 
dry fields 
532 
543 
525 
462 
453 
509 
442 
477 
446 
492 
Maize 
(shelled) 
1,931 
1,902 
2,127 
1,720 
1,989 
2,220 
2,037 
1,926 
1,985 
1,900 
Cassava 
roots 
5,926 
6,222 
5,831 
5,793 
6,343 
7,481 
7,637 
8,149 
8,311 
8,415 
Sweet 
potatoes 
966 
958 
1,142 
1,069 
1,360 
1,317 
1,182 
1,206 
1,268 
1,418 
Peanuts 
(shelled) 
142 
161 
161 
149 
144 
167 
181 
202 
181 
197 
Soy-
beans 
(shelled) 
128 
149 
181 
175 
203 
247 
269 
288 
318 
294 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1941, p. 37. 
Table 48. Production and consumption per head of the principal food crops in Java (1929-1940). 
1929 
1930 
1934 
1936 
1938 
1939 
1940 
prod. 
123 
139 
123 
141 
135 
138 
140 
Cereals 
cons. 
121 
134 
115 
128 
124 
122 
124 
/ o 
98 
96 
93 
91 
92 
88 
88 
Root crops 
prod. 
150 
155 
160 
200 
208 
215 
218 
cons. 
129 
142 
148 
176 
185 
190 
191 
7c1 
86 
92 
92 
88 
89 
90 
88 
prod. 
3.9 
4.0 
3.5 
3.8 
4.5 
4.0 
4.3 
Peanuts 
cons. 
2.7 
3.0 
2.4 
2.3 
2.6 
2.0 
2.7 
X1 
69 
75 
69 
60 
58 
50 
63 
< 
prod. 
2.6 
3.1 
4.1 
5.6 
6.4 
7.1 
6.5 
Soybeans 
cons. 
4.7 
4.9 
4.1 
4.9 
5.5 
6.0 
5.6 
X1 
181 
158 
100 
87 
86 
93 
86 
1
 Percentage of annual production consumed by local population. 
Source: J. H. BOEKE. The evolution of the Netherlands Indies economy, 1947.P. 109. 
Table 49. Rice imports of the Outer Provinces by origin (1931-1938), in tons. 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
From Java 
22,411 
6,234 
19,981 
32,844 
31,544 
92,822 
186,970 
67,452 
From the other parts 
ofthe Outer Provinces 
29,770 
17,087 
27,051 
54,100 
47,811 
56,574 
64,087 
74,565 
From abroad 
317,336 
269,519 
245,845 
210,932 
263,173 
213,202 
157,534 
303,389 
Source: C. J. J. VAN HALL en C. VAN DE KOPPEL DP rT^i 
Vol. I, p. 377. Landbouw in den Indischen Archipel, 1946, 
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Table 50. Per capita rice consumption in kg in Java, for the period 1850-1940. 
1850 
1860 
1870 
1880 
1890 
Consumption 
103 
97 
100 
120 
102 
1900 
1910 
1920 
1930 
1940 
Consumption 
103 
113 
101 
95 
86 
Sources: For 1850 till 1930; A. M. P. A. SCHELTEMA, The food consumption of the native inha-
bitants of Java and Madura. 1936, p. 12; for 1940: Statistiscal pocketbook of Indonesia 
1941, p. 142. 
Table 51. Export of tapioca products, excluding waste {1932-1940). 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
Net quantity in 
1000 tons 
226.0 
171.7 
144.8 
156.8 
285.4 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
Net quantity in 
1000 tons 
417.0 
246.8 
279.7 
226.5 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1941, p. 84. 
Detailed studies made of garden culture show that the share of land allotted to 
them by the farmer and the intensity of cultivation increases as the total cropland per 
head decreases. 
The growing use of dry fields and the cultivation of crops such as maize, cassava, 
sweet potatoes and soybeans have gained greatly in importance to meet the needs of 
the increasing population.59 This development is of a relatively recent date: it was not 
until the 1885 depression that the Dutch government actively promoted the intro-
duction of these crops, which are called collectively 'polowidjo' or 'palawidjaja.'60 
Most of the peasant agricultural land is used for annual crops which are primarily 
for food production. The development of peasant farm crops during 1930-1940 can 
be illustrated by Tables 46 and 47. 
The area covered by peasant crops for export in Java was estimated at about 
550,000 ha in 1940, which was less than one fifteenth of the land under cultivation.61 
The chief export product from the lowlands grown by the farmers was derived from 
the so-called secondary crops. These crops included maize, cassava, groundnuts and 
soybeans. As indicated earlier they are grown on sawah's or on dry fields. Data of the 
59
 J. VANGELDEREN, m: Indonesian economics (fn. 9), p. 136. 
6 0
 GEERTZ, op. tit. (fn. 7), p. 92. 
61
 ROBEQUAIN, op. tit. (fn. 9), p. 349. 
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export were given by BOEKE (see Table 48). For each of the four most important 
groups - cereals (rice and husked maize), root crops (cassava and sweet potatoes), 
peanuts and soybeans - he gave the total production and consumption per head and 
the ratio of those figures. 
The production of rice and maize fluctuated with good and bad harvest years, but 
consumption per head remained much on the same level. The volume of root crop 
production in 1940 increased about 40 % as compared with that in 1929. The consump-
tion of home produced cereals decreased because of the greater export to the Outer 
Provinces. The rice import of the Outer Provinces is illustrated by Table 49. 
Per capita rice consumption in Java is given in Table 50. Between 1850 en 1940 it 
dropped from 113 kg to 87 kg. There was a counter-balancing increase in the con-
sumption of cassava and other food crops, which are inferior to rice as far as protein 
and vitamins are concerned. 
With the increasing production of root crops and pulses, the menu of the Javanese 
household changed.62 But in spite of the increasing consumption of cassava, there was 
still an important export of this product; indeed it was the biggest peasant export 
crop.63 The export of tapioca or cassava flour is presented in Table 51. 
From the other two important peasants' cash crops, viz. sugarcane and tobacco 
only the latter is exported. The area cultivated with tobacco amounted in 1938 to 
147,000 ha.64 
The export of peasant agricultural produce from Java showed a rapid expansion, as 
llustrated earlier in Table 4 under 2. This expansion has been possible primarily 
because of the role of the Chinese, who were the middlemen in the Javanese trade, and 
the considerable influence of the banks and great trade firms (European, American, 
Japanese and Chinese) with their many branches and agencies. Due to the 'open door' 
policy of the Dutch there was a keen competition between these firms and they tried 
to expand their business by accepting a low rate of profit.65 
4.2 The period after World War II 
4.2.1 Estate agriculture 
In 1958, 75% of the estates, planted with sugar-cane, coffee, tea, cinchona, cocoa, 
tobacco and kapok were located in Java.66 Rubber, though also an important estate 
crop in Java, was primarily produced in the Outer Islands, especially in Sumatra. 
92
 For further particulars on the Impact of the changing diet of the Javanese people see footnote 58. 
6 3
 ROBEQUAIN, op. cit. (fn. 9), p. 351. 
64
 VAN HALL and VAN DE KOPPEL, op. cit. (fn. 56), Vol. 1, p. 364. 
M
 ROBEQUATN, op. cit. (fn. 9), p. 350. 
«• E. JACOBY, Agrarian unrest in Southeast Asia, London, 1961, p. 71. Since the production of some 
estate crops is concentrated in Java, the development of these crops in Java and Madura after the 
war actually reflects the development of those for the whole of Indonesia. 
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The declining importance of the estates in Java and Madura is illustrated by 
Tables 52-54. 
Sugar. Production of sugar in 1963 amounted to 650,563 tons, a decrease of about 
53 % as compared with 1938. The number of sugar-mills participating in the pro-
duction for 1963 was 56, with a total planted area of 81,800 ha. In 1938 there were 
97 mills with an area of 84.800 ha.67 The decline in mills and area were 42 and 6 % 
respectively. This means that production decreased more than total planted area, or in 
other words: production per ha declined. The average yield after World War II was 
indeed just about one half of that before the war.68 
According to the figures of the Central Bureau of Statistics, the exports of sugar 
showed a decline from 1,071,100 tons in 1938 to 32,900 tons in 1962.69 Part of this can 
be explained by a greater consumption at home. Further details of the sugar factories' 
development will be discussed in chapter 8. 
Tea. In 1963, tea output amounted to 27,918 tons, which is a decrease of 55% since 
1938. The number of estates dropped 56% and the planted area 44%. Here again the 
average yield per ha decreased, primarily to be attributed to lack of imported mate-
rials, such as spare parts and insecticides. There are no separate figures for Java's 
exports, but the figures for the whole of Indonesia seem to be sufficiently represen-
tative.70 
Coffee. Coffee output in 1963 amounted to 19,075 tons, a decrease of 52% as com-
pared with 1938. The number of estates dropped 57 % and the planted area 53 %. Thus 
the average yield per ha was about the same. Again no separate figures are available for 
Java's export, but the situation will not have been basically different.71 
Tobacco. The development of estate tobacco can be seen from Table 55. Production of 
Java's estate tobacco in 1958 amounted only to 3,856 ton as compared with 20,924 
tons in 1938, or a decrease of 86 %. No figures are available for Java's exports, but the 
figures for the whole of Indonesia indicate that these exports decreased considerably.72 
"See Tables 52-54. 
68
 See 3.1.1. 
69
 Statisticalpocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 151. 
70
 According to CBS-figures, the export of tea during 1962 showed a decline of 42,700 tons: from 
71,900 tons in 1938 to 29,200 tons in 1962. This decrease was due primarily to the decline in produc-
tion. It is believed that pressure or internal demand also limited the export (see Statistical pocketbook 
of Indonesia 1963, p. 147). 
71
 The CBS-figures show that the export during 1962 declined from 69,000 tons in 1938 to 57,200 tons, 
a decline of 11,800 tons. The same factors, already mentioned for tea are the main causes of this 
decline (see Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 148). 
72
 The publication of the Report of the Bank of Indonesia was suspended after 1960, so that the 1958 
figures on estate tobacco are the latest available. According to the figures of the Central Bureau of 
Statistics' the export of estate tobacco showed a decline of 37,000 tons from 48,000 tons in 1938 to 
11,000 tons in 1962. (See Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 149.) 
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Rubber. From Table 34 it can be seen that estate rubber production increased in 1963 
by about 1% as compared with 1938. The number of estates dropped 32% and the 
acreage 16%, but the average production increased. Among other causes, this 
increase was due to overlapping. The production in 1963 could have been greater if 
import requirements, such as for equipment and chemicals, had been met. 
However, the long-run prospect of estate rubber for the whole of Indonesia, as 
earlier indicated, is not very encouraging. The average yield on estates has declined 
after 1952 primarily due to the inability of most estates to undertake a normal 
replanting program and also to the gradual decline in yield per hectare as the trees 
become older and are not replaced. 
Cocoa and Cinchona. Cocoa and cinchona production in 1963 decreased by 64 and 
78% respectively as compared with the 1938 figures. Though of minor importance in 
the total agricultural exports, cinchona is of interest because of the almost complete 
monopoly in the world's production which Java held for many years before World 
War II. 
During World War H, after supplies from Java were cut off, this monopoly was 
broken by synthetic anti-malaria drugs. In the post-war period output and export 
remained considerably below the prewar level, and the outlook is not encouraging.73 
In conclusion it is difficult to indicate precisely the trends of export of estate crops 
from Java since there are no specific figures published. However, it is generally 
accepted that the export of estate crops, with the exception of rubber, decreased 
substantially. This is due to the fall in production caused by several factors men-
tioned while discussing the specific crops, and to increased domestic consumption. 
Table 52. Number of estates in exploitation by principal crops in Jam and Madura, 1938,1962 and 1963. 
1962 1963 Percentage increase 
(1938=100) for 1963 
-42 
-34 
-56 
-57 
-71 
-33 
-33 
Sugarcane 
Hevea rubber 
Tea 
Coffee 
Cinchona 
Cocoa 
Oilpalm 
Hard fibres 
Tobacco 
Cassava 
1938 
97 
609 
297 
314 
96 
30 
6 
391 
40 
28 
'For 1938 rail fibres. 
54 
427 
137 
140 
30 
23 
4 
2 
-
— 
56 
400 
131 
134 
28 
20 
4 
-
-
-
i938 i b i d . » g Z £ 2 2 Z % ™ £ ™ » % * r {*£•_»*"* *5 1938 Ibid. De lanlbouZ™, ™2 and J^Oecember 1963. pp. 2-57; for 
^ m p e ^ S ^ T S T ^ ' " ' m2' PP" 16^4: f0r SU8arCane in: HaSU 
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Table 53. Planted area in ha of principal estate crops in Java and Madura, 1938,1962 and 1963. 
Sugarcane 
Hevea rubber 
Tea 
Coffee 
Cinchona 
Cocoa 
Oilpalm 
Hard fibres 
Tobacco 
1938 
84,829 
288,911 
105,054 
88,585 
15,179 
6,172 
890 
19.7211 
28,809 
1962 
82,541 
192,612 
58,126 
42,285 
3,869 
6,585 
892 
1,000 
-
1963 
80,114 
193,643 
58,978 
41,574 
3,475 
6,259 
892 
1,206 
-
Percentage increase 
(1938=100) for 1963 
- 6 
-16 
-44 
-53 
-77 
+ 1 
0 
-94 
-
1
 1938 :aU fibres. 
Sources: for 1938: De landbouwexportgewassen, see footnote Table 52; for sugarcane in 1963: 
Hasil sensus perkebunan 1963, table 4; for the other data; Central Bureau of Statistics, 
see footnote Table 52. 
Table 54. Production of principal estate crops in tons in Java and Madura, 1938,1962 and 1963. 
Sugarcane (tel quel) 
Hevea rubber 
Tea 
Coffee 
Cinchona 
Cocoa 
Palmoil 
Palm kernels 
Hard fibres 
Tobacco4 
887 1 
73 J 
1938 
1,375,510 
63,606 
62,235 
39,697 
10,276 
1,576 
960 
33.5641 
20,924 
66 
4 
1962 
588,714 
65,425 
37,025 
12,094 
2,094 
631 
\ 70 1 
1,422 
5,7822 
1963 
650,563 
64,345 
27,918 
19,075 
2,431 
569 
59 \ 60 
W 
810 
3,856s 
Percentage increase 
(1938=100) for 1963 
-53 
+ 1 
-55 
-52 
-78 
-64 
-96 
-
-85 
•For 1938: all fibres. 
•Figure for 1957. 
3
 Figure for 1958. 
4
 For 1938,1957 and 1958: Bank Indonesia Report 195911960, p. 178). 
Sources: for 1938: De landbouw-exportgewassen, see footnote Table 52; for sugarcane in 1963: 
See Table 15; other data from Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Table 55. Production of estate tobacco in Java (1938 and 1953-1956), in tons. 
Production Production 
1938 
1954 
1955 
20,924 
4,185 
3,548 
1956 
1957 
1958 
3,921 
3,782 
3,856 
Source: Bank Indonesia Report 195911960:178. 
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4.2.2 Peasant agriculture 
The development of the harvested farm crop area in Java and Madura after World 
War II can be seen in Table 56. 
It appears that the total harvested area in Java and Madura expanded 13 % during 
the period 1939-1962. This increase can be specified as follows: 8% by the more 
intensified use of arable land through double cropping and 5 % to new arable land. 
These figures again demonstrate the limitations in constructing new irrigation works 
and to bring new arable land into production in Java (see further Chapter 11). 
Data on the harvested area for the principal farm food crops in Java and Madura 
are shown in Table 57. It can be noted from the table that the area under paddy 
practically did not increase over the period 1940-1942. 
The development of the production of principal farm food crops can be seen in 
Table 58. In 1962 rice production (dry stalk paddy) was 11 % above that in 1940, that 
of maize was about 29% higher, and that of cassava 3% lower. For the post-war 
period the conclusion is that the volume of the principal food crops fluctuated without 
any clear trend. 
The planted area and production of other crops are, with the exception of sugarcane 
and tobacco, only available for 1961 (Table 59). 
Main food crops. The same method as applied before is followed to estimate the 
amounts of exported food crops. For each of the six principal items Tables 60 and 61 
give the total production and the consumption per capita and the percentage of the 
production consumed by the population. 
Production of cereals and rootcrops increased 18%, while the increase of popula-
tion was 22% from 1953 to 1962.7* If we compare the increase of food production in 
relation to the population increase for the 1940-1962 period, the picture is even less 
favourable: production in Java and Madura increased 7%, while the population 
increased 33 %.75 This resulted in a decrease in the principal foodstuffs available per 
capita from domestic production in Java and Madura since the war. 
The consumption figures were kept more or less constant by the import of rice 
from abroad and maize from the Outer Islands, especially from South Celebes. 
The amount available for export of cassava, the peasant's main export crop from 
Java before World War II, is declining as can be seen in Table 62. The main reason for 
this decrease is the expanding home consumption due to the population increase. 
73
 WICKIZER, op. cit. {fn. 31), p. 92 
Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 11 and pp. 69-70. ' 
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Table 56. Harvested areas of farm crops in Java and Madura during the period 1939-1941 and 
1953-1962, in 1000 ha. 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Cereals1 
6,058 
6,072 
6,329 
5,516 
6,157 
5,767 
6,002 
5,867 
6,495 
6,006 
6,249 
5,815 
6,443 
Root-
crops2 
1,323 
1,393 
1,349 
1,269 
1,231 
1,253 
1,379 
1,499 
1,629 
1,700 
1,646 
1,593 
1,705 
Pulses3 
862 
895 
926 
917 
1.014 
967 
998 
1,054 
1,155 
1,151 
1,247 
1,153 
1,330 
Tobacco 
139 
166 
145 
89 
123 
104 
143 
166 
151 
166 
152 
165 
136 
Sugarcane 
17 
18 
19 
22 
28 
43 
43 
35 
42 
40 
36 
29 
24 
Other 
crops 
540 
578 
582 
546 
556 
540 
565 
604 
646 
633 
700 
665 
501 
Total 
8,939 
9,122 
9,350 
8,359 
9,109 
8,674 
9,130 
9,225 
10,118 
9,696 
10,030 
9,420 
10,139 
As percentage 
of all arable 
land 
113.2 
115.1 
117.5 
102.6 
109.6 
104.0 
110.3 
110.7 
121.4 
115.5 
119.6 
112.3 
121.0 
1
 Irrigated plus non-irrigated rice and maize. 
!
 Cassava, sweet potatoes, potatoes, etc. 
3
 Peanuts, soybeans and others. 
Source; Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 67. 
Table 57. Harvested areas of principal food crops in Java and Madura, 1938-1941 and 1953-1962 
(in 1000 ha). 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Irrigated 
paddy and 
gogoran-
tjah1 
3,653 
3,724 
3,743 
3,768 
3,897 
3,925 
4,076 
4,069 
4,124 
4,056 
4,006 
3,668 
3,707 
Non-irri-
gated 
paddy 
375 
365 
357 
249 
260 
264 
224 
242 
265 
273 
314 
324 
384 
Total 
rice area 
4,028 
4,089 
4,100 
4,017 
4,157 
4,189 
4,300 
4,311 
4,389 
4,329 
4,320 
3,992 
4,091 
Maize 
2,030 
1,983 
2,229 
1,499 
2,000 
1,578 
1,702 
1,556 
2,106 
1,677 
1,929 
1,823 
2,352 
Cassava 
992 
1,041 
1,003 
868 
866 
876 
899 
987 
1,075 
1,188 
1,145 
1,142 
1,137 
Sweet po-
tatoes 
197 
209 
205 
216 
174 
176 
260 
277 
302 
258 
250 
213 
350 
Peanuts 
241 
251 
259 
240 
270 
253 
264 
289 
283 
300 
313 
294 
293 
Soybeans 
415 
418 
440 
422 
478 
462 
447 
462 
533 
531 
577 
541 
514 
1
 Gogorantiah: rice planted on dry sawahs, with sufficient rainfall later on irrigated, or the re-
verse. 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 68. 
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Table 58. Production of principal food crops in 1000 tons for Java and Madura (1938-1941 and 1953-
1962). 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Irrigated 
paddy and 
gogoran-
tjah 
7,915 
8,477 
8,467 
8,239 
8,878 
8,525 
8,902 
8,839 
9,237 
9,386 
9,234 
8,740 
9,305 
Non-irri-
gated 
paddy 
446 
492 
526 
282 
385 
289 
244 
277 
307 
332 
423 
495 
695 
Total 
paddy 
8,361 
8,969 
8,994 
8,521 
9,263 
8,814 
9,146 
9,116 
9,544 
9,718 
9,657 
9,236 
10,000 
Maize 
(shelled) 
1,985 
1,900 
2,433 
1,302 
2,154 
1,462 
1,431 
1,309 
2,012 
1,475 
1,779 
1,706 
2,450 
Cassava 
(fresh 
roots) 
8,311 
8,415 
8,736 
6,468 
6,430 
6,519 
6,420 
7,168 
8,100 
9,082 
8,624 
8,443 
8,120 
Sweet po-
tatoes 
(fresh 
roots) 
1,268 
1,418 
1,475 
1,231 
1,064 
1,008 
1,503 
1,595 
1,750 
1,490 
1,394 
1,216 
1,200 
Peanuts 
(shelled) 
181 
197 
210 
164 
204 
178 
178 
192 
192 
200 
211 
203 
202 
Soybeans 
(shelled) 
318 
294 
338 
274 
362 
306 
311 
299 
380 
375 
388 
376 
337 
Source: Statisticalpocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 70. 
Table 59. Planted area and production of principal farm grown (non-estate) commercial crops in Java, 
Coconuts 
Coffee 
Tea 
Kapok 
Arecanuts 
Pepper 
Cloves 
Nutmeg 
Sugarcane 
Tobacco 
dry copra 
dry beans 
dry green tea 
seeded fibre 
dry, cut nuts 
dry seeds 
dry flowers 
dry nut + mace 
brown sugar 
dried 
Area in 1000 ha Productionin 1000 tons 
534.1 
56.5 
64.4 
131.4 
11.0 
1.4 
7.3 
0.1 
27.1s 
161.8s 
275.2 
9.1 
37.71 
18.5 
4.3 
0.3 
0.1 
193.6s 
64.3 
1
 Including the production of wet leaf purchased and processed by estate factories. This quanti-
ty amounted to 7000 tons (calculated on dry green product). 
• Inclusive the production of cane used for chewing and that processed by estates' factories. The 
latter quantity amounted to 58,270 tons of brown sugar. 8
 The area refers to the area harvested during 1961. 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 74,75, 76, 77. 
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Tobacco. The area under peasant tobacco has regained its prewar value and so has the 
production76, but exports have decreased, as is apparent from the figures for 1958.77 
The main reason is the rise in home consumption of cigars, cigarettes, native straw 
cigarettes and cut tobacco manufactured in local industries.78 
Table 62. Export of tapioca products excluding waste, from Java, (1938-1940 and 1958-1962), in 1000 
tons. 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1958 
246.8 
279.7 
226.5 
21.1 
1959 
1960 
19611 
1962 
144.3 
104.2 
78.9 
10.0 
Note: postwar data prior to 1965 not available. 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 155. 
Table 63. Average yield ofpreasants' sugar per ha in Java, 1957-1961. 
Y e a f 1 9 5 7
 1958 1959 I960 1961 
Average production in tons 
P e l h a 6
-
9 2
 6-60 6.54 7.13 8.68 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, pp. 74-77. 
Table 64. Average yield of peasants' teaper ha in Java, 1957-1961. 
^
 1 9 5 7
 1958 1959 I960 1961 
Average production in tons 
! ! ^ ! °-371 0-394 0.510 0.587 0.585 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, pp. 74-77. 
Table 65. Export of kapok from Java, 1938-1940 and 1958-1962. 
Year 
1938 1939 1940 i 9 5 8 1959 I960 1961 1962 
QuantityinlOOOton i 6 , 3 2 1 .8 1 6 ? ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 154. 
" Production in 1938 was estimated to K» f,f. i nn * 
and VANDEKOPPEL,op .cvTse t o l 1 i T Tt'u W h k h 1 4 ' 5 4 9 W e r e e x P ° r t e d < s e e V A N H A L L 
" Total export of t o b a c c I n d u l l o f ^ f a a d t a W e 5 6 f o r t h e c^ivated area in 1939). 
from the peasant, The ^ S ^ ^ ^ T J 0 22'°6°tons ° f ^ i c h only 841 tons came 
Statistikkonjunktur, May-June 1963 n 4fi »JT, ? , a ( s e e : C e n t r a l B u r e a u of Statistics, 
'•It appear, that the J L n J ^ ^ S ^ T 1 T " ' W P" ^ 
of its importance as a revenue earner. woacco manufacturing industry, perhaps because 
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Sugarcane. In 1958 peasants' sugarcane covered an area of 42,000 ha as against 
24,000 ha in 1962. But the postwar cultivated area has always surpassed that before 
the war, as can be seen from Table 56. Production shows an increasing tendency and so 
has the average production as can be seen in Table 63. 
The increase in average production per hectare may be explained by the assistance 
given by the 'Jajasan Tebu Rakjat' or 'Jatra' (the Smallholders' Sugar-cane Founda-
tion), instituted by the Ministry of Agriculture and by the 'Kantor Penjelidikan Gula 
Tebu Rakjat' (Smallholders' Cane Sugar Research Office) in Solo.79 The Jatra helps 
the farmers with credit. The research office in Solo attempts to improve the quality of 
smallholders' cane and to encourage the development of smallholders' sugar enter-
prises. It also designs milling machines for the small cane planters. Most of the 
peasant sugar-cane is consumed locally. 
Tea. The area under peasant tea was more or less constant80, but production per hec-
tare showed an increase so that the average yield went up, as can be seen from 
Table 64. This increase is primarily due to the re-establishment of security in the tea 
growing area in West Java after 1958, which made it possible for the peasants to 
combat the blister blight successfully, with the assistance of the Extension Service. 
Part of the product is sold to the estates as can be seen in Table 59. But export 
decreased, which WICKIZER explains as follows: "When the peasants of Java held 35 % 
of the total tea acreage of Indonesia in 1940, they accounted for 18 % of the volume of 
tea exports. Disregarding the extreme fluctuations occasioned by the war and the 
early postwar period of adjustments, the smallholders' share in 1954 was still 18 % of a 
considerably reduced volume of the total export, but thereafter the proportion fell 
rapidly to 12% in 1955 and to 8% in 1956, while estate output and exports remained 
steady."81 This decrease could be primarily explained by the increase in home con-
sumption. 
Copra. The area under the other crops mentioned in Table 59 are primarily cultivated 
with coconut. After World War II, the export of copra decreased, mainly due to a de-
cline in production per tree because of aging and to the increase in domestic demand by 
the growing population. Java, before the war an exporter of copra, became an importer. 
Kapok. Export of kapok, a minor Indonesian export product and primarily grown by 
peasants in Java, has also declined as shown by Table 65. 
Before the war, Indonesia was by far the leading exporter of kapok, but in recent 
years shipments have been reduced to a fraction of its previous level. Decline in world 
demand, owing to the development of various substitutes in numerous uses, is the 
principal cause. 
'• But the main cause of the increase in average production is the use of more fertilizer per ha. 
80
 As compared with the prewar figure, which in 1938 amounted to 66,000 ha, it remained about the 
same. 
8 1
 WICKIZER, op. cit. (fn. 31), p. 65. 
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Summarizing it can be concluded that peasants' tea and tobacco in Java have regained 
their prewar production level, while sugar and cassava have surpassed it, whereas 
copra decreased slightly. However, as far as exports are concerned, two of the three 
principal prewar peasants' export crops, namely tea and cassava, show a decline. In 
the case of copra, Java has even to import it from the Outer Islands. The decrease of 
the various exports after the war was to be expected in the context of a rapidly growing 
population, since peasants' agriculture exports consist primarily of food items and 
table luxuries. 
4.3 Concluding Remarks 
As explained under 4.2.2, even the smaller export of cassava and the larger import of 
rice could not prevent a lower consumption of principal foodstuffs, as illustrated by 
Tables 60 and 61. To face this most unfavourable situation, the government launched 
a three-year program to achieve self-sufficiency in rice. This program was called the 
'Swa Sembada Beras' (SSB, Self-sufficiency in Rice Production). It is primarily 
designed for Java and required an increase of paddy output sufficient for home con-
sumption from 1962 west monsoon rice harvest onwards. This three year plan, 
initiated in 1959, is incorporated in the Eight Year's National Overall Development 
Plan 1961-1969 for agriculture, along with a number of other projects in the food and 
fibre area which will be discussed more elaborately in Chapter 6. 
The question of foreign exchange earnings, their allocation and the whole politico-
economic problem involved, is a very serious one for the government to be solved, due 
to the precarious position of overcrowded Java. This island, with about two thirds of 
Indonesia's population, contributed only 15% to the export earnings in the postwar 
period but uses most of the total earnings to finance its imports, with the foreign 
currency mainly provided by the Outer Provinces. 
In addition, non-agricultural employment is not able to absorb the net increase of 
the rapidly growing population so that agriculture has to take most of the burden. 
Since for decades there has been a shortage of land and a surplus of labour in Java, all 
ttus means that the Javanese economy has thus descended to a very serious situation. 
Something should be done to lift Java from its present state 
In the following chapters the attempted measures of the government to relieve the 
population pressure on Java will be discussed. But to understand the scope of the pro-
blem and the conditions giving rise to those measures, it will be helpful to precede 
with a brief description of Java's agriculture (Chapter 5). 
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5 The agricultural situation in Java 
Productivity in agriculture is a function of soil, climate and the skill of the farmer. 
Nature certainly has favoured Java's agricultural development. Yet it is evident that 
the rapid population growth of this island is a factor of primary importance in deter-
mining the future course of agricultural development. 
In an agrarian economy of the type found in Java, any increase in the number of 
inhabitants is followed by an attempt to extend the area under cultivation. But where 
new land becomes increasingly scarce, pupolation growth is also followed by more 
intensive cultivation methods. This is the case in Java where little room for further 
extension of the agricultural area is left and where labour intensity under the existing 
conditions is approaching its limit. Fortunately there is room for much improvement 
in methods, such as the use of fertilizers, better seed, and the distribution of irrigation 
water, which clearly could raise productivity. The posibilities of changes in techniques 
will be discussed in Chapter 9. As an alternative solution, efforts have been directed 
towards agricultural resettlement in less densely populated parts of the Outer Pro-
vinces. This will be discussed in Chapter 7.82 
To understand the scope of the problem and the conditions giving rise to the 
various agricultural development programs, it will be helpful to give a description 
of the agricultural situation in Java. This can be accomplished by a discussion of the 
size of land holdings, the tenure arrangements and land productivity. 
5.1 Population growth and reduction in farm size 
Farm size can be expressed in land area and in terms of capital or labour input, 
sometimes in annual production or sales. But as in Java the land itself is the most im-
portant element in peasant agricultural production and so the area of cultivated land is 
traditionally used as a measure for farm size.83 
To study the influence of population growth on the size of the farms, it is necessary 
to gather some information on the total area of available agricultural land. From 
Table 66 it appears, that Java did not much change in this respect between 1940 and 
1962, in spite of the rapid population growth. 
82
 Another possibility to raise the income of the Javanese farmer is the rehabilitation of the former 
estates, especially the sugar factories, where the farmers can earn an additional income. Th,s will be 
discussed in Chapter 8. 
83
 The area of cultivated land is practically the same as the area of arable land. 
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Table 66. Distribution of land use in Java and Madura (1940 and 1962). 
Peasant agriculture 
Estate agriculture 
Forests 
Other lands 
Area 
in 1000 ha 
7.9941 
9832 
3,116 
1,124 
in 1940 
in per cent. 
60.5 
7.4 
23.6 
8.5 
Area 
in 1000 ha 
8,377 
627 
2,991 
1,322 
in 1962 
in per cent. 
63.5 
4.8 
21.7 
10.0 
1
 Inclusive shifting cultivation. 
' Including small holdings and horticultural areas occupied by foreigners. 
Sources: For 1940: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1941, p. 36. For 1962: Compiled from 
several publications. 
Table 67. Growth of population for Java and Madura for the period 1815-1962. 
1815 
1845 
1860 
1870 
1880 
1890 
1900 
1905 
Total popu-
lation in mil-
lions 
45 
9.4 
12.5 
16.2 
19.5 
23.6 
28.4 
30.0 
Average % 
annual 
increase 
2.48 
1.94 
2.64 
1.87 
1.90 
1.86 
1.10 
1920 
1930 
1940 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Total popu-
lation in mil-
lions 
34.4 
40.9 
48.4 
50.4 
55.7 
61.9 
63.1 
64.6 
Average % 
annual 
increase 
0.93 
1.79 
0.40 
1.93 
2.24 
2.24 
2.24 
Sources: K. J. PELZER. op. cit., p. 254; Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963. p. 11. 
Table 68. Various data on population
 andsize ofpeasmt agricuUural Qrm .„ ^  ^ ^ 
1900 
1930 
1940 
1961 
1922 
1938 
Population in 
millions 
28.4 
_ 
41.8 
48.4 
63.0 
Number of 
peasants in mil-
lions 
-
7.6 
12.7 
Total arable 
area in million 
ha 
5.6 
~~ 
7.6 
7.9 
8.4 
Average area of arable 
land in ha 
per peasant 
-
1.00 
0.66 
per landtax 
paying land-
owner 
1.15 
0.86 
Sources: The population figure for 1900 a m t t h T w > ' " ' 
(fn. 52). p. 254; the population n T J r o ^ ™ 1 a r e f r o m K- J- PELZER. <*>•«'• 
Pocketbook of Indonesia mTv S h e numbf r " 0 "* 1 9 6 1 m f r ° m : Statis<™1 
book but for 1941 (p. 14) and tnatfor ' 9 6 ? £ v ^ * ? ^ 1 0 ™ t h e s ™ ° < * e t -
JONKERS, Welvaartszorg in IndonesiaL « ~ ? - } ^ T h e t 0 t a l a r e a figure i s f r o m A-
from a^ W *^JJGr ;S t B m eenPerSPectief- » • 65"66- « * 
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Table 69. Numbers of farms (over 0.1 ha) by size of area, Java, 1963. 
Area (ha) 
0.10-0.49 
0.50-0.99 
1.00-1.49 
1.50-1.99 
2.00-2.99 
3.00-3.99 
4.00-4.99 
5.00 or more 
Total 
Livestocks holdings 
Total holdings 
Djakarta 
14,640 
4,130 
1,970 
960 
860 
300 
140 
120 
23,120 
20 
23,140 
West Java 
1,205,857 
525,412 
216,462 
83,567 
74,409 
23,034 
10,714 
11,929 
2,151,384 
537 
2,151,921 
Central Java 
1,378,675 
731,946 
276,163 
113,844 
79,289 
25,314 
10,092 
8,020 
2,623,343 
700 
2,624,043 
East Java 
1,358,650 
813,603 
335,062 
140,627 
112,531 
38,230 
14,583 
13,147 
2,826,433 
731 
2,827,164 
Jogjakarta 
194,612 
82,617 
28,830 
11,891 
6,824 
1,758 
454 
651 
327,637 
-
327,637 
Total 
4,252,434 
2,157,708 
858,487 
350,889 
273,913 
88,636 
35,983 
33,867 
7,951,917 
1,988 
7,959,905 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Hastl sensus pertanian 1963, p. 1. 
Table 70. Per capita area of arable land (in ha) of peasant agriculture in Java and Madura, 1939-19411 
and 1953-1962* 
1939 
1940 
1941 
0.170 
0.167 
0.166 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
0.157 
0.157 
0.155 
0.151 
0.150 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
0.147 
0.141 
0.138 
0.138 
0.135 
1
 Per capita of total population. 
'Per capita of the Indonesian population. 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 66. 
As to this growth it can be remarked that, before 1815, the death rate was very high 
because malaria, hookworm, and other diseases were widespread. The establishment 
of modern health services, initiated by the Dutch government, has mainly been re-
sponsible for the following phenomenal population increase as illustrated in Table 67. 
Population increased with 122%, the area of peasant agriculture with only 50% 
during the six decades. 
In the beginning, this increase did not hamper development, as there was enough 
additional land available. But since 1922, there appeared more mouths to be fed than 
there was new land to be occupied. This resulted in a steadily increasing pressure on 
land, as apparent from Tables 68 and 69. This led to a reduction in the average area of 
arable land per farm from 1.00 ha in 1930 to 0.66 ha in 1961, mainly caused by sub-
division of holdings which were sometimes splitted up in as many as five to six small 
plots. Comparison of the 1961 census with an earlier census indicates that during the 
last 30 years the average arable land per peasant in Java is slowly decreasing in size with 
the steady growth of population. In 1930, for example, the average arable land per 
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peasant was about 1.00 ha, one half larger than in 1961.84 
Of the 1.00 ha mentioned above, in 1930, 0.43 ha was sawah, 0.57 ha belonged to 
dry fields or gardens.85 In 1961 these data were 0.28 and 0.38, respectively.86 This 
reduction also appears from the fact that the number of landowners who have to pay 
taxes increased at a faster rate than the area subjected to this tax (Table 68, last 
column). The postwar development shows a further reduction in farm size, as can be 
seen from Table 70. 
The Javanese peasant can support himself and his family on his dwarfsize holding 
only through double cropping and intensive cultivation (apart from additional work 
outside his farm). The consequence is, that he has to grow primarily food crops, so 
that little land remains for commercial crops and the cash receipts are small. This 
also causes the structure of the agricultural labour to be characterized by the domin-
ance of the family unit. But such dwarf units are uneconomic because they do not 
require the full services of the family. This gives rise to idleness and concealed un-
employment. Occasionally this situation is partly solved by several members of the 
family occupying themselves with handicrafts. 
5.2 Tenure arrangements and debts 
The Agrarian Law of 1870 stipulated that native land ownership, both individual and 
communal, was to be protected by the government and that such land could not be 
sold to non-natives. This prohibition was of fundamental importance, for it prevented 
legal ownership of land from passing into the hands of foreigners, many of whom were 
anxious to obtain it. 
Though Indonesians were not forbidden to sell their land to autochthonous fellow-
citizens87, landlordism was not a severe problem in the prewar period, as there were 
only a few rich Indonesian fanners. But after World War II there was a trend to 
increasing landlordism.88 The causes included the bigger sale of land by peasants due 
to the insecure situation in some rural areas like in southeast Priangan, the growing 
speculation on land as a result of inflation, and the emergence of an Indonesian 
middle-class, which practically did not exist before the war. The government considers 
this development as undesirable. To cope with this problem it enacted the Basic 
Agrarian Law of 1960, comprising the fundamental regulations on agrarian policy. 
An upper limit between 5 and 20 ha was fixed for the size of ownership, dependent on 
the population density and the fertility of the soil in various regions. The expropiated 
land was to be redistributed to small farmers and landless peasants (see Chapter 9). 
81
 See footnotes 85 and 86. 
85
 JONKERS, op. cit. (fn. 14), pp. 65-66. 
" Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 66. 
" Fellow citizen here means of Indonesian nationality, not of foreign origin. 
88
 Information supplied by officials of the Department of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs; see also 
Table 69, where is indicated that about 0.4% of the number of landholdings consist of 5 ha or more. 
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A program for reorganizing land use, and regulations of the various landrights were 
included in this law. 
There are no recent data on the extent of tenancy in Java as the data of the Agricult-
ural Census of 1963 are still being processed. The only figures for Java are from 
HASSELMAN'S study of 1903 (see ZINKIN89), when there were 90% owners and 10% 
tenants. The number of tenants today would be considerable higher, but it is still 
small as compared with other southeast Asian countries. 
However, HASSELMAN'S figures for 1903 fall short of revealing the true nature of the 
problem. At least 38% (HASSELMAN'S estimate is 30 %90) of the current agricultural 
working force on Java is estimated to be landless wage owners. Prior to the war this 
group was primarily employed as estate labourers. In addition, there is a large but 
unspecified group of small landowners who, through shortlease or debt, have lost 
effective control of their holdings.91 
Among those landowners who have managed to acquire a moderate area of agricul-
tural land, holdings generally consist of scattered small fields rather than large 
coherent estates worked by hired labour. The landowners then lease their land in 
small parcels to tenants on a share basis. The terms of the tenants' contract vary 
greatly and depend upon such local conditions as population pressure, fertility of the 
soil, and especially upon customs. As regards rice, frequently it is one half of the 
yield, often deducted from the 'bawon', a form of harvest payment in kind. This 
usually amounts to 20% of the yield which the tenants can keep for themselves. The 
tenants then actually get 60% of the total rice yields. Contracts vary also in regard to 
the division of expenses like sowing seed and tax payment. 
To meet extraordinary expenses, or when in need of cash, the small peasants, 
excluding those who held shares of communal land, may mortgage their land. These 
shareholders can only lease their share to someone in the village and not to an out-
sider. The contract is seasonal and usually the cash rent is paid in advance. 
PELZER said that "The payment is sometimes made one or two years before the 
land is actually put at the disposal of the lessee. The latter in most cases does not 
intend to cultivate the land himself but employs the lessor as tenant, or rather as sub-
tenant, that is, he subleases the land back to the owner on a share basis and takes one 
half or even five sevenths of the crop. The creditors are usually merchants, who by this 
method assure themselves of a cheap supply of rice or occasionally individual investors, 
who in this way obtain high interest rates. The longer the rent is paid the lower it is."92 
*» ZINKIN, op. cit. (fn. 50), p. 48. 
•° Ibid. 
11
 The agriculture census questionnaire of October 1963 was designed to cover various aspects of 
agriculture including land tenure. But most of the results have not yet been published, so HASSEL-
MAN'S figure had to be used here. 
M
 PELZER, op. cit. (fn. 52), pp. 170-171 (for the situation before World War II). The same situation 
existed after World War II, maybe in certain areas even worse since there is a big demand and a short 
supply of agricultural credit. 
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Comprehensive data on the extent of indebtedness of the Javanese farmers before 
World War II, do not exist, but the percentage of farmers going into debt in this 
manner is considered to be high. Although the situation as illustrated below is not 
representative for Java (these figures are considerably higher than the average accord-
ing to PELZER), yet it can be used to give some idea of how serious the peasants' 
indebtedness was in some areas. A survey made at the beginning of 1939 by SOENARIO 
in the Tulungagung region (East Java), indicates that out of a total of 2,470 land-
holding peasants, 74,2% had leased some of their land in order to obtain cash and as 
many as 33.9 % had leased their whole property.93 
However, before World War II, the development of moneylenders or usurers who 
had a strong grip on the peasants as experienced for instance in Burma, was made 
impossible in Java. This can be explained by three facts: (a) that alienation of land to 
a non-Indonesian was prohibited by the Agricultural Law of 1870, (b) that from 1900 
onwards government credit agencies were set up to fight usury, and (c) that several 
small village banks and pawnshops were established to help the peasants meet then-
need of cash. 
In the years of economic crisis, depression and paralyzation of the institutional 
credit organizations (as will be discussed later on) the peasants were forced to borrow 
from private moneylenders, on very unfavourable terms. 
Where, before World War II, in some regions of Java and Madura, e.g. in the 
regency of Indramaju, this kind of indebtedness threatened to have serious conse-
quences, the government immediately took measures to free the peasants from the 
inextricable net of the private creditors, and debt redemption was made possible by 
the Usury Ordinance of 1938. 
In 3 out of the 21 villages included in the survey made by SOENARIO, every land-
holder leased either a part or all of his land and in 9 out of 21 villages 90 % or more of 
all landholders had gone into debt in this fashion. 
A credit survey after World War II has not yet been conducted and consequently no 
exact information exists as to the indebtedness of the peasants, their actual need for 
credit and their customary sources of credit. But the government is of the opinion 
that some selected regions of Java still have serious rural credit problems. Many rural 
credit institutions have been re-established and new ones have been added, but they 
are still inadequate to meet the need of the peasants.94 With high interests rates 
ranging from 10 to 25% per month on small loans, peasants who have no collateral 
are forced to go to private moneylenders.95 In some cases, the peasant is forced either 
to lease his land to the creditor as payment for his debt and actually becomes a share-
cropper on his own land, or to sell his produce before harvest time at non-profitable 
prices.96 
•
3
 Ibid. 
"Ibid., p. 172. 
" The interest rate of 10 to 25 % per month was mentioned in 1962 by some officials of the Bank for 
Cooperates, Farmers and Fishermen. The main cause of this high rate is the rapid inflation since 
1958. The present rate may be even higher, since the inflation has continued. 
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5.3 Technology and productivity 
A survey of the trends in agricultural production and food consumption in Java must 
begin with rice, the key-product in Java's agriculture, as it provides over two-thirds 
of the population's calorific intake. 
The shortage of modern technology in rice farming is shown in numerous ways: in 
the applied traditional techniques, in the small use of both natural and artificial 
fertilizers, and in the nearby failure to improve the breeds.97 Before the war, artificial 
fertilizers were applied to only one percent of the crop land area on Java, although 
13% (one million hectares) showed phosphate deficiency. Improved seeds were 
planted on only 25 % of the total area. On the other hand, large-scale construction of 
a modern technical irrigation system and extension of the agricultural area by double 
cropping greatly enlarged the food production between 1900 and 1941. In this way the 
capacity of Java to support a larger population has been possible, as shown earlier. 
In 1939 irrigated land accounted for 40 % of total peasant agricultural land, and 
harvested areas amounted to 113 % of total arable peasant agricultural land. 
After the war, the government attempted to introduce fertilizers and improved seed 
on a large scale to meet the demand of the increasing population. At present about 
75 % of the rice fields is fertilized and about 50 % of this is grown with improved seed; 
but because expedients have not been intensively or rightly applied, the success has not 
been up to expectation. In spite of a strenuous effort from the Agricultural Extension 
and the Irrigation Services to increase food production by extending the irrigated area 
at the same rate as the population increase, this has been only a partial success (see 
Chapter 9). In 1962 in Java the area of irrigated land was practically the same as 
before World War II and Java's harvested areas amounted to 120% of the total 
arable peasant agriculture land. 
The production of paddy per hectare has more or less remained as before the war, 
namely 2180 kg before and 2350 kg after the war.98 
Next, it was noticeable that the investment made in estates and peasant agriculture 
initially did raise the peasants' income. However, the rapidly growing population and 
the limitations of available resources for further improvements in the peasants' econ-
my, ultimately failed to raise the income of the Javanese farmers. Moreover, there 
occured no significant expansion outside traditional agricultural pursuits. Yet a rapid 
expansion was noticed within peasant agriculture which is made possible by the 
perfection of labour absorbing productive techniques which raise land, but not labour 
productivity. 
•* Due to the relative high food prices, as compared with other prices, the economic position of many 
farmers in Java and Madura who own land is better in the postwar than in the prewar period. But 
the position of the sharecroppers and the agricultural labourers is worse. 
*' The restricted use of fertilizers may be due to an unfavourable ratio between price and costs rather 
than the shortage of capital. Perhaps social factors that inhibit the use of fertilizers or other improved 
production practices also play a role. 
98
 Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 66. 
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Though there are still some possibilities left to raise agricultural productivity, as 
will be seen in Chapter 9, the central problem is that the rural population is increasing 
so rapidly, and that the exceptionally small farms are unable to absorb any additional 
labour force without a further decline in the already low level of living. The following 
chapters will illustrate the measures attempted by the government to face this problem. 
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6 Objectives of agricultural plans and policies 
6.1 General background 
The previous chapters have shown that the policies and actions of the government 
have a profound effect on the rate and direction of agricultural development. MOSHER 
has stated: "These policies and actions are of many kinds. The policies include those 
regarding landownership and tenancy, taxation, foreign exchange, tariffs, domestic 
prices and public investments. The actions include programs of education, research, 
credit, market regulation, land development, construction of transport facilities and 
many others as well. National planning is the process of deciding what the government 
is going to do with respect to each of those policies and actions affecting agricultural 
development within a given period of time. In making these decisions, the government 
must face up to the question of what is needed at the moment to move agriculture 
forward and what preparation needs to be made now in order to meet needs that can 
be foreseen in the near future. It must also take into account the amount and nature of 
its resources of money and manpower that can be applied to meeting the needs of 
agriculture."99 
However, each government will formulate its own objectives since all do not desire 
the same things equally or in the same proportions. The priority given by each 
government to economic objectives will differ. These priorities, as reflected in the 
various agricultural development plans, express the governments attitudes, preference 
and principles. Therefore, first the general background of the objectives and policies 
of agricultural development in Indonesia will be given to show the government's 
attempt to increase the agricultural production. This background is also valid for 
Java. 
This chapter primarily discusses agricultural development plans and therefore 
agricultural considerations play a decisive role. The author does feel the limitations of 
this presentation. If the reader wants to see Indonesian agricultural development in a 
broader context, as part of overall economic development plans, he should consult 
other studies and publications as well.100 
As explained in Chapter 1, the government has to face the problems of large food 
imports, especially rice, and the declining importance of agricultural exports. There-
*• A. T. MOSHER, Getting agriculture moving, New York, 1966, p. 169. 
100
 For the convenience of the readers not familiar with the literature on economic development of 
Indonesia, a list is included in the bibliographic references. 
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fore, efforts have been made to replace the import of food and to promote the export 
of agricultural products, as appeared from the succesive agricultural development 
plans in Indonesia. These plans will be briefly discussed in the next sections. 
6.2 The successive agricultural development plans 
6.2.1. The Special Welfare Program 
The first agricultural development plan after 1950 was launched in 1951, under the 
so-called 'Rentjana Kesedjahteraan Istimewa' (RKI), the Special Welfare Program.101 
In order to promote food production the government drew up plans arranged in two 
parts: a short-term plan, implying intensification of agriculture in Java, and a long-
term plan implying intensification and extension of rice fields in the Outer Provincies. 
The available funds should serve to a more general use of better strains, to the exten-
sion of the application of fertilizers, to combat pests and diseases, to the improvement 
of irrigation, and to bring new rice fields into production. 
This RKI is a combination of the so-called 'Kasimo Plan', which was launched by 
the Republic of Indonesia in Jogjakarta in 1948, during the revolution, and the 
'Welfare Plan' of the Government of the Dutch East Indies, which was designed for 
the territories under their control. After the transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch 
government to the Republic of Indonesia in December 1949, the two plans were 
combined and called the RKI. The scope of the plan, the goals to be achieved and the 
amount of funds allocated were modest. The budget for this plan and the production 
targets for the various crops were fixed annually. 
6.2.2. The Five Year Plan 1956-1960 
The Five Year Development plan102 1956-1960 was prepared by the State Planning 
Bureau under the guidance of the then Minister of National Planning, Dr. DJUANPA. 
It included the twenty year projection of Indonesia's needs, population growth rates, 
source of financing and an agricultural development plan. The whole plan called for 
expenditures to a total amount of Rp 30,000 million. The agricultural part, also called 
the Second Agricultural Plan, primarily written by the Minister of Agriculture with 
the assistance of foreign experts and the author himself, should receive 13% of the 
total amount allocated for the execution.103 
Actually this plan is a continuation of the RKI, but added are the non-food agri-
101
 Rentjana kesedjahteraan istimewa, Ministry of Agriculture, Djakarta, 1951-1955. 
102
 Garis-garis besar rentjana pembangunan Lima Tahun 1956-1960, Biro Perantjang Negara (State 
Planning Bureau), Djakarta, 1956 and 1957. 
108
 In the meantime the 13% had been increased to 20% as a result of an amendment on the Five 
Year Plan where emphasis was put on food production and shipping. 
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cultural development projects like forest industries, the promotion of export products, 
etc. Development expenditures were not specifically earmarked for individual projects 
in the government budgets. The total expenditures in each category were approximately 
met in money terms, but the inflation caused much of the budgeted amounts to be 
absorbed in the ordinary government operating expenditures. 
The quintupling of rice imports in 1955 to 1956, the decision to nationalize the 
remaining Dutch interests late in 1957 and the spreading rebellion in 1958 created 
major obstacles in carrying out this five-year plan; therefore it was adjusted to the then 
existing conditions. In 1957 major emphasis was put on the production of foodstuffs 
instead of the planned industrial projects. 
In early 1958 as the Dutch 'Royal Packet Company' (KPM) withdrew its vessels, 
the government had also to pay much attention to maritime shipping. 
6.2.3. The Three Years' Rice Program 1959-1962 
During the execution of the Five Year plan, the Ministry of Agriculture launched its 
third agricultural development plan, which was better known under the name of 
'Rentjana Swa Sembada Beras' (SBB, 'Selfsupporting in Domestic Rice Production 
Program'). This rice program was initiated in 1959 and aimed at selfsufficiency by the 
endofl962.104 
A more detailed account of the SSB will be given in Chapter 9. 
6.2.4. The National Overall Development Plan 1961-1969 
Before the Five Year plan was wholly executed, another plan was announced: the 
'National Overall Development Plan 1961—1969'.105 This eight year plan gives priority 
to projects designed to provide more autonomy to the local government and a more 
self-reliant economy. For the first three years emphasis should be put on food and 
clothing. The agricultural part (the fourth agricultural development plan since 1950), 
which was announced in August 1960, included the three years' rice plan (following the 
initiated plan of 1959) along with a number of other projects on food and fibre. 
The general Overall Plan is divided into two parts: 
A Projects, 335 in number (plus 39 provisional ones added later), are the core of the 
development program and are intended to contribute directly to national development. 
They consist of projects to increase domestic production for capital and consumption 
of both intangible and tangible forms. 
B Projects, falling into 8 categories are projects which are hoped to provide additional 
104
 Rentjana Tiga Tahun produksi beras, Departmen Pertanian (Ministry of Agriculture), Djakarta, 
1960. 
105
 Ringkasan ketetapan madjelis permusjawaratan rakjat sementana, Republik Indonesia, No I dan 
II/MPRS/1960 (People's Consultative Congress), Djakarta, 1960. 
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rupiah and foreign exchange revenues sufficient to cover the cost of the A projects. It 
is primarily concentrated on the increase of agriculture exports (e.g. rubber, tea, 
coffee, copra, fish), mineral export (e.g. tin and oil) and tourism.106 
The A projects contain twelve major groups which, together with their expected 
expenditures, are shown in Table 71. 
The B projects, to be started at the same time as the A projects, comprise the planned 
expansion of agricultural and mineral export production. Other B projects are mainly 
increases of receipts from existing sources that are to be reserved for financing the 
Overall Development Plan. This plan aims at gross foreign exchange receipts of 
nearly $2500 million, equivalent to about 111,000 million rupiah at the official 
exchange rate in 1960 (1 US $=Rp 45) and gross rupiah receipts of 120,000 million 
rupiah, or a total equivalent to about 231,000 million rupiah. Table 72 shows these 
Table 71. 'A-projects' in Eight Year Development Plan 1961-1969; money figures in thousand million 
rupiahs.1 
Group of projects 
Cultural 
Educational 
Research 
Public welfare 
Government 
Food 
Clothing 
Industry 
Health 
Transport and 
communications 
motor transport* 
rail transport* 
sea transport* 
air transport* 
other communica-
tions* 
Finance and Tourism 
Special projects 
(military) 
Total 
Project number Planned expenditures 
9 
43 
16 
11 
6 
8 
7 
81 
6 
144 
11 
1 
4 
5 
4 
3 
1 
335 
amount 
1.6 
16.3 
2.7 
6.2 
3.6 
25.1 
28.9 
52.0 
2.2 
60.2 
30.9 
7.0 
10.1 
4.5 
7.7 
11.3 
30.0 
240.0 
per cent. 
of total 
0.6 
6.8 
1.1 
2.6 
1.5 
10.5 
12.0 
21.7 
0.9 
25.1 
12.9 
2.9 
4.2 
1.9 
3.2 
4.7 
12.5 
100.0 
Allocation of expenditures 
local cur-
rency 
1.6 
16.3 
0.8 
6.0 
3.6 
14.0 
14.2 
28.2 
1.7 
36.2 
23.9 
3.0 
3.2 
2.2 
4.0 
10.5 
_ 
133.0 
foreign 
currency 
_ 
1.9 
0.2 
11.1 
14.7 
23.8 
0.5 
24.0 
7.1 
4.0 
6.9 
2.3 
3.7 
0.8 
_ 
77.0 
not all-
ocated 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
— 
_ 
„ 
_ 
„ 
__ 
30.0 
30.0 
converted at the official exchange rate of 1 US % = R P 45 
^ ~ ^ ^ ^ °^ i n ^ a t i o n as cited in: lndonesia. 
1
 Fishing is included in the Department of Agriculture. 
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Table 72. Gross and net receipts on 'B Projects' and costs of'A Projects' in Eight Year Development 
Plan 1961-1969. 
Gross receipts from B projects 
Expenditures for B projects 
Net receipts 
Cost of A projects4 
Net receipts from B projects 
Financing not provided for 
In foreign exchange 
in mill. $ 
2,462.5 
1,391.3s 
1,071.2 
2,213.0 
1,071.2 
1,141.8 
in 1000 mill. 
Rp1 
110.8 
62.62 
48.2 
99.6 
48.2 
51.4 
In 1000 mill. Rp 
120.0 
38.03 
82.0 
140.0 
82.0 
58.4 
Total in 1000 
mill. Rp1 
230.8 
100.6 
130.2 
240.0 
130.2 
109.8 
1
 US Dollars expressed in rupiahs at the official exchange rate of 1 S — Rp 45. 
' On the most unfavourable assumption of Rp 62,000 million cost of capital and consumer goods 
and the officially given 600 million rupiah foreign exchange cost of the tin projects. 
"Includes 33,750 million rupiah for purchasing foreign exchange from oil companies and 4,230 
million rupiah for reducing rubber and copra smuggling and for promoting tin and tourism 
projects. 
4
 It is assumed here that 75 % of the cost of the 'Special Projects' consist of foreign exchange 
cost, and 25 % of rupiah cost (see Table 71). 
Source: as in Table 71. 
Table. 73. Expectedreceiptsfrom'B Projects'in Eight Year Development Plan 1961-1969. 
Foreign exchange revenue Total revenue in 
1000 mill. Rp 
in million u s » in IUUU mm. Kp* 
Oil: 
government share of exports 
foreign companies' capital in Rp 
Timber export increase 
Saving on fish import 
Copra export increase2 
Rubber export increase2 
Tin export increase 
Aluminium export increase 
Tourism 
Result of 1959 'monetary reform' 10 
Share of state enterprise profits 32 
Community saving 8 
Sale of shares and bonds 8 
Sale of capital goods 16 
Sale of consumer goods 46 
Total 2,462.5 110.8 120 
US $
1,180 
750 
52.5 
12.5 
76 
320 
15 
11.5 
45 
1000 ill R 1 
53.1 
33.7 
2.4 
0.6 
3.4 
14.4 
0.7 
0.5 
2.0 
1
 Converted at the official exchange rate of Rp 45 per US S. 
* Through efforts to eliminate smuggling. 
Source: as in Table 71. 
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sources more specifically. In the execution of the A projects, agriculture plays an 
important role as can be seen from this table. About 22.5 % of the total investments is 
allocated for the execution of food and clothing projects which are primarily of agri-
cultural origin. 
In the implementation of the B projects, in order to earn additional foreign exchange 
for financing the A projects, about 20 % is expected from agricultural sources as 
can be seen from Table 73. 
6.3 Objectives and policies of agricultural development in 
Java 
From what has been described in Chapters 3 to 5 it is obvious that the crucial problem 
of agricultural development in Indonesia is how to get agriculture moving in Java. 
If a solution could be found to Java's agricultural problems, agricultural development 
in the whole of Indonesia would be a relatively easy task. Thus the objectives of 
agricultural development as explained earlier, namely increasing food production and 
earning more foreign exchange, are of general importance. Therefore emphasis has 
been put on the following measures: (a) providing adequate food for the growing 
population, (b) assistance in earning or saving foreign exchange, (c) alleviating the 
population pressure on land primarily by transferring farmers to the less populated 
areas of the Outer Provinces. Other objectives are: (d) supplying raw materials for the 
growing industrial economy, (e) building up the economic and social overhead 
capital in the rural areas for a healthy and prosperous rural economy, and (f) reducing 
underemployment and increasing rural incomes through more intensive techniques. 
, ! S <eeniena« ^  m ^ S tUdy ' J a V a 'S P°Pula t i°a ^creased from 50.5 million in 1950 
to 64.6 m 1963, an increase of about 28 % in a period of 12 years. The absolute mag-
nitude of this increase (14.1 million) is superimposed on an already huge mass, while 
e l * ' ! ^ ° U t e r P rOVinCeS a r e S p a r s e I y P°Pu l a t e d- Moreover, non-agri-
TrTc/ 7 Tbeen able to absorb *•net kcrease of p ° p u l a t i o n - F o o d 
andt T ^ Y * * ° f ^ d 0 m i n a t e S t h e C u l t u r a l economy of this island, 
Before W T H W * T ? * ^ **"* t 0 M t h e r aP id ly b a s i n g population. 
Butft ^ ' " ' ^ . ^ ^ ^ P ^ a v i t a l role in theJavanese economy. 
^^^T00 T m 1933) and later because ° f the war and the revo lu t ion> 
Z t o * T rlbeen a W e t 0 F e g a i n ^ f 0 r m e r P ° s i t i - - Therefore, accord-
2 a v t Z I T ' fCre SCem t 0 b C t h r e C m a h l P° s s i b i l i t i e s o f t e s t i n g capital in 
S S Z S ^ e T 7 7 y ' D a m e I y ( a ) t h e t r a n s f e r o f J a v a **e farmers to the 
rsutZtt^T ^ (b) t 0 Pay Spedal a t t en t ion t o t he rehabilitation of 
a^d TasSL t ? T ^ ^ U D d e r S ta tC m a n a ^ e n t , and (c) fertilization 
tTchmwZr^ ' ? ^ °f be t te t Seed a n d o t h e r proved agricultural 
techniques to mcrease the production of peasants'agriculture. 
In^eTurZ Cnant T%? 2 "** **" P°SSibiUtieS t0 achieVe its o b J e c t i v e s ' 
InthefoUowmgChapteritwillbediscussedinhowfarsuccesswasmetwith. 
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7 Agricultural resettlement 
7.1 Organized agricultural resettlement in the Outer Provinces 
7.1.1. Necessity and prewar development of agriculture resettlement 
To gain a better insight into the scope of agricultural resettlement projects it may be 
helpful to start with a short description of land use and distribution of population in 
the whole of Indonesia. 
In 1962 only 9 % of the land area in Indonesia was regarded as arable as illustrated 
by Table 74.107 But there is a striking difference between the intensity of land use in 
Java and Madura and the other major islands. Whereas 68 % of the land in Java and 
Madura is divided into small farms or estates, in Borneo, the other extreme, only 1 % 
is under regular agricultural use. In total, about 60% of the country is covered by 
forest, while 30 % is urban, waste and unclassified land. 
The last official census of Indonesia, in 1961, revealed that the total population 
amounted to 97,085 million.108 With a land area of 1,904,345 square kilometers, this 
gives an average density of 51 persons per square kilometer.109 This figure does not 
reflect the real problem of population density, because it does not take into account 
the extremely uneven distribution over the archipelago. The population of Java and 
Madura alone was 63,059 million in 1961, or nearly two thirds of the total; yet these 
islands make up only 7% of the land surface of Indonesia. The density of Java and 
Madura is 25 times the average density in the Outer Islands, as can be seen from Table 
75. 
There is a limit beyond which the cultivated area cannot be enlarged at the expense of 
the forest cover without serious consequences. This limit has already been passed on 
Java. Foresters have estimated that 30% of the land should be covered by forest to 
safeguard the water supply so vital to the sawahs of the island. Instead, forests now 
occupy only 22 %. (see Table 74). 
On the other hand, the Outer Islands have considerable possibilities for agricultural 
expansion, since much more land than necessary for the control of erosion is still 
107
 The actual figure of the land under agriculture may be higher, as the conventional figure given by 
the Ministry of Agriculture for arable land amounts to 16 million ha instead of 13.7 million ha 
mentioned in Table 74. The difference can be explained by the inclusion of land devoted to shifting 
cultivation in the Ministry of Agriculture's figures. 
108
 Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 13. 
109
 Ibid. 
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Table 75. Population density in Indonesia, 1961. 
Population in 1961 Area in square km Density per square 
in millions km 
Java and Madura 
Other islands 
Indonesia 
63,059 
34,026 
97,085 
132,174 
1,772,171 
1,904,345 
477 
19 
51 
Source: Statisticalpocketbook of'Indonesia 1963, p. 13. 
under forest. Nothing would seem more natural than an attempt to solve Java's 
problem of overpopulation with large-scale migration to the Outer Islands. 
Transmigration has a history that goes back to the early part of the present century 
when the Netherlands East Indies' Government initiated organized resettlement to the 
Outer Islands. From 1905 to 1941, 204,000 persons moved from Java to the Outer 
Islands and 45,000 ha of new land were brought under cultivation. After some trial 
and error, the program was well under way just before World War II, when a tem-
porary halt was put to this migration.110 The present study will be restricted to the 
policies and achievements of the postwar period, and local transmigration will not be 
considered.111 
7.1.2. Considerations on postwar transmigration 
The postwar problems of transmigration are considered by the government to differ 
from those of the prewar period. The present transmigration or land settlement 
program should not be considered as the logical continuation of the plans of the 
former Netherlands East Indies' Government. The considerations leading to the 
present transmigration projects are the following: 
(a) It is certainly true that the population problem of Java is yet to be solved, among 
other means, by transmigration. But at present, there are other considerations (to 
be mentioned below) of the government that make transmigration desirable. 
These considerations are perhaps even more important than moving surplus 
population. If, however, in the process some of the population pressure on Java 
is alleviated, this is all to the good. The other side of the coin is that solely trans-
migration is not sufficient to solve the problem of Java's overgrowing population. 
(b) The Indonesian economy is almost entirely agricultural and in world trade it 
could do more than supply raw materials. On the import side, Indonesia still 
requires food and at the same time it also strives to import capital goods. The 
110
 Sie Kwat Soen, Land colonization in Indonesia, Ithaca, 1957. (Unpublished M.Sc. thesis, available 
at the Cornell University Library). 
111
 For readers interested in the pre-war achievements several excellent publications are available 
(see the bibliography at the end of this study). 
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extent to which such an economy is dependent on the vagaries of the international 
market is already known and does not need elaboration here. Planned diversifica-
tion of the economy, also leading to further industrialization, is required to escape 
the nearly complete dependence on external market and sources of supply. But to 
all intents and purposes, in the initial stages industrialization will require imports 
of machinery and industrial equipment of all types. Since the government is of the 
opinion that increasing agricultural exports in the short run will be of doubtful 
value, it has attempted to raise the domestic production of basic foodstuffs for 
internal consumption in order to save foreign exchange. It is then to be hoped 
that a larger portion of imports could be devoted to capital goods. 
As earlier explained, the program for increasing domestic food production can 
be accomplished by doing two things: by extending the land area and by inten-
sifying the use of existing farm lands. As the possibilities to expand agricultural 
lands on Java have reached their limit, the extension of agricultural land should 
be accomplished in the Outer Provinces. 
(c) After the war, defense considerations played an important role. The settlement of 
large numbers of young men, if possible with military training in such strategic 
locations as Borneo was considered very important. 
(d) Furthermore the unitary state of Indonesia requires increasing assimilation of the 
Javanese and other ethnic groups in order to minimize the centrifugal political 
forces inherent in Indonesian nationalism. In other words, the government wants 
'Indonesianization', the creation of a homogenous nation in which the problem of 
regionalism will gradually vanish. 
7.1.3. Quantity and quality of land available in the Outer Islands 
Although there is still much empty land outside Java which can be reclaimed for 
transmigration needs, for the time being and because of various difficulties, the 
government is devoting its main attention to open areas which have been sufficiently 
investigated. Even here, the projects are limited to the sections which offer the best 
possibilities and the reclamation of which can be most easily accomplished. The areas 
which are intended for transmigration centers amount according to the Ministry of 
Agriculture, to 2,542,000 ha, of which 695,000 ha of forest areas would be suitable for 
agriculture and 1,947,000 ha is proposed for forestry projects (Tables 76 and 77). 
Actually, the figure given by the Ministry of Agriculture is on the low side. 
As has been said before, the Outer Islands have considerable possibilities for agri-
cultural expansion, since much more land than necessary is covered by forest. There 
is a forest area of about 120,000,000 ha, including the forest reserve required for 
erosion control, distributed over the archipelago as can be seen in Table 78. But the 
situation is not as favourable as this table suggests. The forest area includes not only 
primary forest, but also an extensive area covered by alang-alang (iwperata cylindricd) 
and second growth forest.112 Therefore, the author considers much more significant 
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Table 76, Forest areas in Indonesia considered suitable for agriculture in 1963. 
Location 
West Pisang 
West Rumbia 
West Terusan 
South Mesudji, West Tulangbawang 
(Bedara nunggal) 
South Mesudji, South Lumpur 
(Sungai Gebang) 
Rantaubinuang 
Langsa 
Bulaksana (Singkil) 
Delta Kapuas (Pontianak) 
Sikau (Kumai) 
Mamudji 
Total 
Province 
Lampung (Sumatra) 
Lampung (Sumatra) 
Lampung (Sumatra) 
Lampung (Sumatra) 
Palembang (Sumatra) 
Riau (Sumatra) 
Atjeh (Sumatra) 
Atjeh (Sumatra) 
West Borneo 
Central Borneo 
South Celebes 
Area (ha) Remarks 
20,000 
40,000 
80,000 
100.0001 
80,000 
60,000 
30,000 
75,000 
80,000 
40,000 
90,000 
695,000 
Replacement of these 
forest areas in another 
locality is desirable 
1
 It is expected that the Sanggarbuana Ltd. and the Tokyo Wood Working Industry will con-
duct logging operations in these areas. 
Source: Department of Forestry, Ministry of Agriculture, Contribution to the realization of the 
transmigration projects, 1966, p. 10. 
the figure given for available 'unoccupied' land by the State Planning Bureau. This 
refers to land which has already been investigated and found suitable for agricultural 
purposes, but not yet utilized. This land, 4,312,000 ha, scattered over the archipelago, 
represents more realistically the amount of land available for transmigration purposes 
in the next ten to twenty years; Table 79 supplies some details"3. 
The quality of the soil must be taken into account in considering the available 
quantity of land. It should be kept in mind that the soil of Java for the greater part is 
unusually fertile for tropical regions, largely owing to its origin from volcanic ash of 
about neutral chemical reaction. Large areas in Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes are 
devoid of volcanoes and here some of the soils are strikingly poor. But this infertility 
is not an insurmountable obstacle, as modern agricultural technology can improve 
soil fertility by using fertilizers, growing leguminous plants, etc. 
The amount and distribution of rainfall also greatly affects the fertility of tropical 
soils and hence population density. Heavy rainfall throughout the year combined 
with high temperature leaches the soil. Such rainfall in most parts of Sumatra, Borneo 
and some parts of Celebes, helps to account for the inferiority of their soils as com-
112
 If, due to the population pressure, fire repeatedly attacks abandoned temporary fields, finally only 
grasses and some herbs and shrubs survive. These persist because their roots, tubers or bulbs send 
out new shoots after the fire. The most important grass that finally triumphs over forest vegetation is 
Imperata cylindrica, called 'alang-alang' in Indonesia. (PELZER, op. cit.,fii. 52, p. 19.). 
113
 See also Table 80 for the area under cultivation in the Outer Islands. 
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Table 77. Proposed forestry projects. 
Name and kind of projects 
L = logging, P = pulp 
Special projects to assist transmigration: 
Pulau Pini (North Sumatra), L 
Sasak/Kinali (West Sumatra), L 
Tapan (West Sumatra), L 
Sunai Gaung (Riau), L 
Sungai Buaja (Lampung), L 
Meliau (West Borneo), L 
Arut Kumai (Central Borneo), L 
Palangkaraja I (Central Borneo), L 
Mamudju (South Celebes), L 
Other projects : 
SingkiKAtjehiSL 
Simalur (Atjeh)1, L 
Penjengat (Riau)1, L 
Way Hitam (South Sumatra)1, L 
Warsamson (West Irian), L 
Manukwari (West Irian), L 
Nabiro (West Irian), L 
Sarmi (West Irian), L 
Nunukan (East Borneo)2, L 
Sesajap (East Borneo)2, L 
Malinau (East Borneo)2, L 
Pulau Laut (South Borneo), L 
Sampit (Central Borneo)2, L 
Takengon (Atjeh)1, L 
Siondop (North Sumatra)1, L 
Torgamba (North Sumatra)1, L 
Mursala (North Sumatra)1, L 
Batahan (North Sumatra)1, L 
Mentawai (West Sumatra)1, L 
Bukit Gadang (West Sumatra)1, L 
Mandau (Riau)1, L 
Rangau (West Sumatra)1, L 
Sengati Kahidupan (Djambi)1, L 
Semangus (South Sumatra)1, L 
Rawos (South Sumatra)1, L 
Sokosuban (South Sumatra)1, L 
Sampit (Central Borneo), P 
Samarinda (East Borneo), P 
Batulitjin (South Borneo), L 
Palankaraja II (Central Borneo), L 
Palangkaraja III (Central Borneo), L 
Obi (Moluccas), L 
Buru (Moluccas), L 
Total 
Area (ha) 
17,000 
60,000 
30,000 
50,000 
40,000 
80,000 
100,000 
20,000 
80,000 
60,000 
40,000 
50,000 
30,000 
60,000 
120,000 
80,000 
120,000 
18,000 
18,000 
18,000 
20,000 
20,000 
80,000 
50,000 
50,000 
6,000 
14,000 
30,000 
60,000 
40,000 
20,000 
30,000 
70,000 
31,000 
30,000 
40,000 
40,000 
25,000 
60,000 
60,000 
40,000 
40,000 
1,947,000 
Annual ca-
pacity (m3) 
60,000 
120,000 
120,000 
120,000 
60,000 
120,000 
120,000 
60,000 
120,000 
120,000 
120,000 
120,000 
60,000 
120,000 
120,000 
120,000 
120,000 
80,000 
80,000 
80,000 
80,000 
80,000 
270,000 
166,000 
100,000 
30,000 
30,000 
33,400 
100,000 
107,000 
40,000 
70,000 
120,000 
82,700 
40,000 
5,000s 
5.0003 
80,000 
100,000 
100,000 
80,000 
80,000 
Number of 
transmigrants 
500 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
500 
1,000 
1,000 
500 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
500 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
200 
200 
200 
200 
200 
1,300 
850 
500 
150 
150 
150 
500 
500 
150 
400 
600 
400 
150 
100 
100 
200 
500 
500 
400 
400 
24,000 
Required an-
nual funds 
(USS) 
100,000 
200,000 
200,000 
200,000 
100,000 
200,000 
200,000 
100,000 
200,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
50,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
150,000 
150,000 
300,000 
150,000 
150,000 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
-
-
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
3,200,000 
' Trans Sumatra Highway forestry projects. »Projects in operation. ' In tons. 
Note: The contribution can be increased if wood industries can be integrated in the logging pro-jects. 
Source: Department of Forestry, Ministry of Agriculture, Contribution to the realization of the 
transmigration projects. 1966, pp. 11-12. 
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pared with those of Java, where especially in the middle and eastern provinces the 
rainfall is concentrated in the west monsoon. Obviously much research work still must 
be done to find just how to manage the poor tropical soils. 
Still a further consideration is the accessibility of the areas to markets. Much of the 
area of the Outer Islands is hidden behind mountains or jungles. The cost of opening 
transportation facilities would be tremendous. This is a limitation which can only be 
overcome slowly. 
Table 78. Forest area in Indonesia, in 1000 ha (1966). 
Cultivated or under Without fixed pur-
regular supervision pose 
Total 
Java and Madura 
Sumatra 
Borneo 
Celebes 
Moluccas and West Irian 
Lesser Sunda Islands 
Indonesia 
2,990.8 
7,793.2 
3,908.4 
1,689.2 
-
1,218.2 
18,000 
-
20,626.8 
37,561.6 
8,220.8 
37,500.0 
265.6 
105,000 
2,990.8 
28,420.0 
41,470.0 
9,910.0 
37,500.0 
1,483.8 
120,000 
The difference of about 6,000,000 ha in the totals is caused by the fact that in Dr. MAHAN'S 
figures in Table 74 some of the forest areas are included in the non-classified land. 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Forestry: Forest resources in Indonesia, 1966, 
p. 5. 
Table 79. Available unoccupied land in the Outer Islands, in hectares (1954). 
North Central South 
Sumatra Sumatra Sumatra 
Borneo Celebes 
687,000 
Moluccas 
150,000 
Lesser 
Sunda Is-
lands 
263,000 
Total 
4,312,000 607,000 1,030,000 776,000 799,000 
Source: State Planning Bureau, Questionnaire for Indonesia, MI700IXW54-30,1954. 
Table 80. Cultivated area of smallholders' agriculture in the Outer Islands, Indonesia, 1954 (in ha). 
North Sumatra 
Central Sumatra 
South Sumatra 
Borneo 
Celebes 
Lesser Sunda Islands 
Total 
Lowland 
rice 
254,500 
241,800 
124,200 
196,600 
_ 
248,300 
1,493,400 
Dry fields 
249,100 
222,600 
266,900 
-
47,500 
252,200 
1,673,800 
Shifting cultivation 
upland rice 
130,400 
142,000 
197,500 
244,000 
45,500 
-
855,800 
perennial 
crops 
17,400 
28,100 
42,900 
-
-
16,000 
107,200 
Permanent 
perennial 
crops 
288,300 
783,800 
398,500 
393,500 
47,500 
62,900 
2,368,300 
Total 
939,700 
1,418,300 
1,030,000 
833,300 
140,500 
579,400 
6,498,500 
Source: See Table 79. 
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7.1.4. Administrative organization of transmigration 
According to Government Regulation No. 2 of 1952, the plans for resettlement shall 
be drawn up by the Director of the State Planning Bureau.114 In order to coordinate 
the migration program a Committee of Transmigration was established in 1955. 
The members consist of representatives of various Ministries (with the Vice Premier as 
chairman), the National Reconstruction Bureau (Biro Rekonstruksi Nasional, BRN 
and the National Reserve Corps (Corps Tjadangan Nasional, CTN).U5 The author 
served in the capacity of secretary from 1953 to 1955. This Coordination Committee is 
responsible for handling the work of the various ministries and agencies. 
Since 1959 this Committee has been reorganized several times. Sometimes it is 
called Board of Transmigration and, apart from changes in persons, its composition 
remained more or less the same. 
The government's organized program for internal migration, or transmigration, is 
under responsibility of three agencies. Two of them devote their time to the settlement 
of veterans of the revolution and the army, while the third deals with the other popula-
tion groups. 
The CTN was established to handle ex-members of the regular Indonesian army. It 
was subsequently reorganized into the BPBAT (Biro Penampungan Bekas Anggauta 
Tentara or Resettlement Bureau for Ex-service Men). 
The BRN was organized to resettle former guerilla fighters, people who were active 
during the revolution as 'irregulars'. Finally, the Department of Transmigration dealt 
with the resettlement in the more traditional sense. 
The BPBAT and the BRN are provisional organizations to be disbanded as soon as 
the rehabilitation of ex-fighters and reservists is completed. The Department of 
Transmigration is recognized as a permanent organization116; its responsibilities are 
as follows: (a) In the assembly area (Java): registration of the candidates for resettle-
ment, collection and transport, and subsidizing during collection and transport; 
(b) La the resettlement area: investigation, survey, opening and distribution of the 
land, together with reception, location and care of migrants, and provision for the 
welfare of the migrants, beginning with the formation and centralization of an econ-
omic and social organization to be channeled into a village-city form of society. 
7.1.5. Selection of settlers 
The 'ten commandments of MAASSEN', the guiding rules for selecting settlers for the 
regular transmigration as described in the following pages are still applied by the 
Department of Transmigration.117 They are: 
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(1) Select genuine farmers; non-farmers are a burden for a settlement and endanger 
its success. 
(2) Select physically strong people; only they can stand the hardships of pioneering. 
(3) Select young people; by taking them, one reduces future population increase on 
Java. 
(4) Select families; families are the foundation of peace and order in the settlement. 
(5) Don't select families with many young children; the working members of the 
family cannot carry that burden at the start. 
(6) Don't select former plantation labourers; in 90 % of the cases they are cause of 
discontent in the settlement. 
(7) Don't allow so-called 'resettlement marriage'; they are a source of unrest in 
settlement.118 
(8) Don't accept expectant mothers; the pioneer settler needs the full help of the 
wife during the first years. 
(9) Don't accept bachelors; sooner or later they will become involved with some-
body else's wife. 
(10) Allow dessas or kampongs to migrate as a whole; in such cases the first nine 
commandments may be ignored. 
7.1.6. Kinds of transmigration 
One of the 'faults' in the resettlement scheme as it operated just before the war, was the 
preference given to families, thus ignoring the fact that the village, as well as the 
family, is a basic social unit among the Javanese. 
The Indonesian government has noticed the weakness of former resettlement plans 
and tried to correct them in its new transmigration scheme. Large-scale migrations are 
now contemplated, based on colonization by integrated village units, including, 
wherever possible, the head of the village and the religious elders. But such a group 
colonization will not facilitate the dispersion of migrants among the autochthonous 
population, thus slowing down the 'Indonesianization process'. 
In 1956 the government planned to carry out an interesting project which was called 
Transmigrasi intellectueel' (the transmigration of intellectuals). 'Intellectual' is 
broadly defined to include not only persons with high school and more advanced 
education, but also those with skills, such as carpenters, blacksmiths, etc. Such mi-
grants are intended to form new, non-agricultural villages. But it is stressed that it 
is not the purpose of the government to create a special class in these transmigration 
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areas.119 Future transmigration policy may be significantly affected by comparing the 
achievements of transmigration of intellectuals with the transmigration of farmers. 
In 1955, there was also a plan to move students with agricultural high-school train-
ing to Central Sumatra. Their allotment of land was to be 10 to 15 ha and it was 
intended that they would apply mechanization to rice cultivation on dry land.120 But it 
is doubtful whether this form of agriculture will be feasible in Indonesia; experience 
in the past has not been encouraging. Further information on the execution of this 
project is not available. 
The standard colonists' allotment consists of two hectares of land. Irrigation is 
provided for, the land is cleared and contoured, a house is built and roads are estab-
lished. Travelling expenses to the site are furnished and a subsistence allowance is 
granted until the first harvest. Seeds, tools and financial aid are given for rising the 
rice crop. Besides these facilities, the migration areas are provided with medical clinics, 
schools and other social overhead capital. 
According to plans of the Department of Transmigration, two million people or 
400,000 families will be moved to the following islands during the eight years' period 
beginning in 1961121: 
Sumatra 640,000 persons (32 %) 
Borneo 1,040,000 „ (52 %) 
Celebes 89,000 „ ( 4.5%) 
Moluccas and West Irian 230,000 „ (11.5%) 
Lesser Sunda Islands (excluding Lombok) 1,000 „ ( 0 %) 
The policy of the Department of Transmigration is to direct its activities towards 
the following subjects122: 
(a) Placing settlers in already well-established areas, where there is still room for 
more settlers. 
(b) Carrying forward projects which are not finished, i.e. in regions now only partly 
occupied by resettlers. 
(c) Opening new settlements adjacent to progressive resettlers. 
The formation of a new isolated settlement requires previous detailed investiga-
tions as transmigration is justified only when all possibilities have been studied 
intensively enough to guarantee a healthy growth later on.123 
By confining transmigration to already established areas, the seeds, etc., which the 
settlers need, can be more easily provided. If, at times, a shortage of food occurs from 
pests or diseases, the settlers may expect help from neighbours. A shortage of labour 
also can be met in this way. For example, seasonal labour shortage may appear during 
the period when soil is prepared or during harvesting while irregular labour demand 
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may arise during the construction and repair of roads, dams and water channels. 
A new settlement isolated in the middle of the rain forest often suffers from plant 
pests. 
Settlements should be located as much as possible near transport facilities, or there 
must, at least, be a possibility of creating a transportation network in the future. 
The size of new resettlements must be adequate for efficient operation.124 Experience 
has shown clearly that tiny colonies are difficult to keep alive. 
7.1.7. Economic organization of the settlement area 
Before World War II, 1.05 ha of sawah in new settlements was thought to guarantee a 
proper subsistence for a family. The governement provided 2 ha to each family and 
presented a proposal to enlarge it to 3 ha.125 According to KEYFITZ and WIDJOJO, the 
settlers indeed got 1.4 ha, being 1.05 ha arable land and 0.35 ha for a house and 
surrounding gardens.126 This gives a total of 1.4 ha, while later on TAMBUNAN mentions 
in the Work Plan for 1951 an increase in the allotment of workable land to 2 ha 
per family.127 
Land is allocated in accordance with the Department of Transmigration Regulation 
no. 3 of 1953, article 6, which provides that every migrant familyin the area shall be 
given land by the government as follows: 
(a) For the non-farmer a plot of land at least 0.25 ha in size for his house. 
(b) For the farmer, a plot of land 0.25 ha for a house and at least 1.75 ha for work 
land. 
(c) The farmer-migrant shall have cultivation rights on the afore said work land for 
three years. 
(d) If, according to an examination by the Department of Transmigration the above 
mentioned workable land has been cultivated as well as possible, the rights of 
cultivation shall be changed to a right of ownership. 
(e) The non-farmer who later wants to farm also can be given work land in the same 
manner as for the farmers'.128 
The problem of determining the size of land holdings to be allocated to migrants is 
not only related to considerations of land and labour, but involves capital require-
ments, especially if expenditure for clearing the forest, building the roads, etc. are 
necessary prior to settling. 
The determination of an optimum size of holding on this basis therefore resolves 
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itself into the problem of estimating optimum production factor proportions. If land 
and capital are available in abundance, then there is no problem. But in Indonesia, 
with its shortage of capital, transmigration must compete with alternative uses such 
as agricultural techniques and mechanization. Moreover, with respect to size of 
holdings, economic factors need not dominate. The government also has to face polit-
ical difficulties, and it has to avoid giving the impression of favouring the Javanese 
farmers at the expense of the autochthonous population. A solution might be found 
by stipulating that, wherever migrants from seriously overpopulated areas of Java 
are recruited for agricultural colonies in the Outer Islands, every province of Indonesia 
has the right to be represented in the settlement project of the government. 
The first method, moving people from Java to the Outer Islands, is probably more 
efficient in relieving pressure in locations where this relief is mostly needed. The 
second method sacrifices part of the efficiency for the broader objectives of giving 
citizens, from all parts of Indonesia, the right to share in a national undertaking. At 
the same time it achieves the goal of breaking down provincialism and promoting 
national solidarity by bringing together as many divergent groups as possible. 
It is not practicable to leave the clearing of the forest entirely to the settlers129, 
because such work, on say two hectares, is far too heavy for one family, especially 
when the vegetation is entirely jungle (which is normal). If the clearing work has to be 
finished quickly, it should be carried out by machinery or, if this is not possible, the 
job should be given on contract to local inhabitants who really understand such work. 
The land which has been cleared must be planted as soon as possible. If planting is 
not promptly done, the already mentioned alang-alang will quickly cover the cleared 
area. Once this has happened, the cost of reclamation is prohibitive. Such grass plains 
serve solely as hunting reserves. 
For this reason, the transport of prospective settlers should be timed to match 
exactly the progress in opening the forest land of the new colony. To secure efficient 
clearing of forest land, the government has formed the 'Jajasan Pembukaan Tanah 
Transmigrasi' (Japeta), the Institute for the Opening of Settlement Land, which 
closely cooperates with the Department of Transmigration. Moreover, the Japeta has 
a representative on the Coordination Committee of Transmigration. Except for the 
one year, when it was included in the Department of Transmigration, this institution 
received a seperate budget appropriation. 
The basic administrative area for transmigration is the resettlement district.130 Such a 
district will have an area of at least 12,000 ha and it will be supplied with whatever 
equipment is considered necessary. Resettlement districts will be organized by the De-
partment of Transmigration and Japeta with the aid of other agencies (Public works, 
Irrigation, Internal Aifairs, Finance, Economic Affairs, Labour, Agriculture, etc.). 
Among the regions which are proposed for settlements the Sukadana Complex 
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(Lampung, Sumatra) is considered particularly suitable. Including roads etc. about 
140,000 ha of forest land and old secondary growth will gradually be transformed into 
ten districs.131 
Each district will be supplied with: 
(a) A 'mother village' for the Pamong Pradja (Civil Service) and other authorities, 
small scale industry, trade, etc. (100 ha). 
(b) A seed farm for paddy, secondary crops, fruits, commercial plants, etc. (50 ha). 
(c) A stock breeding center (100 ha). 
(d) Forest to the extent of 500 ha. 
(e) Farm land for about 4000 families (12,000 ha).132 
The pattern of agriculture is determined primarily by three purposes: food for the 
family, fodder for the livestock (chiefly draught animals) and products for sale. The 
small size of the productive unit results in emphasis on the first two needs. 
The structure of the agricultural labour economy is based on the dominance of the 
peasant family unit. This means that the majority of productive units in most transmi-
gration regions do not offer employment to outside labour, except at times when 
pressure of seasonal operations makes such employment unavoidable.133 
Although 2 ha of land are given to each settler, this does not necessarily improve 
his economic status as compared with that in Java (0.85 ha in the early fifties)134, 
because as a rule the land in Java is more fertile. Thus, the policy of the government 
does not raise the farmer in the settlement areas materially above the level of sub-
sistence. 
According to the Department of Transmigration135, the average per catita income 
in the colonization areas in 1954 was between Rp 2.70 and Rp 3.60 a day. In Jogja-
karta (Central Java) the agricultural labourer had at that time a per capita income of 
Rp 0.78 a day, while a farmer with land had Rp 3.91; the latter figure is explained by 
the fact that better irrigation facilities made double cropping possible. But if the settler 
comes from the class of agricultural labourers, his economic situation is substantially 
improved. 
Another aspect of the level of living of the settler which must be touched upon is 
food consumption. The average diet of the settler is favourable as compared with that 
in Java, qualitatively as well as quantitatively. But the level of food consumption and 
nutrition in the colonization areas can still be improved, especially with food rich in 
protein (pulses, meat, fish, etc.). 
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7.1.8. Obstacles to transmigration 
For the economic development of a resettlement area, a certain amount of accultura-
tion or assimilation of the new inhabitants is necessary. Therefore, no Javanese 
agricultural settlement could be founded without the collaboration of the basic 
population unit of the community in the Outer Islands.136 
Till now, the local community officials have shown themselves anxious to support 
Javanese settlement, probably because of the financial advantages connected with it. 
But it is doubtful if this attitude will persist indefinitely. The recent regional military 
revolts have indicated that the people of the Outer Islands seem to be 'restless' under 
the Java-oriented national government in Djakarta. Therefore it is the task of the 
present government to create an atmosphere in which transmigration is considered by 
all ethnic groups as a necessary national adventure, a national objective. All groups 
must understand that all Indonesians must have a stake in the success of transmigra-
tion. Education, extension work, and the press can contribute to make this agricul-
tural resettlement an integral part of the economic development of the whole country. 
The national government has to be tactful in carrying out these resettlement pro-
grams. The impression must not be created that the Javansee farmer will benefit at 
the expense of the autochthonous population in the Outer Islands. 
The social relationship between the autochthonous population and the settlers is 
another field where successful policies and techniques remain to be developed. As 
already mentioned earlier, the government's intention is that assimilation between the 
newcomers and the original inhabitants shall take place as soon as possible. In other 
words, the objective is Indonesianization, the creation of a homogenous nation and 
the reduction of regionalism to the point where it is no longer a threat to national 
existence.137 
In the resettlement area, however, this problem of regionalism becomes compli-
cated. According to BACHTIAR AMINUDDIN, the reasons are the 'mistakes' sometimes 
made in the newly built villages in the neighbourhood of the pioneer village: each new 
group tends to become isolated in its settlement. Even now, the relation between new-
comers and oldtimers leaves much to be desired. 
Other causes can be found in the mistakes made on both sides, especially in the 
Lampung area.138 
First, it can be said that the Lampung people look down on the newcomers. This is 
because they are generally well-to-do as compared with the newcomers, who represent 
the 'have nots'. Intermarriage is difiicult, because in addition to isolating themselves 
from one another: 
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(a) The bride money required by the Lampung people tends to make it too expensive 
to propose to a Lampung girl. 
(b) The Javanese are not allowed to visit the courting place (a place of rendez-vous 
for the Lampung youth). 
(c) The Lampung people seldom visit the market place of the Javanese or their cul-
tural performances. 
On the other hand, the newcomers make no effort to study the local language which 
is an important tool for mutual understanding. The Javanese language is quite general 
in Lampung and quite a number of the local people can communicate in Javanese.139 
Moreover, the names of the villages established by the newcomers are taken from their 
place of origin. Thus we see these new villages with names like Wonosobo, Wonogiri, 
Brebes, Purbolinggo and Wates taken from places existing in Java. 
BACHTIAR AMINUDDIN suggests that assimilation of the Javanese and the residents 
of the Lampung may be accelerated by the following140: 
(a) The establishment of political parties in the area. 
(b) The establishment of social clubs, labour and farmers unions, women's activities, 
neighbourhood associations, religious groups and so forth. 
(c) The organization of sport, youth groups and so forth. 
(d) The establishment of schools with the Indonesian language as the medium of 
instruction. 
(e) The establishment of buildings for public meetings. 
(f) The organization of an assimilated civil service. 
(g) The mixing of migrants from the same village among the local inhabitants instead 
of keeping them separate. 
(h) The entrance of the migrants into the marga (local community) and, more or less 
as a consequence, the rights to join landownership. 
Up to 1960 there was no comprehensive law or regulation in Indonesia concerning 
land, and the problem of land tenure was regionally regulated. Adat (custom) played 
a predominating role in all decisions in this field. Among others, various district lands, 
controlled by the marga, could not be 'disturbed' by people from outside that mar-
ga.141 Thus an important factor in this transmigration scheme is the question of 
ownership of and control over the land and whether the owner is willing to accept 
Javanese settlers. The securing of suitable land offers a complex problem since much 
of the area of the Outer Islands has been occupied permanently or temporarily by the 
indigenous people. Large parts of these areas are not actually used for agriculture, but 
are needed as gathering grounds for such forest products as rattan, resins and lumber, 
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and as hunting grounds. No person, unless belonging to the community that claims 
territorial sovereignity over such land, may use it without the consent of the communi-
ty. Such permission may usually be secured by the payment of a nominal fee. There-
fore an up-to-date agrarian law for the Outer Island was needed to establish suitable 
tenure rights for the settlers and to ensure the collaboration of the indigenous popula-
tion in the transmigration program. 
In 1960 the government enacted the Basic Agrarian Law no. 5 which concerns the 
basic principles of agrarian regulations. It settles the various landrights, the tenancy 
and rent arrangements, the limits of landownership, etc. Furthermore it is stated in 
this law that lands not belonging to individuals or public bodies, including the so-called 
'marga-land' in Sumatra and similar holdings in other parts of the Outer Provinces 
are owned by the state. 
The government can 'enforce' the establishment of agricultural land resettlement 
projects in certain areas even against the objection of the local community concerned. 
Formerly this was impossible, because it had no right to dictate plans to the marga. 
Of course, the government always tries to make the utmost efforts in coming to an 
agreement with the community before starting the executing of its plans. 
On the other hand, the government should administer the new legislation with 
much caution so as to avoid giving the impression to the indigenous population of the 
Outer Islands that their traditional rights are being pushed in order to favour the 
Javanese farmers. 
Land which is not included in some marga is usually located in areas where there 
are no human beings, and there the establishment of new settlements is particularly 
difficult. The solution here will be to construct roads between such areas and the 
outside world. But the important point is how to select pioneers who are willing to 
face loneliness in these extensive jungles. 
Generally it is accepted that the social ties in the traditional village community and 
the attachment to the soil are the main reasons which prevent the farmer from 
leaving his village. The Department of Transmigration has made intensive propaganda 
efforts to reduce the reluctance of the Javanese to migrate. It was reported that in 
1954 approximately 2,000,000 persons registered to be moved to the Outer Islands. 
But, due to lack of funds, only a small part of them could be actually transferred.142 
New ways have to be found to reduce the government's cost. This point will be 
covered later in this study where spontaneous colonization after the war will be 
discussed. 
Until now, the government has held the belief that the possibilities of irrigation in 
the new areas are especially important. The social prestige of the Javanese is based on 
the ownership of sawahs (wet rice field) and it is less difficult to persuade him to 
migrate to a wet growing region than to a region where he could never expect to 
establish sawah. 
But irrigation has its limits. Sooner or later a shift to dry field agriculture will be 
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necessary. Although the main feature of the postwar period in Indonesia has been the 
slow recovery of the prewar food consumption level, there is evidence suggesting that 
with the growth of the towns, the increasing industrialization and the gradual rise in 
national income, there may be a marked trend towards a more 'western' type of diet. 
This involves an increase in demand for such articles as oils, fats, fruits, vegetables 
and livestock products. This way, ultimately, also leads to a surplus in the production 
of rice. For this reason, the Agricultural Extension Service is encouraging the so-called 
'compound cultivation', i.e. planting of vegetables, fruit trees, tuberous plants and 
other crops on dry fields. 
Some efforts are also being made to integrate the development of crops with an 
expanded production of livestock. In this way animal residues are returned to the soil 
and will increase its fertility. This mixed crop-livestock agriculture is a promising line 
of development in Indonesian agriculture. 
Another possibility in dry field agriculture is the cultivation of export crops. But 
such a program is subject to important reservations. In particular, attractive prices of 
agricultural export products as compared with other crops, are certainly needed to 
encourage the farmers to plant those crops. 
Transportation is another limiting factor in carrying out the migration program on 
a large scale as shipping tonnage is scarce in Indonesia and shipping is essential since 
the country consists of many islands. 
However, the government's program can be carried out only over a long period 
owing to the weak state of public finance. But if the Department of Transmigration 
wants to speed up the rate of migration, it must find, among other things, a way to 
reduce the shipping shortage e.g., by chartering foreign ships. 
7.1.9. Cost of resettlement 
There are no accurate figures available on the costs of moving one family. 
In 1966, the Department of Forestry gave the following data.143 
(a) Land and land clearing. Each family consisting of 5 persons needs on the average 
2.5 ha of land: 1 ha for food crops, 0.75 ha for other crops, 0.25 ha for housing and 
gardening and 0.50 ha for roads and buildings. Of this 2.5 ha only 1 ha would be 
cleared by the government, while the rest can be done later on by transmigrants them-
selves. This 1 ha is intended for housing, gardening, roads and buildings, so that 0.25 
ha remains for food crops.JThe clearing of land, which amounts to 400,000 ha 
annually, has to be done mechanically. The necessary surveys would cost Rp 50/ha, 
Rp 250 has to be paid to free one hectare from ownership rights. Expenses for clearing 
are estimated on $ 60+Rp 350/ha. 
(b) Housing and other buildings. Each family is provided with a locally made pre-
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fabricated house of 36 m2 and 4 m2 for other buildings (schools, mosques, etc.). Total 
expenses: $ 52+Rp 6072 per family. 
(c) Agricultural seeds and tools. Each farmer needs some tools, 50 kg of fertilizers, 
7 kg paddy and 7 kg maize, which will cost Rp 250 per family. 
(d) Provision for the first 8 months. Monthly each family needs 40.5 kg rice, 1 kg salt, 
1 liter kerosene and 1 kg dried fish, together Rp 2880 for 8 months. Cooking utensils 
will cost Rp 75 per family, clothing Rp 250 per family. Total expenses per family for 
the first 8 months: Rp 3205. 
(e) Social welfare. For the first 5 months social care will cost Rp 1250 per family. 
(f) Total cost per person: Rp 2375+$ 22.50. 
A better estimate is the figure based on the author's study published in 1957. It 
starts from the three cost figures given by the Department of Transmigration, namely 
the expenditures of the Department of Transmigration, the budget of that Department 
and the amounts received per family of average size of 4.5 persons. The trend in the 
cost of moving people by the Department of Transmigration is given in Tables 81 and 
82. 
The expenditures in 1954 were about seventeen times as high as those in 1951, but 
the number of resettled persons rose only to its tenfold. Thus the rupiah cost per 
family increased. 
In examining the budget figures of the Department of Transmigration a continuous 
increase until 1953 is observed, then a drop occurs in 1954 and 1955 and they rise 
again in 1956. The increase of the total amount received per family from 1951-1954 
also indicates the increase in the total cost of moving. To this figure still have to be 
added expenditures for irrigation, road building, health and educational purposes. 
The cost of irrigation will account for a substantial part. S. K. DEY, UN Consultant 
on Community Development to the government of Indonesia, estimated it in 1955 at 
Rp 3000 per hectare.144 
Table 81. Budget amounts and expenditures of the Department of Transmigration, in million rupiahs, 
1950-1956. 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
Budget amounts 5 3.5 17.51 57.7 54.1 47.0 84.0 
Actual expenditures - 3.0 1.3* 45.3 50.4 
1
 Exclusive payroll of personnel. 
• The great difference between the figures for 1952 is caused by the fact that the expenditures for 
the JAPETA (Jajasan Pembukaun Tanah Transmigrasi. the Institute for the Opening of Settle-
ment Lands) were included in the budget of the Department of Transmigration. 
Sources: Department of Transmigration, Penlelenggaraan transmigrasi 1954, p. 4 (for the years 
1955 to 1954, and: ibid. 1956. p. 4 for the years 1955 and 1956). 
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Table 82. Amounts received and cost of moving per migration family, 1951-1954. 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
Number of migrants 
2,541 
16,825 
35,432 
26,239 
Amounts received 
per family in Rps 
4,304 
5,054 
5,191 
6,242 
Cost of moving 
actual cost in 
Rps1 
8,600 
10,100 
10,400 
12,500 
one family 
rupiah costs2 
in 1938 
230 
279 
326 
408 
1
 N. KEYFITZ and WIDIOJO, op. cit. (fn. 126), p. 127. The actual cost of moving is roughly twice 
the amount per family. This approximation has generally been accepted as a rule of thumb. 
' Obtained by dividing each figure in the preceding column by the corresponding index for the 
cost of living (see Table 83). 
Source: Department of Transmigration, Penjelenggaraan transmigrasi 1954, pp. 4-6. 
Table 83. Weighed index numbers of market prices of twelve foodstuffs in the countryside of Java, 
1950-1954(1938 = 100). 
1950 
1591 
1951 
3188 
1952 
3620 
1953 
3166 
1954 
3063 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts 1956. p. 70. 
Table 84. Specification of the amount received per migrant family of 4.5 persons 1951-1954. 
1951 in Rps 1952 in Rps 1953 in Rps 1954 
Household 
Clothing 
Agricultural equipment 
Seeds 
Housing costs 
Living expenses for 10 months 
Transportation 
Clearing 1 ha of land 
Cost of temporary quarters • 
Total 
89 
114 
31 
70 
2100 
950 
450 
500 
4304 
90 
121 
33 
40 
2000 
1250 
500 
750 
250 
5054 
40 
91 
50 
60 
2000 
1450 
550 
750 
250 
in Rps 
702 
55* 
602 
107 
2500 
1600 
600s 
1000 
250 
% oftotal 
amount 
1.1 
0.9 
1.0 
1.8 
40.2 
25.2 
9.7 
16.1 
4.0 
5191 6242 100.0 
1
 If the migrants have to wait for the distribution of houses. 
• The auantity of goods was lower than in 1951 and 1952. 
»The transportation costs amounted to Rp 600, whereas under 7.1.9. they were mentioned to be 
Rp 492. The difference is probably explained by the inclusions in the first figure, of board and 
lodging during travel. 
Source: Department of Transmigration. Penjelenggaraan transmigrasi 1954. Djakarta 1954, p. 4. 
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Table 85. Indebtedness of migrants to the government, 1950-1953 (in rupiahs). 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
Total 
Kind of migra-
tion scheme 
Regular 
Family 
Regular 
Family 
Regular 
Family 
Regular 
Family 
Number of mi-
grated families 
_ 
28 
102 
714 
1,823 
2,045 
8,939 
1,073 
14.7241 
Amount of debt 
to be repaid in 
1000 rupiahs 
_ 
2.9 
442,6 
102.1 
6,417.4 
322.1 
18,341.7 
159.7 
25,788.2 
Installment re-
ceived in 1000 
rupiahs 
_ 
0.7 
-
8.8 
-
18.8 
-
1.8 
30.1 
Balance of debt 
at the end of 
1954 in 1000 
rupiahs 
-
2.3 
442.4 
92.2 
6,417.4 
303.3 
18,341.7 
157.9 
25,758.1 
1
 If the average size of the family is considered to be 4.5 persons, the number of migrants does 
not correspond with the actual number ofmigrants given in Table 88. This difference is explained 
by the fact that there is another breakdown of families in the migration area due to marriages, etc. 
Source: Department of Transmigration. Penjelenggaraan transmigrasi 1954, Djakarta, 1955, p. 
34. 
Table 86. Number of transmigrants by territory of origin, 1962. 
West Java 
Central Java excl. Jogjakarta 
Jogjakarta 
East Java and Bali 
Other Lesser Sunda Islands 
South Sumatra 
Celebes and other territories 
General 
transmigration 
no. of 
families 
384 
1049 
249 
637 
121 
175 
— 
no. of 
persons 
1835 
4505 
1057 
3532 
522 
909 
-
Special 
transmigration1 
no. of 
families 
274 
1442 
136 
436 
152 
_ 
-
no. of 
persons 
1193 
5468 
590 
1914 
604 
_ 
-
Total 
no. of 
families 
658 
2491 
385 
1073 
273 
175 
no. of 
persons 
3028 
9973 
1647 
5446 
1126 
909 
1
 Comprising members of previously misrated familifc ir.^,i~-_ •• 
Source: Statisticalpocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 23. 
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Table 87. Number of transmigrants by area of settlement, 1962. 
North Sumatra 
West Sumatra 
South Sumatra 
Riau Archipelago 
West Borneo 
East Borneo 
Central Borneo 
South Borneo 
Celebes 
Western Lesser Sunda Islands 
Total 
General 
transmigration 
no. of 
families 
0 
100 
735 
58 
2 
606 
281 
743 
90 
0 
2,615 
no. of 
persons 
0 
481 
3,641 
275 
9 
2,805 
1,225 
3,504 
420 
0 
12,360 
Special 
transmigration 
no. of 
families 
128 
0 
2,112 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
200 
2,440 
no. of 
persons 
466 
0 
9,103 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
200 
9,769 
Total 
no. of 
families 
128 
100 
2,847 
58 
2 
606 
281 
743 
90 
200 
5,055 
no. of 
persons 
466 
481 
12,744 
275 
0 
2,805 
1,225 
3,504 
420 
200 
22,129 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 24. 
Table 88. Number of transmigrants 1938-1940 and 1953-1962. 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
General 
transmigration 
no. of no. of 
families 
_ 
-
8,848 
7,470 
4,316 
4,281 
• 4,870 
2,385 
5,826 
2,500 
3,369 
2,615 
persons 
_ 
-
35,432 
26,239 
16,665 
18,232 
12,509 
10,610 
23,963 
10,295 
14,709 
12,360 
Special 
transmigration 
no. of 
families 
_ 
-
-
1,054 
1,112 
1,171 
1,484 
2,288 
3,870 
5,613 
3,122 
1,695 
2,440 
no. of 
persons 
_ 
-
-
3,995 
3,953 
4,724 
6,118 
10,721 
15,809 
22,133 
11,780 
4,900 
9,769 
Total 
no. of 
families 
-
-
-
9,902 
8,582 
5,487 
5,765 
5,158 
6,255 
11,439 
5,622 
5,064 
5,055 
no. of 
persons 
33,399 
44,694 
52,208 
39,427 
30,192 
21,389 
24,350 
23,230 
26,419 
46,096 
22,075 
19,609 
22,129 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 24. 
91 
KEYFITZ and WIDJOJO have indicated that the amount received by the settlers 
constituted about 50 % of the total expenditures for moving one family.145 
Since no indices for the cost of living are available, the rupiah expenditures for 
transmigration have been deflated by a price index for twelve articles of food at 
prevailing market prices in rural districts of Java and Madura.146 Such an index is 
assumed to reflect the purchasing power of the rupiah (see Table 83). 
The 'deflated' cost of moving people to the Outer Islands has steadily increased 
during the postwar period. Total cost figures for 1955 are not available, but a rise is 
indicated by the fact that the estimated transportation cost per family in 1954 was 
Rp 492, whereas in 1955 it was Rp 598, an increase of 18 %.147 
Table 84 provides a specification of the amount received per average size family 
from 1951 till 1954. The figures for 1954, the latest available when the investigations 
were completed, show the procentual distribution over the various items of the amount 
received per family. 
Housing, clearing 1.5 ha of land, initial living expenses and transportation are the 
main items included in the amount spent on a family; they constitute 40.2, 16.1, and 
25.7 per cent, respectively. 
Table 85 shows the indebtedness of the migrants to the government. The inability of 
migrants to repay the loan is obvious. Practically none of the debts of the people moved 
under the regular transmigration scheme have been repaid. The repayment of the 
loans to the migrants under the family transmigration148 scheme has been unsatisfac-
tory as well: only Rp 30,000 out of a total of nearly Rp 26,000,000 has been repaid 
here. 
7.1.10. Results of organized agricultural resettlement 
The number of settlers and dependents moved is illustrated by the Tables 86,87 and 88. 
Most of the migrants have settled in South Sumatra, the remainder being spread out 
over the other areas. 
7.2 Survey of spontaneous agricultural resettlement during 
the postwar period 
Up to 1957 the government was not concerned with 'spontaneous' transmigration, but 
this idea of additional transmigration practically without financial aid from the 
government is receiving more and more support. Under this new plan, the role of the 
"
s
 KEYFITZ and WIDJOJO, op. tit. (fit. 126), p. 127. 
1U
 These twelve articles of food are: rice, corn, cassave, peanuts, soybeans, buffalo meat, dried and 
salted small fish, hen eggs, coconuts, coconut oil and salt. 
" ' Penjeleggaraan transmigrasi 1954, Djakarta, 1955. 
148
 Family transmigration refers to persons who join relatives previously established in the colonies. 
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government would be restricted to clearing the forest and to make social overhead 
investments, whereas all other expenses should be met by the migrants themselves. 
But Javanese farmers are reluctant to emigrate to the Outer Islands without 
government support, and the large-scale movement as in Burma, Thailand and the 
former Indo-China are unknown in Indonesia.149 The explanation is that in the Indo-
Chinese peninsula transport is much easier. Moreover, people from these three coun-
tries moved to areas where the quality of the soil is as good as or even better than that 
of the land they left. In Indonesia it is just the reverse: Javanese farmers have to move 
from fertile, volcanic Java to the usually less fertile lands of the Outer Islands. 
But if agricultural resettlement is to be increased in Indonesia, some way must be 
found to encourage spontaneous transmigration. Then it may be expected that more 
people can be transferred from overpopulated Java to the Outer Islands and the 
average cost to the government for moving the people could be substantially reduced. 
The statistical data on spontaneous migration are rather confusing or inaccurate. 
But it should be kept in mind that estimates of spontaneous migrants are by necessity 
based on questionable assumptions. However, such estimates may be used for their 
broad demonstrative value. An attempt was made by the author to study the voluntary 
movements between Java and Sumatra in 1953.150 
An indication of the number of spontaneous migrants to Sumatra can be found 
from the number of persons transported by the State Railway ferry service from 
Merak (West Java) to Pandjang (South Sumatra) and back. 
The figures show that in 1953, 97,998 persons were transported from Merak to 
Pandjang, and 82,209 from Pandjang to Merak.151 The difference suggests that in this 
year at least 15,800 persons remained in Sumatra. 
Of course this is only a very crude estimate, as there are other transport possibilities. 
Transport by air is usually too expensive and can be neglected. But to move by 
shipping lines may be financially possible for some migrants. Nevertheless this number 
cannot be very large, as the ships have only a limited capacity which also appear from 
the fact that the Department of Transmigration always has to charter special boats 
for its settlers. The conclusions seems justified that an additional 20% of migrants 
may be added to the total of 15,800 ,so that in 1953 about 19,000 people may have 
migrated on their own account from Java to Sumatra (Table 89). 
Moreover, the Department of Transmigration took care of a number of people who 
wanted to join relatives in the new settlements. This concerned 1783 persons, nearly all 
with destination of Belitung (South Sumatra).152 The government provided them with 
loans and land. The Ministry of Labour organized, in cooperation with some planta-
148
 Lectures on Asian Economic Development, given by Professor F. GOLAY, Cornell University, 
Ithaca, NY. 
160
 Here 1953 is chosen because only in that year sufficient data were available. 
151
 State Planning Bureau, Questionnaire for Indonesia, M700/XII/54/30, Djakarta, 1954. 
162
 Actually this is a total figure for 1950 to 1954. Since there is no specification for the year 1953 (the 
year in which the Department of Transmigration started to operate effectively) and the total number 
for the 4 years is relatively small, the author assumes the total amount as acceptable for the year 
1953 (see footnote 151). 
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Table 89. Number of spontaneous migrants from Java to Sumatra in 1953. 
Way of migration 
Moved by ferry of State Railway 
Organized by Department of Transmigration 
Organized by Ministry of Labour 
Total 
Number of migrants 
19,000 
1,783 
5,774 
26,557 
Source: Compiled from several publications. 
Table 90. Number of workers and their families departing from Java and Madura to be employed in 
industries or on estates in other islands.1 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1951 
1952 
1953a 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962a 
Male 
_ 
-
-
6,596 
7,869 
2,117 
1,528 
4,188 
3,098 
970 
1,400 
1,867 
5,901 
6,237 
5,700 
Female 
_ 
-
-
3,961 
5,741 
1,293 
1,330 
2,238 
1,929 
720 
951 
1,336 
5,018 
4,974 
5,782 
Houshold members of the 
workers on contract 
female 
_ 
-
-
1,572 
1,671 
491 
99 
1,905 
1,146 
269 
449 
531 
883 
65 
3 
children 
_ 
-
-
6,286 
7,607 
1,562 
1,347 
3,897 
3,376 
796 
1,101 
1,502 
5,868 
5,386 
6,508 
Total 
23,334 
25,347 
24,310 
18,415 
22,888 
5,463 
4,304 
12,228 
9,549 
2,755 
3,901 
5,236 
17,670 
16,662 
18,083 
1
 Data supplied by: Free Emigration of the Sumatra Planters Association (FESPA), Zuid West 
Sumatra Syndicate (ZWSS), Pusat Perkebunan Negara (PPN) and Standard Vacuum Petroleum 
Maatschappij (SVPM). 
• Exclusive workers from Java and Madura migrating through the intermediary organizations or 
those mentioned under footnote 1. Their number amounted in 1952, 1953 and 1962 to 311. 342 
and 817 persons, respectively. 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 279. 
94 
tions, the transfer of groups of workers to be employed in Sumatra; in 1953 their 
number was 5774.153 
The various estimates of the number of spontaneous migrants to Sumatra are 
combined in Table 89; the total is between 26,000 and 27,000. 
Excluding these plantation workers (who actually are not real migrants because 
they may return to Java) the total number of spontaneous migrants amounted in 1953 
to 19,000+1/5 X 5774 or very roughly 20,000 people. If it assumed that 50 to 70% of 
them found their occupation in agriculture, the conclusion is that in 1953 between 
10,000 and 14,000 farmers (including their dependents) spontaneously went from Java 
to Sumatra. 
This type of migration becomes significant when compared with organized re-
settlement of the Department of Transmigration which, in 1953, moved a total of 
40,000 persons.154 Of course, the estimate of spontaneous migration cannot be judged 
by the results of one particular year. But as earlier explained it can be used for their 
broad demonstrative value, namely to show that the spontaneous migration scheme 
deserves further exploration as a means of speeding up transmigration plans in the 
future. 
It is interesting to see the numbers of persons and their households from Java and 
Madura who are attracted by the estates and other enterprises in the Outer Islands 
(Table 90). The conclusion is that these movements are of limited value to relieve the 
population problem on Java as a maximum of only 23,000 persons could be employed 
anually in the postwar period. 
To persuade people to move from fertile Java to the less fertile Outer Islands, the 
government has to provide a minimum land holding sufficient to provide the settlers 
with a living. This concept has been defined by LEWIS155 as the ability "to earn as 
much on the land as he could earn if he went to town and did the sort of work men of 
his education and ability can get". Such a definition presupposes the existence of 
alternative labour opportunities in the cities. 
According to the Population Census 1961, the urban population of Djakarta, 
Surabaja, Bandung and the other 'Kota-kota Autonom' (municipalities) increased 
from 2.2 million in 1930 to 7.8 million in 1961.158 It has therefore much more than 
tripled, partly due to surplus births. The surplus births for the whole of Java amounted 
in the same period to 51.2%. If the large cities had followed the same pattern, their 
increase in population would have been 51.2% of 2.2 million or about 1.1 million. 
Actually it was 5.6 million, which means a move of roughly 4.5 million people to the 
towns.157 A study carried out by the Institute of Economic and Social Research of the 
153
 Statisticalpocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 279. 
164
 See Tables 87 and 88. 
155
 A. W. LEWIS, Thought on land settlement, / . Agric. Econ. 6 (7), 1950, p. 8. 
166
 TAN GOAN TIANG, Growth of Cities in Indonesia 1930-1961, Tijdschr. Econ. Soc. Geogr., mei-juni 
1965. 
157
 Ibid. 
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School of Economics in Djakarta has shown that indeed the migration to the city 
means a rise on the social ladder.168 But if this flow is maintained at the rate mentioned 
above, it certainly will depress the wages there and increase unemployment, unless 
industrial expansion keeps at pace with it. This has not been the case in the period after 
1957. The consequences of this continuous urbanization are various social problems 
in housing, sanitation, prostitution, etc. They deter the sound development of the 
community, and the problems become more complex when the cities grow. Most of 
the migrants' movement from the rural areas into the towns is not caused so much by 
a need of more inhabitants in the towns, but by population pressure and a general 
'charm' of the city.159 On the whole it would be more beneficial if a part of the desire 
to move from overpopulated villages could be steered into a desire to move, spon-
taneously and independently, to the Outer Islands. 
It is clear that, to promote a large-scale spontaneous move of Javanese farmers to the 
Outer Islands, a high degree of cooperation and participation by all elements of the 
Indonesian population is required. The task of the settlement program must not be 
the responsibility of the government only, but it must be considered by the Indonesian 
population as a national goal. 
KEYFITZ and WIDJOJO have proposed that, if each village on Java assumes the res-
ponsibility to move a certain number of families (especially the younger people) to the 
Outer Islands through its own effort (e.g. by providing loans to the settlers), more 
funds would be available to the government for building irrigation dams and roads, 
and clearing the forest. More people could then be moved and the capacity of the new 
areas to absorb people would be increased by these large development projects.160 
It is possible that some parts of the investment expected to materialize in the 
Community Development Program could be used not only to improve the living 
conditions in the villages, but also by providing funds for transporting people from 
their villages in Java to the Outer Islands. In the Indonesian five-year plan (1956-1960) 
it was expected that the village community sector would provide Rp 7500 million or 
25 % of the total investments of their purposes.161 
There might also be possibilities for implementing a community development at 
the other end, namely in the resettlement areas themselves. In this context it may be 
appropriate to conclude this subject with the remarks of Dr. D. K. DEY, Community 
Project Administrator in India, who has worked several months at the State Planning 
Bureau in Djakarta162: "Indonesia needs looking back at her own image in the 
mirror. She will discover how the dark valleys were cleared of pestilence and parasites 
158
 The urbanization of Djakarta, Ekonomi dan Keuangan 8,1955, p. 707. 
159
 State Planning Bureau, The population of Indonesia, p. 6. 
mo KEYFITZ and WIDJOJO, op. cit. (fn. 126), p. 132. 
191
 State Planning Bureau, Some explanations on Indonesia Five-year Development Plan, 1956-1960, 
Ekonomi dan Keuangan 9,1956, p. 667. 
182
 DEY, op. cit. (fn. 144), p. 50. 
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and how these were transformed into the greenland orchards of today through the 
labour of love done through community music over centuries. The Community 
Development Program in Indonesia is old wine in a new bottle and is but a restatement 
of the old challenge 'Gotong royong or alang-alang?' (mutual aid or alang-alang grass 
land). 
7.3 Will resettlement remain desirable? 
Will resettlement in general remain desirable in the future? If so, in what form and to 
what extent? 
The author tends to agree with VAN DER LEEDEN that the first question has to be 
answered most definitely in the affirmative. The efficient economic development of 
the large, sparsely populated territories outside Java is of great importance, and 
political considerations of a national and also an international nature even make it 
imperative.163 
As to the second question, the government once designed a plan for moving 
18.5 million Javanese within 30 years, starting in 1951. Agriculture organized on a 
commercial basis in the Outer Islands was the basis of the plan. Increasing emphasis 
was placed on the development of industry in all its forms. This industrial development, 
which was to supplement the industrialization program of Java, was expected to supply 
the dynamic forces necessary for a satisfactory solution of the welfare problem of the 
Javanese people and of the exploitation problem of the vast Outer Islands. In short, 
settlers were to form the core of a greater industrialization program for the whole of 
Indonesia. 
However, the government had to drop this ambitious plan because of financial and 
technical reasons. The budget figures of the Department of Transmigration show that 
in 1951-1955 a total of 180 million rupiahs has been spent for this purpose. In the 
five-year plan 1956-1960 a total cost of 383 million rupiahs (3 % of the total public 
investment) was allocated and about 200,000 persons were to be moved from Java, based 
on the achievements during the 1951-1955 period.164 But due to the inflation, there 
was virtually no increase in the real expenditures. 
As indicated earlier in this study, the Indonesian National Development Plan 
1961-1968 includes a more ambitious program, namely moving 2,000,000 persons 
from Java to the Outer Islands during 8 years. While in the five-year plan about 
140,000 persons have migrated from Java, of the eight-year plan only a small part 
will probably be carried out as up till 1963 only 55,000 persons have been moved.165 
163
 C. R. VAN DER LEEDEN, Het aspect van landbouw-kolonisatie in het bevolkingsprobleem van Java, 
denHaag,1952,p.224. 
164
 See footnote 102, pp. 257-266. The cost of moving one person is estimated at about Rp 1800, 
exclusive irrigation and other overhead costs. See further: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, 
pp. 23-24. 
1,6
 Compiled from several sources, among others from the Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963. 
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If the government follows its present policy, in the long run it will be defeated in 
two ways by the rising costs. On the one hand, the cost of organized migration con-
tinued to rise along with inflation, on the other hand, as less suitable areas become 
involved, wet cultivation outlays for irrigation become increasingly costly and the 
point will be reached where irrigation is no longer economically justified. It may be 
that these problems can be met by the government by encouraging both spon-
taneous migration and dry field cultivation. 
However, it still remains obvious that there is no possibility of solving the Javanese 
problem by means of transmigration. It is to be expected that at best transmigration 
will provide employment opportunities for a significant number of Javanese farmers 
without solving the many problems for those left behind in Java. While it may be 
expected that transmigration will hasten the economic growth of the other islands, it 
is evident that transmigration alone can be of only limited value for the solution of 
Java's demographic and economic problems. More about this subject will be given in 
Chapters 10 and 11. 
98 
8 Rehabilitation of the sugar factories 
8.1 The poor state of sugar production 
In the past the sugar factories, spread over the vast plains of Java, were mainly owned 
by foreigners who rented the fields from the farmers.166 Thus the influence of non-
indigenous activities penetrated more deeply into the social and economic life of the 
village than was the case with the upland estates. Their high labour requirements, and 
the rotation between estate and peasant agriculture left their mark on the whole 
economy of the area all around. Therefore, the economic crisis in the thirties had 
a very great impact on the economic situation. No accurate balance can be 
struck as to the effect on the local population of the resulting great fall in the wages 
formerly paid to the 60,000 permanent and about 700,000 temporary labour force. 
Although the loss was largely offset, as the land formerly rented became available for 
food or other crops, the farmers were the main victims, especially the landless and 
very small ones. This was felt all the more because the inhabitants of the sugar 
producing areas had, to a great extent, based their lives on a cash economy founded on 
wage payment.167 
Compared with prewar times, there is at present a greater variation in the way cane 
is produced: 
(a) The land is hired for about 18 months from the peasants. Before the war, factories 
negotiated the short-term contract with the individual farmers; nowadays the 
rent is regulated by the government. 
(b) Cane is bought from independent farmers. During the prewar period this was 
possible only for the factory on a very small scale with a special permit from the 
government. After the war, some factories relied to a large extent on this method. 
(c) A crop-sharing arrangement is established between factories and farmers. The 
rate has become 60% of the yield to the farmer and 40% to the factory, but this 
has not proven to be very attractive to the farmer. There is now talk of 70% to 
30% to encourage the farmers to join this arrangement. 
(d) Profit-sharing arrangements are established between factory and farmers. There 
is no information available on this method and its operation, because it is still in a 
pilot stage.168 
las p o r jhg w a y factories obtained their land for sugar cultivation in the prewar period see Chapter 4. 
167
 PIM, op. cit. (fit. 9), pp. 24-25. 
1,8
 E. DE VRIES, Agro-economic survey of Indonesia, Report to the Ford Foundation, August 1966, pp. 
19-20. 
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Table 91. Number of sugar factories by landrights, Java, 1963. 
West Java 
Jogjakarta 
Central Java 
East Java 
Total 
Number of 
factories 
6 
1 
16 
33 
56 
Acreage owned 
by factories 
339 
17 
968 
13,607 
14,931 
Acreage 
hired from 
peasants1 
8,305 
479 
23,358 
41,502 
73,644 
Number of 
peasants 
19,379 
4,890 
83,167 
104,846 
212,282 
Total 
acreage 
8,644 
496 
24,326 
55,109 
88,575 
1
 Excluding one factory in East Java which only processes peasants' cane. 
Source: Hasilsensus perkebunan 1963, table 3B. 
Table 92. Quantity of crushed cane by source, 1963 (in 1000 tons). 
West Java 
Jogjakarta 
Central Java 
East Java 
Total Java 
Total cane 
Factories Quantity 
6 581 
1 25 
16 1482 
33 4122 
56 6210 
Cane from land 
owned by fac-
tories 
Factories Quantity 
1 0 
1 0 
6 403 
8 403 
Cane from land 
hired from peas-
ants 
Factories Quantity 
6 580 
1 25 
16 1467 
32 3089 
55 5162 
Cane bought 
from individual 
peasants 
Factories Quantity 
1 0 
5 14 
22 630 
28 645 
Source: Hasil sensus perkebunan 1963, Table i 
1938 
1962 
1963 
Planted area 
in 1000 ha 
84.8 
82.5 
80.1 
a oj sugar from lands cu 
Production 
in 1000 tons 
1,375.6 
588.7 
650.6 
titivated by factories in Java. 
Average yield in tons 
per ha 
16.2 
7.1 
8.0 
100 
During the postwar period the sugar industry in Java has changed in several re-
spects ; the three main points are the following: 
(1) As earlier explained in Chapter 4, the production declined due to both a decrease 
in yield per hectare and in cane area (see Table 93). 
(2) Whereas before the war practically all cane used for centrifugal sugar production 
was cultivated on land hired by the sugar factories from the peasants, in 1963 
this was estimated on 92 % (or 73,644 ha169) of the total production. There appears 
to be a trend for further decline in the future.170 
(3) The per capita consumption is at present higher than in the prewar period: about 
8 kg as against about 5 kg.171 Due to the declining production and the higher 
consumption, there is less available for export. 
The development of total area planted, the production and the yield per hectare of 
sugar originating from land cultivated by the factories themselves can also be seen 
from Table 93. For a better understanding of the factors which caused the obvious 
decline after the war, it may be useful to study the high achievements accomplished 
in the prewar period. 
The impressive success of the sugar industry (before the war Java had the highest 
yield per hectare) was to a great extent due to an efficient and low-cost production of 
cane with a high sugar content. From 1886 to 1941, the research work, especially that 
of the experimental station at Pasuruan, steadily increased the yield both from field 
and factory.172 Much attention had to be paid to the economic use of the irrigation 
water as its quantity was limited not only by the capacity of the irrigation canals, but 
also by the requirements of peasant crops. A systematical rotation of crops was 
established. The different soil types were catalogued. On every large plantation the 
result of the soil analyses was plotted on large-scale maps. In this way the most suit-
able manure was determined by the extension officer in charge of fertilization.173 
Nevertheless the rise in yield was due more to selection of high producing strains 
than to improvement in cultivation methods. The most famous strain was the POJ 
2878. By 1929, it covered 90% of the cane area in Java. The average yield was then up 
to nearly 15,200 kg sugar per hectare. This cane not only gave a high yield, but it was 
also immune to 'sereh' and other diseases, and it was far less sensitive than any other 
strain to differences in soil and climate.174 Since the war, the Sugar Research Institute 
at Pasuruan, has developed two other strains, POJ 3016 and POJ 3067, which are 
supposed to be even better than POJ 2878.175 
1,9
 See Table 91. 
170
 However, it is possible that production could be increased considerably on the existing area if the 
causes of the fall in output will be removed. 
171
 International Sugar Council, The world sugar company structure and policies, London, 1963, Vol. 1, 
p. 222. 
172
 ROBEQUAIN, op. cit. (fit. 9), p. 341. 
173
 Ibid., p. 342. "'Ibid. 
176
 TJIOE SOEN BIE, Preliminary variety traits in the crop year 1959, Berita-berita perusahan gula 1965, 
pp. 1-82. 
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Yet the yield per hectare declined by about 50% (Table 93). This can partly be 
attributed to irrigation difficulties, less efficient methods of cutting and handling, late 
arrival of fertilizers, insect plagues and thefts. Besides these, three problems stand out 
in importance, namely: the problems relating to the soil, the labour resources 
(primarily skilled labour) and the bad state of the old sugar factories. 
Despite the present disconcerting position of the Java sugar industry, there are 
certain factors amid the general uncertainty which justify a review of its prospects and 
possibilities, and some tentative practical proposals for its rehabilitation do not seem 
out of place. 
8.2 The problem of the soil 
Under the Agricultural Law of 1870, the sugar factories obtained the soil by a complex 
system in which it was rented from the peasant for 3 | or 21J years. The best soils with 
a good water supply could be selected, and sugar cane was grown alternatively with 
food crops. A typical cropping cycle runs as follows: 
First third of sawahs Second third of sawahs Third third of sawahs 
Year 1: dry season 
wet season 
Year 2: dry season 
wet season 
Year 3: dry season 
wet season 
Year 4: as year 1. 
newly planted cane 
growing cane 
harvestable cane 
wet rice 
dry crops 
wet rice 
harvestable cane 
wet rice 
dry crops 
wet rice 
newly planted cane 
growing cane 
dry crops 
wet rice 
newly planted cane 
growing cane 
harvestable cane 
wet rice 
In order to secure the supply of cane at present, vertical disintegration, by which 
growing is separated from processing, is encouraged by the government. 
In 1960, the law of 1870 was revoked; instead, the Basic Agrarian Law no. 5 was 
sanctioned by the Parliament. Based on the 'hak sewah', or right of renting land, it 
stipulates, among other things, that sugar factories still can rent land from the farmers, 
but in each sub-district of the sugar areas a maximum and a minimum are assigned for 
planting with sugar-cane, to be fixed by a decree of the Minister of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Affairs, on advice of the Governor and a special committee of the region 
concerned. In this1, decree the procedure for settling the annual rent is also regulated. 
According to this law, the contracts are renewed for each cultivation period and 
usually each time different soils are allotted. 
The government fixes the domestic prices for sugar.176 Before the war these prices 
were about twice that of rice, after the war they were often lower.177 This results in 
"• Actually the price policy of the government is a complicated matter. These matters will be discussed 
when examining the government's sugar policy. See also Table 105. 
177
 See Table 105. 
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low land rents, especially when compared with those in the free market: the farmers 
could get better prices if they cultivated rice or other crops. In other words, the peasants 
did not like to cultivate cane at low prices and they tried to evoke the regulations by 
giving the poor soils to the sugar factories. In places with communal landholdings, 
they cooperated for this purpose. 
Later on the government increased the rent to a reasonable level, but still farmers 
are only willing to rent that part of their land which is onbly suitale for cultivating 
less profitable crops.178 
Often the area allocated for sugar industries consists of scattered plots. This causes 
delay in delivery and higher costs for transport to the factory, and since the cane have 
to be crushed immediately after cutting, this also means a lower output of juice. 
In 1963, 80,114 ha was planted with cane of which 73,644 ha or 92% was leased 
from the peasants, while the remaining 6470 ha or 8 % was owned by the factories.170 
To restore the sugar industry to the level of before 1933-1934, one of the problems 
is how to obtain large coherent areas with fertile soils where sugar factories can work 
on a long term basis. As the presently operating sugar factories have a much greater 
capacity than the old ones, they need over 1000 ha for economical operation. If smaller 
units could be constructed, perhaps a few hundred hectares of land would be sufficient, 
which would be much easier to obtain (see 8.4). 
Another system which might be successful is, that the factories obtain a greater part, 
if not all, of their supplies by contract from small growers instead from their own crop 
grown on leased lands with hired labour.180 Then the farmers have their own share in 
the responsibility for the production process. 
To maintain the quality of the cane and to avoid any fatal risk caused by the 
cultivation of inferior cane, cultivation should be put under scientific supervision of 
agricultural experts, either from the Ministry of Agriculture or from the factories. 
It must also be kept in mind, that a large central factory represents a considerable 
investment. If sugar factories have to depend on areas cultivated by farmers, incentives 
should be created for persuading the peasants to plant sugarcane and not to change to 
another crop. Possibly a fair price for their cane or a profit sharing arrangement 
between the factory and the farmers could solve this problem. Since this new form of 
cooperation is still in a 'pilot project' stage, it seems advisable to wait for the results 
before more detailed well-founded recommendations are suggested. 
"• DE VRIES, op. cit. (fn. 168), p. 20. Probably the rent set by the government is still relatively too low 
as compared with what the farmers could get if they plant their land with other crops. In early August 
1966, there was a proposal to increase the sugar price from Rp 3.38 per kg to Rp 5.58 wholesale off 
factories an increase of 65%, in order to give farmers more rent from their land. But even this sub-
stantial increase might not be enough to persuade the farmers to rent their best land to the factories. 
We will come back on these matters later in this study. 
1,9
 See Table 91. 
1 8 0 1 . C. GREAVES, Modern production among backward peoples, London, 1935, p. 104. 
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8.3 The problem of labour 
Since 1958, practically all sugar factories (about 90%) have been run by the govern-
ment as state enterprises, as shown in Table 94. Although labour difficulties then 
decreased due to the improved relations between employers and employees, yet the 
shift from private foreign to state enterprises affected the industry in an unfavourable 
way, as apparent from the following pages. 
The take-over of sugar factories caused difficulties in management and administra-
tion. When the Dutch experts departed after 1957, they were replaced by less trained 
and less experienced Indonesian personnel. The distribution of personnel according 
to education level is illustrated in Table 95. In 1963 of the 2558 staff members running 
the 56 factories, only 17 (less than 1 %) were University graduates and 202 or 8 % were 
from the sugar academy. This low standard of skill naturally militates against efficient 
production. The problem was then, how and where to put the available trained people 
so that they work most productively and maximum use of their skill could be made. 
The fact that they had to work in more than one factory had to be considered tem-
porary justified only to overcome the short supply, but efforts were made to train a 
sufficient number of people to fill the vacancies. 
Of the 360,226 workers, 7 % were permanent employees, comprising both staff 
members and labourers (Table 96). Their salaries were based on government regulation 
and paid on a monthly basis. 
Government regulation no. 14, 1962, as amended by no. 21, 1963, provided for a 
wage scale and a system of allowances varying according to marital status, size of 
family, etc. Apart from their money wage, the workers receive rice, sugar, textile 
and several other necessities at subsidized prices. In addition, all employees are 
supplied with transport facilities (usually buses) or with travel allowances. A limited 
number even has free use of a car and free housing. Nevertheless the wages are 
inadequate to supply the worker with the minimum comfort. 
It is not surprising, that under such circumstances it has not been easy to get the 
best people to join the sugar factories. Many of them leave again under pressure of the 
increasing prices for daily necessities to look elsewhere for a better income. If they 
stay, this means that either the wife must also work or that they must moonlight181, 
a practice which cuts into a worker's leisure, affects his health and depletes his energies. 
Of course, this has a bad effect on the efficiency of the worker which results in a low 
productivity and robs the management of discipline. 
Though the government had to guarantee an annual income which undoubtedly 
created some sense of security, workers would probably have had more security if 
they had got a salary more in line with private enterprises or where earnings were 
commensurate with the living requirements, and were responsive to differentials in 
skill, industriousness, ingenuity and other variables worthy of reward. 
181
 They are forced to work outside their main job to earn an additional income to have a reasonable 
living. 
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Table 94. Number of sugar factories in Java by type of enterprise, 1963. 
West Java 
Jogjakarta 
Central Java 
East Java 
Total 
Number of factories 
6 
1 
16 
33 
56 
State enterprises 
6 
15 
31 
52 
Private enterprises 
1 
1 
2 
Source: Hasil sensus perkebunan 1963, Table 1. 
Tabic 95. Education level of staff members in sugar industry in Java, October 1963. 
Univer- Acad- Agric. Techn. Other General Primary 
sity emy school school voca- second, school 
tional school 
schools 
Total 
West Java 
Jogjakarta 
Central Java 
East Java 
Total 
1 
1 
6 
9 
17 
25 
4 
57 
116 
202 
40 
6 
108 
288 
442 
66 
12 
168 
291 
537 
81 
3 
102 
194 
380 
122 
12 
242 
568 
944 
3 
-
18 
45 
66 
338 
38 
701 
1511 
2588 
Source: Hasil sensus perkebunan 1963, Table 17. 
Table 96. Size of labour force of sugar factories in Java, October 1963. 
Staff members 
Other permanent employees 
Labourers paid on a daily basis 
Total 
2,588 
23,778 
333,860 
360,226 
Source: Hasil sensus perkebunan 1963, Table 16. 
Table 97. Minimum daily wages in some selected sugar factories1 (in Rps). 
For single workers: 
in money 
in kind2 
total value 
For married workers with 2 children: 
in money 
in kind2 
total value 
1958 
4.50 
2.65 
7.15 
4.75 
5.95 
10.70 
1959 
4.75 
3.14 
7.89 
5.00 
9.32 
14.32 
1960 
5.00 
3.99 
8.99 
5.25 
9.32 
14.57 
1961 
6.00 
4.86 
10.86 
6.00 
11.44 
17.44 
1962 
6.25 
4.86 
11.11 
6.25 
18.37 
24.62 
' Estates workers united in the Association of SugarFactory Workers. 
• Converted in accordance with official (subsidized) prices. 
Source: Statistical pocketbook ofIndonesia 79«,P.281. 
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Table 98. Number of workers in sugar factories in Java, 1930 and 1963. 
Number of factories Total production in Permanent emplo- Casual labourers 
1000 kg yees 
1930 180 3,000,000 54.0001 1,000,000 
1963 56 650,000 26,000 334,000 
1
 The 54,000 people permanently employed included 4,000 Europeans. 
Source: from several publications. 
Table 99. Year of construction of sugar factories in Java. 
Number of factories1 Percentage of total number 
Before 1914 48 87 
1914-1929 5 9 
1942-1963 2 4 
1
 One sugar estate in Central Java has no mill; the cane is milled by a factory in West-Java. 
Source: Hasil sensus perkebtman 1963. Table 18. 
Table 100. Percentages sugar processed from cane by old and new factories. 
Year of construction of factory Number of factories1 Average quantity of sugar (in 
kg) produced from 100 kg cane 
before 1929 53 10.1 
1942-1963 2 11.0 
See footnote Table 99. 
1
 Source: Hasil sensus perkebunan 1963, Table 18. 
Table 101. Number of factories1 by number of days of maximal daily milling, 1963. 
0 1-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31-45 46-60 >60 Un- Total 
days days days days days days days days known 
West Java 
Jogjakarta 
Central Java 
East Java 
Total Java 
-
-
1 
-
1 
-
1 
-
-
1 
-
-
1 
-
1 
2 
_ 
4 
24 
30 
1 
_ 
4 
1 
6 
_ 
_ 
3 
-
3 
_ 
__ 
-
-
1 
1 
4 
6 
2 
— 
1 
4 
7 
6 
1 
15 
33 
55 
1
 See footnote Table 99. 
Source: Hasil sensus perkebunan 1963, Table 23. 
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Table 102. Number of sugar factories by number of milling days, 1963. 
West Java 
Jogjakarta 
Central Java 
East Java 
Total Java 
<45 
fact. 
-
1 
3 
-
4 
total 
days 
-
26 
117 
-
143 
46-60 
fact. 
_ 
-
1 
1 
2 
total 
days 
_ 
-
46 
60 
106 
61 
fact. 
1 
-
2 
8 
11 
-75 
total 
days 
61 
-
136 
555 
752 
76-90 
fact, total 
days 
4 314 
-
5 413 
5 426 
14 1153 
91-105 
fact, total 
days 
- -
3 285 
8 789 
11 1074 
>105 
fact, total 
days 
1 143 
_ 
1 356 
11 3193 
13 3692 
Source: Hasil sensus perkebunan 1963, Table 24. 
Table 103. Number of working days and lost labour hours in sugar factories in Java, 1963. 
Number of Number of working Number of working 
factories1 days hours lost 
West Java 
Jogjakarta 
Central Java 
East Java 
Total 
6 
1 
15 
33 
55 
484 
26 
1114 
3404 
5028 
492 
9 
1931 
6838 
9270 
1
 See footnote table 99. 
Source: Hasil sensus perkebunan 1963, Table 24. 
Table 104. Additional land needed by factories to extend their milling season (Java, 1963). 
Necessary extension 
West Java 
Jogjakarta 
Central Java 
East Java 
fact. 
2 
-
2 
7 
ha 
300 
-
460 
1,925 
fact, ha 
_ _. 
- -
2 500 
1 110 
1 200 
Total Java 11 2,685 3 610 1 200 
>30days 31-60 days 61-90 days <90days 
Total number Total addi-
of factories tional land 
needed (in ha) 
fact, ha fact, ha 
1 1,500 
1 1,200 
2 2,700 
2 
1 
5 
9 
17 
300 
1,500 
1,160 
3,235 
6,195 
Source: Hasil sensus perkebunan 1963, Table 25. 
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As for the casual labourer, the wages are determined by collective labour agree-
ments negotiated by the directors of the sugar factories and representatives of the 
labour union. They are valid only for a certain period. These wages are composed 
partly of money and partly of kind. Their development can be seen in Table 97. 
The existing labour law restricts enterprises, including those privately owned, to 
dismiss inefficient workers. Therefore, supervision cannot be carried out as it should 
be in a commercial enterprise. The result is that the cost of operating sugar factories is 
higher than necessary. This is illustrated in Table 98: to produce the 620,000 tons of 
sugar, mentioned in this table, about 50% of the 1930 number of permanent employees 
and 30 % of the casual workers were needed, while the total production was only 20 %. 
It is rather striking, that the labour productivity of field workers has also decreased 
after World War II. The cause is, that the factories could only get older men to work 
on the fields. The younger, so much needed for the heavy work in preparing the land 
for cultivation, prefer nowadays employment in the big cities. 
8.4 The problem of the factories 
The main problems of sugar factories are: their old age (Table 99) and their below 
capacity production. 
Of the 55 operating sugar factories, 87 % are old-fashioned, having been constructed 
before 1914. Only 4% were built in the postwar period, while the remaining 9 % were 
built between 1914-1929. 
Virtually all machinery suffers from deficiencies. Spare parts and accessories to keep 
them operating efficiently and properly are often lacking. That the average daily 
processing capacity of the factories in the postwar period was 1627 tons, as against 
1200 tons before the war182 can be explained by the fact that in the postwar period 
more factories with a high capacity are in operation. 
The percentage of sugar extracted from the cane in the postwar period was 10.2%, 
whereas before the war it was 14-17 %.183 But, as Table 100 shows, the new factories 
established after 1942 are about 10% more efficient than the old ones. This means 
that next to the earlier mentioned unfavourable location of the land, the lower labour 
productivity and higher transport costs, the age of the factories play an important 
role in their output. 
It is not only the lack of foreign exchange that has caused the shortage of imported 
spare parts; during the 1957-1962 period, when the political relations between Indo-
nesia and the Netherlands were estranged, some vital parts could not be obtained as 
most of them were manufactured in the Netherlands. But the Indonesian workers 
have a record of keeping things going. Even with the existing old machines, which cer-
18a
 Hasil sensus perkebunan 1963, Table 18, and VAN HALL and VAN DE KOPPEL, op. cit. (fit. 56), deel 
Ha, p. 368. 
1 8 3
 VAN HALL and VAN DE KOPPEL, op. cit. (fn. 56), Vol. Ila, p. 365. 
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tainly would have been disapproved by modern technologists, they were able to 
operate and "as long as production was still possible from a plant, the age of a machi-
ne has been best measured not in terms of its date of manufacture, but rather by its 
prospective productive life."184 
Assuming that the remaining productive life of the sugar factories is on the average 
about ten years, the problem now is how to get a maximum return during that period, 
before they will be replaced by new machines. 
But even if new machines should be introduced, the sugar factories still face 
another problem. Today, the specialized machines with automatic devices require 
different skills from those existing at present in Java. The problem arises then where 
and how to get trained and experienced technicians with sufficient know-how to 
operate these machines. 
The second problem is the below capacity production of the present factories (see 
Table 101). It seems that only 13 factories work on full capacity, namely more than 
105 milling days (Table 102). Besides that there is not enough cane to be processed, 
due to break down of field machines and labour difficulties, so that the 55 factories 
lost an average of nearly 2 hours of each 8 hour working day (Table 103). 
Out of the 55-13=42 factories working below their capacity, 17 (or 40%) would be 
able to work on their maximum output if sufficient raw material was available. Table 
104 shows the areas needed for such an expansion. It is striking to notice that the other 
factories working below capacity are not eager to extend their area; perhaps the 
sugar price is not attractive enough for them to increase their production. 
8.5 The sugar policy of the government 
After 1950 there was a time when farmers could plant and sell sugar cane in the free 
market. But later on, under the pressure of a severe cane shortage from the sugar 
factories' own plantations, from time to time the government had to issue regulations 
in which the farmers were compelled to plant and sell cane to the factories. In other 
words: the sugar production became subject to government control. 
At present the wholesale prices for centrifugal sugar are fixed by the government 
(Table 105). Retail prices are from time to time controlled, especially when there is a 
shortage in the market. This is also the case with the price of cane. 
Price increases are primarily caused by the inflation. Furthermore the table indicates 
that since 1959 the difference between wholesale and retail prices became greater and 
greater, so that in 1962 the retail price was even about four times the wholesale price. 
Under such circumstances it can hardly be expected that traders will be much interest-
ed in export, as exports are paid in rupiah's at the official rate of the dollar. This can 
be seen from Table 106. 
184
 Development Project Consulting Service, Indonesian report on industrial working shops, Vol. I, 
Djakarta 1966, p. 29. 
109 
Incentives to supply the domestic market are equally insufficient for the factories 
to increase their production; as mentioned before, some of them are even not inter-
ested in milling at full capacity. 
Full production is economically justified only when the factories can buy cane from 
farmers at a low price. But when prices are kept low, farmers try to evade selling their 
cane and instead process brown sugar and sell this in the free market. 
Table 107 shows the decrease in production of centrifugal sugar from farmers' 
plantations; Table 108 demonstrates the rise in consumption of non-centrifugal sugar 
from an annual average of 57,000 tons over the period 1934-1938, to 97,000 tons over 
1951-1955 and to 127,800 tons for the period 1956-1960. This table also shows that 
the low prices set by the government stimulate consumption per capita of centrifugal 
sugar, by its distribution at a price far below the free-market price. 
Table 105. Prices for cane, wholesale and retail sugar, 1953-1962. 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Cane price per 
1000 kg1 
113 
123 
119 
130 
139 
165 
171 
-
-
— 
Wholesale price to 
retailers in Rps per 
1000 kg 
_ 
3,080 
3,060 
3,020 
3,500 
4,180 
4,400 
4,650 
5,900 
9,930 
Retail price per kg 
in Rps 
_ 
3.18 
3.29 
3.33 
3.94 
4.92 
5.88 
6.49 
10.75 
36.87 
Ratio between retail 
and wholesale price 
_ 
1.03 
1.08 
1.10 
1.13 
1.18 
1.34 
1.39 
1.74 
3.71 
1
 These prices refer to cane delivered at the factories and are reduced in cases where the cane is 
transported by the factory itself. 
Source: FAO production year book 1961, as cited by the International Sugar Council (see 
footnote 171), p. 222; Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, pp. 257-261. 
Table 106. Export of centrifugal sugar, Indonesia, 1938-1940 and 1958-1962 (in 1000 tons). 
1938 
1,071.1 
1939 
1,357.7 
1940 
803.6 
1958 
87.2 
1959 
39.0 
1960 
34.8 
1961 
0 
1962 
32.9 
Source: Statistical pocketbook ofIndonesia 1963, p. 151. 
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Table 107. Production of centrifugal sugar in 1000 tons tel-quel, 1958-1962. 
From factory From farmers' Total Percent, of total produced 
plantations plantations from farmers' plantations 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1961 
588.0 
675.5 
564.6 
582.3 
552.2 
183.2 
179.6 
113.1 
60.9 
36.5 
771.2 
855.1 
677.7 
643.2 
588.7 
24 
21 
17 
9 
6 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 84. 
Table 108. Sugar consumption in Indonesia, 1934-1938 and 1951-1960. 
Av. 1934/38 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
Av. 1951/55 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
Av. 1956/60 
Centrifugal sugar 
total consump-
tion in tons 
308,000 
338,843 
436,825 
483,080 
499,908 
642,746 
480,280 
612,808 
665,870 
704,796 
723,906 
715,150 
684,506 
per capita con-
sumption in kg 
4.6 
4.4 
5.6 
6.1 
6.2 
7.9 
6.0 
7.3 
7.8 
8.0 
8.0 
7.7 
7.8 
Non-centrifugal 
total consump-
tion in tons 
57,000 
36,000 
60,000 
141,000 
121,000 
130,000 
97,600 
139,000 
126,000 
123,000 
126,000 
125,000* 
127,800 
sugar1 
per capita con-
sumption in kg 
0.9 
0.5 
0.8 
1.8 
1.5 
1.6 
1.2 
1.1 
1.9 
1.4 
1.4 
1.3 
1.5 
1
 For crop years. 
* Estimate. 
Source: International sugar council statistics, FAO, Commodity reference series 1, The world 
sugar economy in figures 1880-1959, as cited by the International Sugar Council 
(see footnote 171). p. 222. 
8.6 Production costs 
Table 109 shows that a large part of the production cost of sugar represents payments 
for rent and wages. The table gives comparative figures for 1925,1936 and 1960. 
Despite the relatively low land rent paid to the farmers, this rent forms 15 to 20 % of 
the production cost, as compared with 7 to 10 % in the prewar period.185 
Since wages are a substantial part of the production cost (estimated at 30-40%, 
111 
Table 109. Percentages of total costs of sugar production, spent on rent, wages and other costs items, 
1925,1936,1960. 
1925 1936 1960 
Rents 7 10 15-20 
Wages 44
 % 38 30-40 
Other items 49 ' 52 40-55 
Source: Various publications. 
Table 110. Wages1 paid to permanent and temporary labourers* in cane cultivation in Java, in 1000 Rps, 
1957-1960. 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
Wages paid to per-
manent and tempo-
rary labourers 
352,155 
398,464 
524,215 
501,978 
Bonuses paid to permanent 
labourers 
at Lebaran3 
4,181 
3,810 
3,782 
2,450 
annually 
10,362 
12,312 
9,670 
1,993 
Total 
366,698 
414,586 
537,667 
506,421 
1
 Including the gross money wage, the difference between the market value and the price paid 
for goods supplied by the factory, various bonuses and allowances, and absence payments during 
leave and sickness. 
»Includes lower rank labourers (up to and including chief foremen) directly engaged in cultiva-
tion work. 
' Lebaran: the end of the Moslim Fast. 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 87. 
38-44% in the prewar period), the wage problem needs to be solved very soon.186 
The most important point is now to use the labour as efficiently as possible. A solution 
could be found in increasing labour productivity by inducing the labourers to work 
harder, or in the dismissal of unnecessary labourers. 
The amount of wages paid to the lower rank labourers (including chief foremen) 
directly engaged in cane cultivation can be seen in Table 110. To these figures must 
be added the wages paid to other labourers and employees (lower and higher ranks) 
engaged in the factories, which amount to 30-40% of those paid to labourers in cane 
cultivation.187 
165
 Told by Mr. SOSRO MOEUONO, an official working at the branch of the Indonesian Government 
Estates Office at The Hague. Mr. Moeljono has been involved in this matter for many years. For the 
prewar figures see H. J. BOEKE, The evolution of the Netherlands Indies economy, Haarlem, 1947, p. 45. 
186
 Communicated by Mr. SOSRO MOEUONO. In the prewar period, labour amounted to 38-44 % of the 
production cost (BOEKE, op. cit.Jn. 185, p. 45). 
1,7
 Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, pp. 7 and 8. 
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8.7 The rehabilitation of sugar factories in Java 
As seen earlier, till now the Indonesian government has built only two new factories 
because of the high costs: for one factory with an annual production capacity of 
30,000 tons of sugar they amount to US $ 8,500,000.188 Therefore the question arises, 
whether the rehabilitation of sugar factories in Java is desirable. And if so, in what 
form and to what extent. 
To answer these questions the following points should be considered. 
Most problems concerning land, labour and the derelict state of the factories could 
be solved by permitting the factories to fix a remunerative sugar price. Then, in turn, 
they could pay higher land rents (and select good soils), higher wages (and attract 
better workers), and from the profits it would be possible to replace at least part of 
their equipment. But it may be questionable, whether the funds needed for such a 
rehabilitation could not be better used for other purposes. 
The following macro- and micro-economic analyses attempt to assess this point. 
Though they are only crude, because in several respects no sufficient information is 
available, they may broadly demonstrate the general considerations that play a role 
in making a decision in such cases. 
The appraisal of an agricultural project can be made at different levels: whether the 
individual farmer benefits from the project, whether the agency which undertakes its 
financing receives a reasonable enumeration, or whether it is sufficiently attractive 
from a national standpoint. The present analysis concerns only the economic evalua-
tion of the project at a national level. 
Various methods can be used to determine whether a project is economically 
justified in view of possible alternatives uses of the involved inputs. Though the author 
realizes the limitations and shortcomings of the capital-output-method, he had to use 
this technique because of lack of detailed information. According to this method, the 
incremental capital output ratio is defined as the ratio of increment of capital 'invest-
ment' to increment in output. In 'capital' are included the investments for reconstruct-
ing the factories and for training personnel. To measure the increment in output, use 
could be made of the expected increase of sugar production resulting from the 
rehabilitation of the sugar factories. 
The foreign exchange costs for rehabilitating the 54 sugar factories is estimated at 
about US $ 54 million.189 Rupiah expenditures would be required for unloading, 
transport and installation; though they are rather substantial they are low as compared 
with the above mentioned amount and can be estimated on 10%, or in dollars at 
188
 People's Consultative Congress, Ringkasan Ketetapan MPRS., I dan II, I960, p. 203, and ECAFE, 
Economic survey of Asia and the Far East 1964, p. 166. This figure of $ 8,500,000 is also supported by 
Professor JOOSTEN as, according to him, the cost of constructing one factory with the annual capacity 
of 30,000 tons will amount to about 30 million guilders. 
188
 The data on which these calculations were based are from a discussion with Mr. SOSRO MOEUONO 
(See also ECAFE, op. cit.,fn. 188, p. 166). 
113 
5.4 million. So the total cost amounts to $ 59.4 million.190 
To meet the shortage of skilled personnel a training program has to be set up. It 
must be placed on a rotational basis as it is impossible to send away a great number 
of persons simultaneously without disturbing the present production. All ranks should 
be involved, from specialized labourers to leading functionaries; as to the latter, it 
probably cannot be avoided to send some of them abroad. Assuming that over a 
period of ten years each year one tenth of the personnel is temporarily withdrawn 
from the factoriess this will cost (with the current staff of 2500) about $ 750.000.191 
The remaining staff will be trained in the country for a period of six months; this will 
cost the government $ 750,000 plus Rp 270,000,000, or, at the dollar rate in 1962 
together about $ 2,000,000.192 
The total rehabilitation cost will thus be $ 61,400,000. 
The benefits expected from this rehabilitation program, estimated at a 10% 
increase (see Tables 98 and 100) in the current production of 700,000 tons amount to 
about 70 000 tons annually if the present delivery of cane can be maintained. This 
means at world market prices varying between $ 40 and $ 160 per ton, an output 
ratio between 5.5 and 21.9, depending on the price of the sugar at the world market 
(seeTable 111). 
From the above evidence we can conclude that economically the rehabilitation of 
sugar factories does not seem as justified as is generally believed.193 
Next it might be argued that it would be much better if the amount of $ 61.4 million 
needed for the rehabilitation of the factories were invested in, for examples the re-
planting of rubber trees. The Economic Survey Team of the U.S. estimated in 1962 
that this cost totalled about $ 45 million during a period of ten years. It involves an 
additional rubber export earning for Indonesia somewhere between $ 260 and $ 430 
million a year. In addition, the export prospects are much better than for sugar and 
the government has to undertake a replanting program as otherwise other cheap 
natural or synthetic rubber producers will gradually squeeze out Indonesia's increas-
ingly inefficient and costly production.194 
On the other hand it has to be realized, that the investment in rubber production 
will primarily be to the benefit of the Outer Islands, thus leaving Java's problem still 
unsolved. Therefore, although rehabilitating sugar factories in Java will be only 
profitable with high sugar prices, the government cannot escape the need to rehabili-
tate some of the factories, if she wishes to avoid as much as possible importing sugar 
from abroad, as it is doubtful whether the Outer Provinces will ever become an im-
portant sugar producing area. 
190
 The estimate of the rupiah cost was based on the experience of the author when he was Project 
Director of the Development Project Consulting Service in Indonesia between 1962 and 1964. 
1,1
 Based on the estimate of the Department of Higher Learning and Science, MPRS Report 1963, 
p. 9. 
192
 Ibid. 
193
 Actually a return in 5.5 years does not appear too bad. 
194
 US GOVERNMENT, op. cit. (fit. 27), pp. 39,69,213-220 and appendix 44. 
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At present the cost for rehabilitating the machinery, using as much as possible local 
materials in replacing some of the worn-out equipment, is much lower than would be 
the cost of reconstruction of the whole factory. Of course, at the end of the period, 
there is a need for a large scale replacement of the worn-out machines, but in the 
meantime, the government should make a technical and economical survey to justify 
the construction of new factories. For example, in a place where there is a cluster of 
sugar factories but not enough cane is available, some of them must be closed or 
transformed into other kinds of factories. Personnel of the reconstructed factories 
should be trained how to handle the new types of machines. There must be certainty 
about the availability of fertile soils and other complementary factors to make an 
investment in new factories attractive. 
In recent years, annual sugar production has fluctuated between 600,000 and 
800,000 tons. Domestic consumption at 'fair' price levels might well be 1,000,000 tons 
for the whole of Indonesia, but at the moment this goal seems to be beyond reality 
because of transport difficulties and high production costs. In addition it could be 
argued that, even if it were economically justified to induce a per capita sugar con-
sumption level twice that of the prewar period, sugar has still to be considered a luxury 
under the present economic situation in Indonesia. 
Thus, whether the government prefers to have a larger export or to rise the domestic 
consumption (to increase the number of calories available for the population), it is 
evident that in both cases sugar production should be increased. However, as regards 
the rehabilitation of the factories it should be clear from the preceding discussion that 
there is no decisive test as to whether the benefits of the project are sufficient to warrant 
its implementation.195 It may be that the agro-economic survey which is being carried 
out in Indonesia will further analyse this important subject and can give a better 
founded recommendation. 
Table 111. Estimation of capital output ratio for the rehabilitation of the sugar factories at various 
sugar prices. 
Increase of pro-
duction in tons 
(1) 
70,000 
70,000 
70,000 
Price levels in 
US $ per ton 
(2) 
40 
80 
160 
Increase of revenues 
in US $ 
(3) 
2,800,000 
5,600,000 
11,200,000 
Estimated 
investments, inclu-
ding training program in 
(4) 
61,400,000 
61,400,000 
61,400,000 
Estimated capital out-
put ratio = (4): (3) 
USS 
(5) 
21.9 
10.9 
5.5 
195
 The author is more inclined to conclude that it is not profitable to rehabilitate the sugar factories in 
Java except with high world sugar prices. 
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8.8 Potential of peasant cane growing 
Viewed from the micro-economic standpoint there are three possibilities for the cane 
grower to use his agricultural resources, namely: 
(a) to cultivate crops other than cane, for instance rice and dry season crops; 
(b) to cultivate cane and either sell it to the factory or process brown sugar himself; 
(c) to rent his land to the factory and to work there at the same time or to seek other 
employment elsewhere. 
Due to lack of detailed economic data it is difficult to state exactly which of these 
above possibilities will be most beneficial to the peasant. However, something can be 
said about the possible decisions and choices of the peasants, based on the rough 
calculation summarized in Table 112. 
From these figures it could be concluded that cane growing will be the least profita-
ble. In the case of working at the factory there is the advantage that the peasant's wife 
might contribute to the family's income by being herself employed there, while in the 
other two alternatives she will help her husband in his farm business. Assuming that 
she will work half of the time and the wage paid by the sugar factory is 2/3 of that of 
her husband, there will be an additional income of Rp 2400. But it must be kept in 
mind that in the year 1960 the wages paid to the workers were relatively high due to 
the monetary reform of late 1959. As, since then, inflation proceeded, this alternative 
will be less favourable, especially as the peasant has to buy additional food for his 
family, the food he receives from the factory being insufficient.196 Nevertheless, under 
the present circumstances the non-cane peasant seems to be the best off. 
Now the question arises, under what circumstances will the growing of sugarcane be 
favourable for the peasant? To answer this question it has to be remembered that a 
farm's gross income depends on the yield and the price of the crop. Usually the total 
yield of a particular crop will not change much in a short time, so that the farmer's 
income chiefly depends on prices. Price changes serve as a mechanism whereby con-
sumers indicate a certain preference and this causes shifts in production and use of 
resources, unless measures are taken to direct the production pattern and the use of 
the resources. In this case the regulations must be made effective. Given a free choice, 
the farmer will cultivate the crop that seems the most profitable to him. Assuming that: 
(a) the non-cane peasant earns during the 18 months with rice and other crops twice 
the value of a sugar crop; 
(b) the average rice yield is 20 quintals/ha with a price rice of x Rp; 
(c) the yield of peasant cane is 600 quintals/ha or 60 quintals of sugar/ha with sugar 
prices of y Rp and a cane price 4 % of the sugar price; 
(d) the main difference between production cost of the two alternatives, excluding the 
processing of the products, is the fertilization cost which in 1960 was estimated at 
Rp 2000 per ha. 
" ' Payment in kind has not increased after 1961. 
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Then we come to the following equation where rice production is as profitable as cane 
growing: 
(2.20x)-500=600 (0.04y)-200 
j=(1.6x+62.50) Rp per 100 kg sugar. 
This means that cane growing is as profitable as rice growing if the sugar price per kg 
is fixed at 1.6 times that of rice plus the fertilization costs. In 1960 however, the sugar 
price was Rp 4.65, while the rice price was Rp 7.75. Therefore it is evident why the 
peasant shifted from cane to rice growing.197 
So much for cane and rice growing. Some of the sugar fields are also suited for 
tobacco and, in the Cheribon area, also for the cultivation of onions. The question 
arises then which crops are more profitable to cultivate. Since there are no farm 
management data on which to base his recommendation, the author could only sug-
gest that the decision should be based on three criteria: 
(a) which crop will give the biggest net added value to national income ? 
(b) which crop will provide the most employment opportunities? 
(c) which crop will give the peasants the highest income ? 
More detailed farm management studies should help the farmers, and the govern-
ment to make a choice for the efficient utilization of the available but limited farm 
resources. 
From the rough micro-economic analysis as given in the foregoing pages, the 
conclusion is that sugarcane growing is not so profitable for the peasants as it is 
generally believed, or to put it in a more general way: it is economically not justified 
to allocate, in advance, a certain percentage of agricultural land for a certain crop as 
done up to now in the case with sugar cultivation in Java.198 
Table 112. Estimated annual income of landowners per ha by type of occupation, Java, 1960. 
Income in Rps 
Non-cane peasant 15,500 
Cane-peasant 6,000-8,000 
Non-peasant 11,000 
1,7
 Of course a new exchange rate might change the situation. 
198
 See also D. H. PENNY, The economics of peasants agriculture: The Indonesian case, Bull. Indon. 
Econ. Stud. 5, Canberra, October 1966, pp. 26-31. 
117 
9 Improvement of peasant's agriculture, especially rice growing 
As mentioned before, peasant agriculture is the backbone of Java's economy. The 
foregoing chapters have reviewed its main aspects in the past; this chapter is intended 
to deal more elaborately with the various factors affecting its present production. 
The range of factors influencing the progress of agriculture is very wide. They can 
be arranged in different ways, but here the classification given by the Conference on 
Productivity and Innovation in Agriculture in the Underdeveloped Countries, held 
at Cambridge, USA, in January 1965, will be followed199. It distinguishes between: 
(1) the physical input 
(2) the economic environment 
(3) research and education 
(4) organizing agricultural development. 
Some factors which affect peasants' agriculture will be discussed more elaborately 
than the others, as they are almost intermediate in their effects. Attention will prima-
rily be given to rice, being the main crop in Java. 
9.1 The physical input 
To raise the volume of peasants' agricultural production in Java, the physical input 
should be increased. The major requirements are: 
(1) To develop an efficient fertilizer program. 
(2) To construct new irrigation works, to improve the existing irrigation system and 
to regulate water supply. 
(3) To select high-producing varieties suitable for different soil, climate and water 
conditions, and to increase the use of such varieties. 
(4) To control pests and diseases. 
199
 Another classification is given by BARTER (based on the FAO/ECAFE Report on Selective aspects 
of agricultural planning for the Far East; see also FAO, Agricultural planning studies No. 3,1963, 
p. 173) who separates the various means by which the governments can influence the rate and pattern 
of agricultural development as follows: 
(1) Provision of material impuls, e.g. fertilizers, improved seeds, and irrigation. 
(2) Measures to improve efficiency, e.g. research and extension. 
(3) Provision of economic incentives, e.g. price support and crop insurance. 
(4) Institutional reforms, e.g. land reforms, provision of institutional credit, reform of marketing 
system, cooperative services and farming. 
119 
(5) To improve cultivation methods by the use of more efficient implements and better 
cropping patterns, including the use of green manure crops. 
As compared with other means of increasing production, the more extensive appli-
cation of fertilizers seems to be most promising as can be seen from the following 
section. 
9.1.1 The use of fertilizers 
The average quantity of fertilizers used (primarily in Java) during the years 1936-1941 
was 122,700 tons. During the period 1947-1952 it decreased to 53,000 tons (Table 
113)200. The import in later years varied considerably, but between 1958 and 1963 
there was a distinct trend for higher figures201. As Indonesia itself did not produce 
large quantities, this means that fertilizers were used only on a very small scale as 
compared with other countries of the ECAFE region. While in Java during the period 
1962-1963 the applied quantity was only 8.5 kg per hectare, in Japan it amounted to 
270 kg, in Taiwan to 190 kg, in Korea to 175 kg202. 
In the past, the estates were the principal buyers; among them the sugar estates 
ranked first. The peasants used only small amounts, mainly for cash crops such as 
sugarcane, tobacco, onions, red pepper and cabbage, sometimes on irrigated rice 
fields. Although good results can also be expected for padi gogo, maize and other 
foodcrops by fertilizing with N, P2Os and possibly KaO (especially on soils in good 
physical condition), they were practically never applied. 
Table 114 gives the amounts of fertilizers recommended by the Extension Service 
in 1953.203 
Since the Rice Selfsupporting Campaign (SSB.) was launched in 1959, the use of 
fertilizers by the peasants has increased considerably, as can be seen from Table 115. 
More than 60% of the fertilizers was intended for use by the peasants. Provision 
for the food crops surpasses the requirements for estate crops, which formerly consum-
ed most of the fertilizers. 
In 1962, about 300,000 tons of fertilizers were imported to increase rice production. 
That year a rise of 10% was noticed as compared with the average over 1953 to 
100
 Sre KWAT SOEN, The Use of Fertilizers in Indonesia, Ekonomidan Keuangan 7,1954, p. 614. 
s n
 Imports are considered to be interchangeable with consumption figures until 1963. Before the war 
there was an average domestic production of 40,000 tons of rock phosphate. After the war production 
was in operation again the middle of 1953, but since then dropped till 9,000 tons annually. Starting 
from 1964, the urea plant in Palembang (South Sumatra) started its production at a potential capacity 
of 100,000 tons annually. 
SM
 This is the average figure for the whole of Indonesia. For Java it is somewhat higher, since fertilizers 
are primary used on this island (see UN, Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East 16, No. 1, June 
1965, p. 22). 
2 0 3
 SIE KWAT SOEN, op. cit. (fn. 200), p. 604. 
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1962.204 But in the year 1962, the weather conditions were very favourable and many 
agricultural experts attributed the increase primarily to the good weather. Factors 
such as climate, soil fertility, nature of the crops and education of farmers are impor-
tants aspects in the use of fertilizers. Besides, economic considerations such as the 
cost of fertilizers and the extra labour needed to apply them play a role. 
Despite the research results of MAHAN and others, many farmers hesitate to use 
fertilizers. Their reluctance could be explained by the fact that MAHAN'S figures are 
averages based on field studies of the Agricultural Experimental Station in Bogor. 
Whether the same results could be obtained on a large scale is still debatable, and 
it is possible that an individual farmer has no results. In view of his weak economic 
position he hesitates to take any risks.205 
Table 113. Imports of fertilizers (in 1000 kg) in Indonesia, 1936-1941,1947-1952,1958-1964. 
1936-1941, average 122,700 
1947-1952,average 53,000 
1958 157,000 
1959 254,600 
For the period 1953-1957 no reliable statistics are available. 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 135, and Warta Biro Pusat Statistik 
(Bulletins of Central Bureau of Statistics), December 1966, pp. 18-20. 
Table 114. Necessary quantities of ammonnium sulphate for peasant agriculture in Java, calculated on 
200 kg/ha. 
tobacco 
pepper 
sugarcane 
potatoes 
onions 
vegetables 
maize 
chillies 
total 
other crops 
all crops 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
228,300 
346,400 
446,800 
375,400 
169,400 
Area in ha 
60,000 
2,000 
35,000 
8,000 
5,000 
10,000 
5,0002 
10,000 
Quantity in 1000 kg 
12,000 
400 
7,000 
1,600 
1,000 
2,000 
500 
2,000 
26,500 
3,500 
30.0001 
1
 30,000 tons of ammonium sulphate makes 6,300 tons of N. '100 kg/ha. 
Source: Sie Kwat Soen, The use of fertilizers in Indonesia, Ekonomi dan Keuangan 7 (9), 1954, 
p. 604. 
204
 Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 135. The total import of fertilizers in 1961 and 1962 
was 350,000 and 450,000 tons, respectively or about 400,000 tons a year, of which 70% was used for 
rice (MAHAN, see footnote Table 74, pp. 68-70). See further, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), 
Produksi-Bahan Makanan Utama di Indonesia 1963, Djakarta 1965, p. 1. 
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 Professor JOOSTEN is of the opinion that unless there is an expanding market for the farmers' 
produce there is little sense to expand production, especially if the fertilizers are imported. 
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Table 115. Fertilizers: import plans for 1962-1963, and destination (in metric tons of plant nutrient), 
Indonesia. 
Agricultural Extension Service: 
paddy 
maize 
fruits and vegetables 
small farmers' commercial crops 
Agricultural State Enterprises (BPU Pertani): 
paddy centers 
upland rice 
Government estates (PPN) 
Private estates (Swasta) 
Total 
equivalent to 
N 
7,294 
12,489 
6,282 
88,261 
196 
22,871 
492 
137,885 
306,400 
urea 
P2O5 
8,754 
15 
7,685 
826 
56,391 
505 
10,069 
3,898 
88,143 
232,000 
superphos-
phate 
K 2 0 
589 
600 
4,366 
679 
6,252 
10,420 
potasiium 
chloride 
Source: MAHAN, op.cit. (fn. Table 74), p. 70. 
Table 116. Irrigation projects included in the Indonesian Overall Development Plan, 1961-1969. 
ha ha 
1961 Rehabilitation of tertiary irrigation system in Java and South 
Sumatra 
1962 Ibid, in Java 
Section I Djatiluhur project in Java 
1963 Section II Djatiluhur project in Java 
Rehabilitation secondary and tertiary system in Java 
Rehabilitation outside Java 
1964 Water reservoir in Java 
Section III Djatiluhur project in Java 
1965 New projects in West Sumatra and South Celebes 
1966 -
1967 New projects in South Sumatra 
1968 Rehabilitation in Java 
New projects in North Sumatra 
Total 1,252,832 
Source: National Planning Council (Depernas) as cited by MAHAN, P. 62 (see Table 115). 
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17,500 
80,000 
80,000 
12,600 
40,000 
5,000 
80,000 
401,000 
85,100 
90,932 
297,000 
63,700 
97,500 
132,600 
85,000 
401,000 
85,100 
387,932 
Convincing farmers of the advantages of fertilizers is a slow process. Especially 
where the government made some mistake, as was the case when, after World War II, 
the KOGAM (the Kommando Operasi Gerakan Makmur, the Welfare Operation 
Command) distrubuted urea in certain parts of south-eastern West Java without the 
support of adequate soil and field research data. The results was: no increase in pro-
duction, and for the time being the farmer in that area hesitates to use fertilizer. 
There were times when a part of the fertilizers, which were supposed to be applied 
to rice, was used for sugarcane, tobacco, etc. Perhaps this was economically justified, 
as the result was indeed a higher return, but the aim to increase rice production was 
not reached.206 
Despite the many problems which still have to be solved, the author is of the opinion 
that properly applied fertilizers are economically justified if their application is com-
bined with fighting diseases, proper irrigation and the use of improved seed. Then 
Java would be able to raise enough food to feed its people. 
9.1.2 Irrigation 
Java, Bali and some parts of the other Indonesian islands are of old renown 
for their irrigation system. Its advantages have so often been brought to the fore that 
further elaboration seems superfluous. 
Java and Madura account for about 63 % of the irrigated land, as can be seen from 
table 36 under 3. This has resulted in a high occupation value of the soil, reaching 118 
in 1941. But after this year it hardly increased anymore, as the establishment of smaller 
irrigation works was economically justified, only after large ones had been constructed. 
The National Overall Development Plan 1961-1969 gives a program for repair 
and improvement of the existing systems and the construction of a number of medium 
sized and a few large projects for the whole of Indonesia. Its execution will add a 
total of 1,252,800 ha, as can be seen from Table 116. Only part of it refers to Java: 
the Djatiluhur Project, the Tjimanuk Development Scheme, and the Brantas Project. 
The Djatiluhur Project will add 180,000 ha; its costs will amount to 5,000 million 
rupiahs. Spending this amount seems hardly justified from an agricultural stand-
point, but actually the generation of power is the main aim of this project. Its com-
pletion will cost the government a total of Rp 2,500,000,000 for power generation, of 
which 50% or about $ 110 million will be in foreign exchange, and another Rp 
2,500,000,000 for irrigation purposes of which no foreign exchange component is 
given.207 It is expected to produce about 216,000 tons of rice annually, just enough to 
feed the increase of Java's population in two years. It took ten years to build and was 
completed in 1967.208 
206
 Sugar was in this example more profitable than rice because it was sold at the free market price in 
contradiction to the example given in Chapter 8. 
so
' MPRS, op. cit. (fn. 191), pp. 192 and 199. Conversion rate of: 1 $=Rp 11.40. 
208
 Average yield of 1 ha is estimated at 1.2 ton rice. 
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Also in the Brantas Project power generation and flood control are the main purpo-
ses. The Tjimanuk Development Scheme is still in the planning stage. 
Irrigation agriculture is considered to be the most productive kind of farming devis-
ed by man, but in the short run it is also the most expensive.209 The cost of building 
irrigation works as part of the multipurpose project is calculated at Rp 11,500 per ha, 
equivalent to US $ 115.210 In this figure is not included the cost of building the main 
and secondary canals. To maintain the high yield required by the high cost of irriga-
tion, again all other physical inputs like fertilizers, improved seeds, pest and disease 
control, and other improved farm practices must be used to full advantage.311 
9.1.3 Improved seeds212 
As indicated earlier, before World War II the government had already developed some 
superior varieties of rice crops.213 It was estimated that already about 1,000,000 hectares 
were planted with these seeds. The most widely used varieties were 'Tjina' and 'Bega-
wan'. During the Japanese occupation (1942-1945), the area with improved seeds 
declined substantially.214 This may be explained by the fact that these varieties re-
quire a somewhat different treatment and that they are more difficult to handle than 
the plants from common seed. 
After World War II, the Ministry of Agriculture launched a number of projects 
to restore the use of improved seeds. With the help of the Institute of Rice Research 
at Bogor, the prewar varieties of high yielding seeds were reproduced and new ones 
were developed. These seeds were sent to the regional experimental farms of the 
Institute of Rice Research where they formed the initial stocks for multiplication. 
Thereafter, under the guidance of the Agricultural Extension Service, the seed was 
transferred to selected good farmers for further multiplication. Finally the new seeds 
were distributed amongst the individual farmers. 
In addition to the 'Begawan' varieties, new improved seeds like 'Gadis', 'Remadja', 
and 'Djelita' have been introduced. The area planted with improved seeds amounted 
in 1962 to about 2,000,000 ha.215 
202
 PELZER has stated that the construction of technical irrigation systems required an average invest-
ment of 190 guilders or about $ 100 per ha before World War II. PELZER, op. cit. (fit. 52), p. 55. 
210
 Since a substantial part of building the dam is imposed on the cost of the power generation, the 
irrigation cost is less than it should be. For instance, according to GROENVELD, the average cost of 
irrigation projects, using a high dam, but in which only the main canals are included in the public 
costs, is between S750 and S1000 per ha (D. GROENVELD, Investment for food, Amsterdam, 1961, p. 
85. 
211
 Before the war the government had already introduced the use of improved seeds on irrigated 
field, to increase rice production. 
212
 Actually the right term is improved quality of superior seeds. For convenience the term improved 
seeds is used here, as usually done in other publications. 
215
 Improved varieties are usually superior in selected characteristics and their ecological adaption 
tends to be relatively limited. 
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In 1960 a Japanese research team which came to Indonesia noticed that the Indo-
nesian rice varieties are quickly 'saturized' with nitrogen. The plants tend to lie down 
if too much fertilizer of this kind is used, which results in loss of kernels. The Japanese 
experts thus recommended to look for new varieties which can stand a heavier nitro-
gen fertilization (e.g. the Japonica rice type) for further breeding purposes. In addi-
tion, varieties are produced suitable for dry cultivation ('Gadjali-lampung') and for the 
tidal swamps ('Bajar-kuning').216 
The use of improved seeds will also be very important for the production of maize, 
especially in combination with fertilizers. It has been proved that the application of 
100 kg of urea per hectare may increase the production from about 1000 kg/ha to 
3000 kg. In the long run, hybrid maize will give considerable possibilities: a yield 
of 8000 to 9000 kg/ha is considered possible.217 But the implementation of a program 
which aims at such improvements requires some education of the farmers, a goal 
which cannot be accomplished overnight. 
9.1.4 Pest and disease control 
In the prewar period, the government already issued regulations against pests and 
diseases. With the establishment of central and local agricultural experiment stations, 
the systematic study of diseases and pests could start, and measures could be taken 
to combat the damage. As the occurrence of plagues is closely connected with climatic 
conditions, a theoretical study of data from the past made a fairly precise forecast 
possible. 
Since World War II, the prewar regulations for pest and disease prevention have 
been in many respects neglected. Some of them were considered politically unaccep-
table, though technically beneficial. For example, to diminish the risk of losses caused 
by rats it is required to keep to certain rules such as the simultaneous planting of rice 
at a prescribed time so that during a sufficiently long period no food is available for 
the animals. But as the farmers were unwilling to follow these measures, and the go-
vernment (because of political reasons) could not force them to do so, the result was 
an explosion of rats. There are of course other measures, such as the use of pesticides, 
but for the time being, planting time regulations seem to be the most effective and 
cheapest way out. 
A study of the use of pesticides may be more important in the future because they 
811
 The exact figures are not available, but it is estimated that it dropped to a very low number of 
100,000 ha. 
816
 MPRS, op. cit. (fn. 191), p. 5, and MPRS, Ichtisar Tahunan 1961 dan 1962, Djakarta 1963, p. 57. 
" ' The use of improved seeds is a very important means of increasing production. For instance, the 
research institutions before World War II won golden opinion by the improvements made in agricul-
tural export. The yield per hectare of rubber, sugarcane and other crops was the highest in the world 
*" MPRS, Ichtisar Tahunan 1961 dan 1962, Djakarta, 1963, p. 57. Dr. MAHAN even mentions -
production of 3000 kg by an application of 1 qt urea (personal communication). 
a 
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Table 117. Use of some pesticides in Indonesia (in tons), 1950,1961. 
1950 
1961 
Arsenicals 
550 
2001 
1
 For 1960. 
' Dusts. 
Benzene 
hexachloride 
10 
295 
Sulphur 
compounds 
250 
3002 
DDT 
85 
168 
Copper 
compounds 
350 
1273 
Source: ECAFE, Economic survey of Asia and the Far East 1964, p. 111. 
will interact strongly with other inputs in the later stages of agricultural development. 
The need for pesticides rises as development proceeds, because other inputs often 
create conditions that favour the spread of diseases and pests.218 
At the present time, a pest-control program must still be carried out under close 
supervision of the officials of the Ministry of Agriculture because many of them are 
poisonous and most of the farmers cannot properly read the warnings attached to the 
packages. 
For a succesfull execution of the pest and disease control program all farmers must 
be coerced to join it. They must receive instructions in plant protection measures, such 
as changes in sowing dates, cultural practices, seed treatment and appropriate crop 
rotations219, breeding crop varieties of rice, maize, etc. with the highest resistance to 
diseases, and the proper use of fungicides and pesticides. 
9.1.5 Other improved agricultural practices 
Productivity of land is not only a function of soil and climate, but also of the technical 
level in agriculture. With the adoption of improved cultural practices such as a wider 
use of green manure crops, better soil conservation measures, the introduction of 
new crops, a better crop rotation and mechanization and other practices mentioned 
earlier, there is technically still scope for considerable improvements in Java. 
The use of green manure crops introduced to the farmers before World War II, 
proved to be most promising to increase the production. It was estimated that 300,000 
ha of the peasant agriculture area were covered with them.220 Mostly Crotalaria 
218
 Data on the use of these chemicals are inadequate, but available information is summarized in 
table 117. 
219
 These are some of the operations of which the farmer has to be mindful of the right time to counter-
act the adverse effect of some major diseases and pests. 
220
 Sm KWATSOEN, op. cit. (fn. 200), p. 606 et sqq. Green manuring is also important for estate crops 
like tea, coffee, etc. There are no data available about the total acreage used in these plantations. 
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juncea is used; under certain conditions 100 qt/ha may replace 1 qt/ha ammonium 
sulphate.221 
Though no exact data are available, it is certain that during and immediately after 
World War II the use of green manuring has dropped. Among others, this is due to 
the financial difficulties the peasants met. In addition they were eager to have a con-
tinuous production of their land to have more cash and they lost sight of the fact 
that in the long run this would be detrimental to the yield. 
Green manure crops can also be used for soil conservation purposes, e.g. along 
terraces. Sometimes the slopes of agricultural land are covered by leguminous and 
other soil protecting crops, though mountain areas should be kept under forest. These 
are all measures necessary for soil conservation, because once erosion occurs, as e.g. 
in the Gunung Kidul area in Jogjakarta, it will take hundreds of years to regain the 
top soil by reforestation. 
With the introduction of new crops, with the growth of the towns, the increasing 
industrialization and the gradual rise in national income, there may be a marked 
trend towards a more 'western' type of diet. There will be a higher demand for foods 
such as fats, fruits, vegetables and livestock products. For this reason, the Agricultural 
Extension Service is encouraging the so-called 'compound cultivation', i.e. planting 
vegetables, fruit trees, tuberous plants and other products around the houses in the 
villages. 
Some efforts are also being made to integrate the development of crops with an 
expanded production of livestock. By this means animal residues can be returned to 
the soil and consequently increase the production. This joint food and fodder crop 
agriculture is a promising line for better crop rotation. 
After the war mechanization of agriculture was introduced by the government to 
increase production. But the introduction of motor-powered machinery might create 
problems: in Java, with its surplus of labour in agriculture, mechanization might 
aggravate the problem of unemployment or underemployment.222 
9.2 The economic environment 
It is generally believed that the physical input factors are the strategic ones to promote 
agricultural production. Neverheless, it appears that in many cases where the available 
supplies of irrigation water and other requirements have not been considered, or 
where fertilizers have not been properly used by the farmers, the impact of govern-
ment measures on production is much less than had been expected. Lack of economic 
281
 ibid. 
m p o r t i , e reciamation of new agricultural land in the Outer Islands, where there is a more favourable 
land/labor ratio, there are possibilities in the use of farm machinery. Perhaps in the long run agri-
cultural mechanization could play a strategic role in agricultural development in the Outer Islands, 
especially if combined with agricultural resettlement in the scope of regional economic development. 
See also Chapter 7. 
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incentives is one of the main factors why farmers are not eager to use more improved 
requisites. Therefore, the government should pay more attention to create a favourable 
economic environment. The following pages will describe some aspects of economic 
incentives: the price policy, the marketing incentives, the credit policy, and the in-
centives to be expected from land reform and changes in the size of holding. 
9.2.1 Price policy 
The prices received by farmers for their products determine the use of fertilizers and 
other improved requisites. Instability or fluctuation in prices cause the expected in-
crease in the value of the harvested crop not to cover the cost of fertilizers. 
It is difficult to estimate the extent to which price policy affects agricultural pro-
duction in Java. Inflation has been more or less continuous since 1952, and it is 
hardly possible to choose a proper deflator in order to isolate the price influence on 
agricultural production. But something can be said about the effect of the applied 
price policies on production in general. 
Maximum prices for basic agricultural commodities are fixed by the government; 
they are usually relatively low. A special administrative machinery is set up to con-
trol them; but it is inadequate and hardly works. If a price level has become unrealist-
ically low this may become fatal to maintain it.223 While there is a shortage of goods 
and serious inflation occurs, fixed prices will not have any reasonable chance of suc-
cess. 
Thus it is clear that the relatively low price paid to the peasants by the government 
before 1964 for their rice did not increase their output. Both the area devoted to rice 
and the yield per hectare tended to fall, as illustrated by Tables 57 and 58 in Chapter 
4224 
To induce the farmers to sell their rice, the government resorted to a so-called 
non-price measures policy, which means subsidizing fertilizer distribution, equipment, 
etc. It should be realized, however, that even if the non-price measures succeed in 
encouraging the farmers to increase their production, the amount of rice which they 
are willing to sell to the government will be below expectation. As long as the govern-
ment has difficulty in obtaining a domestic market surplus for subsidized distribution, 
it will be forced to import rice from abroad, or to persuade the people to shift to 
other carbohydrate resources. 
In August 1964, in order to encourage domestic production, the government 
commenced to buy rice at the free market price and abandoned its low price purchasing 
policy. But on the other hand, the government had to sell the rice at a subsidized price, 
for example to its officials, thus increasing subsidy costs. Indeed, the government 
faces a difficult task in finding a reasonable price for both producers and consumers. 
223
 P. G. H. BARTER, Agricultural price policies and economic incentives, in FAO, Agricultural 
Planning Studies, no. 3, FAO, Rome 1963, p. 210. 
224
 Statisticalpocketbook of Indonesia 1963, pp. 68-70. 
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Regarding the farmers' export crops, we face another serious problem. The dis-
crepancy between the free market and the legal prices gives rise to smuggling, under-
invoicing of exports. It is difficult for the state trading enterprises to procure goods 
from private producers because they have to purchase the goods against fixed, 
usually low, government prices. Moreover, these manipulations cause a substantial 
volume of foreign exchange to go into non-official hands. 
9.2.2 Marketing incentives 
The author fully agrees with the conclusion of the Conference on Productivity and 
Innovation in Agriculture in the Underdeveloped Countries, which has stated: 
"Market reform ought to be an integral part of any policy for agricultural development. 
Normal economic incentives to induce farmers to increase productivity can operate 
only to the extent that the marketing system enlarges the market for their produce 
and brings them a reasonable price for it. Their desire to earn larger cash incomes can 
be stimulated by a marketing system that brings them cheap consumer goods, and 
their effort to increase productivity can succeed only to the extent that the marketing 
system delivers the needed inputs. Marketing is as critical to better performance in 
agriculture as farming itself and should be regarded and developed as such".225 
JOOSTEN has also stressed that agricultural development is primarily a structural 
problem, that establishing a market for the farmer's produce is equally important 
as, e.g., capital investment.226 
Farming in Java usually means more or less self-sufficiency in food and is not highly 
commercial as in more developed countries. The quantity of marketable surpluses 
depends largely on the size of the consumption of the farmers themselves. For exam-
ple, the proportion of the marketed surplus is estimated at about 30 % of the rice 
production. The government has tried to increase the flow of supplies of agricultural 
products to the urban markets to meet the increasing demand there, but not always 
with success. Indeed the lack of incentive to higher production can be attributed for 
a considerable part to poor marketing facilities,227 and an expanding market for the 
peasant's produce will solve most of the problems for increasing production.228 
The rural market system in Java has been profoundly influenced by the opening of the 
country to the world market. Yet it has retained an identity which separates it from 
226
 Conference Report, p. 80. 
228
 J. H. L. JOOSTEN, Landbouwontwikkeling en macro-economische orde. Landbouwk. Tijdschr. 76, 
1964, pp. 122-124. 
22
' Other impeding factors for increasing production are, for example, transport facilities, credit 
policy of the private moneylenders. 
228
 Professor JOOSTEN has always stressed that lack of markets is one of the impeding factors for 
increasing peasants' agriculture. An expanding market will occur if the non-agricultural sectors will 
also expand (see the section on fertilizers under 9.1.1.). 
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many of the features of the complex world of international business.229 
MEARS230 made a good start in the study of this subject with his publications on rice 
marketing in Indonesia. But in general, data regarding the marketing of peasants' 
agricultural produce and the channels which are followed in this process are very 
scanty. Therefore it is impossible to say anything precise about this subject and the 
discussion has to be restricted to a few remarks. 
The farmer may dispose of his product by selling it to the local merchant or dealer-
processor-shipper or directly to the consumer, or he may sell it to the marketing coo-
peratives society if it exists in his village, From these three marketing systems, the 
first is the most important. It is in this sphere of assembling and distribution of farm 
products in Java that a number of middlemen have emerged. The accompanying 
diagram depicts in a general picture the position of these middlemen, their mutual re-
lations, and their connections with the farmers. It also shows that agricultural mar-
kets in Java can be classified into three categories: village or primary markets, as-
sembling or secondary markets, and distribution or terminal markets. 
It may be more advantageous for the farmer to sell his products to the consumers at 
the village market, whether he does, or does not, depends largely upon the distance 
from his home to the village, the means of transport and the volume of the products 
to be sold. 
Diagram for domestic marketing channels of agricultural products in Indonesia. 
~> middlemen >• wholesalers > retailers -
-•local village markets-
peasants/producers y consumers 
-> cooperatives -
*• processors 
The process of assembling agricultural products from numerous small-scale pro-
ducers and distributing them to Java's sixty-three million inhabitants is very intricate 
and expensive.231 Before the products reach the consumer they pass various markets, 
*" Since this chapter is concerned with farmers' agriculture, the marketing of estate agriculture 
products will not be discussed here. 
230
 See LEON A. MEARS, Rice marketing in Indonesia, plus supplement, Djakarta, 1961. 
231
 Lack of adequate transport facilities also contributes to the high marketing cost of the products. 
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either before or after processing, and they enter through different channels. The 
middlemen are mostly Chinese, but (especially in the last years) also Indonesian 
traders. They perform a combination of services: they act as brokers, warehouse men, 
processors and also as 'bankers' who finance the local crop production. This all 
adds up to a complex and expensive system.232 
Obviously the existence of so many types of middlemen is detrimental to the price 
the farmer receives for his product. But as long as no sufficiently regulated markets 
are established and cooperative efforts on the part of the farmers themselves remain 
inadequate, the presence of so many middlemen is necessary. The government con-
siders no other approach as effective in eliminating the role of middlemen as promo-
ting the cooperative marketing system, where a combination with credit supplies is 
essential. But the establishment of an efficiently operating cooperative is not an easy 
task. 
9.2.3 Credit policy 
According to the government, permanent indebtedness causes the farmer to lose his 
self-reliance and the will to take his fate into his own hands or to raise his low level 
of prosperity. Therefore, the government has established many institutions to provide 
'cheap' credit to the peasants as will be shown in the section dealing with credit-in-
stitutions. Although the government has established many credit agencies and coope-
ratives (the so-called institutional credit agencies), yet they still are relatively weak in 
comparison with the private moneylenders or the non-institutional agencies. These 
moneylenders are estimated to provide about 80 % of the farmers' need and usually 
charge much higher interest rates than those fixed by the government.233 For the time 
being they still are indispensable, because private loans are easier to get, even for 
consumption, and usually are 'unlimited'. Often those agencies give credit without 
any security to people they know. 
On the other hand, governmental funds are limited: not more than 20% of the 
total credit required by the farmers is available from this source. Besides, loans are 
given only for specific purposes, and on condition that the farmer provides for colla-
teral security to back his application. Administrative practices discourage the simple 
farmer from borrowing.234 
The government argues that it is necessary to find a way to solve the peasant's 
need for credit. It must gain the peasant's confidence, act as a protector and promote 
the farmer's welfare in regard to his product. With a more efficient organizational 
setup and emphasis on the technical improvement associated with credit, it must rouse 
232
 C. S. BELLSHAW, Traditional exchange and modern markets, New York, 1965, pp. 67-68. 
233
 This was the situation before the SBB campaign in 1959, when the government provided to every 
farmer a basis of Rp 1000 per ha, partly in kind (like fertilizers). After 1959 the government's share 
has increased. 
234
 See footnote 233. 
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the peasant's spirit and give back his creativeness, which is the basis for agricultural 
development. 
What organizational setup will be the best to carry out is illustrated under 9.4. 
9.2.4 Land reform and size of holding 
As indicated in the discussion of the distribution of farms by size, in 1963 about 85% 
of the farms in Java were under one hectare. Of this number, about 70% had an area 
below half a hectare.235 
A heavy population pressure on scarce land brings about keen competition for the 
right to cultivate a plot of land. Therefore, high rents are common. Rents are of either 
fixed on a certain amount, regardless of the harvest, or they are of the crop sharing 
type. Share-cropping is the prevalent tenancy in many areas in Java (for further 
particulars see under 5). 
In 1960 the Indonesian government enacted the Land Reform Law, better known 
under the name Basic Agrarian Law no. 5, which contains the basic regulations of 
various landrights, the tenancy and rent arrangement, the limit of landownership, 
etc.236 
Rent regulation, as stipulated in the law, shifts the emphasis from crop-sharing to 
fixed rents, thereby providing the tenants with greater incentives. The Crop-Sharing 
Law of 1960 regulates more elaborately the crop-sharing tenancy237; it requires that 
all tenancy contracts must be written and registered.238 
According to the Basic Agrarian Law, the land in excess of the maximum holding 
will be expropriated and redistributed among small farmers and landless peasants.239 
An upper limit of 5 to 20 ha has been set up for the size of ownership, depending on 
the population density of the area, the fertility of the soil, the location of the farm, 
etc. For Java this limit is 5 ha for sawahs and 6 ha for dry land. But as most of the 
farmers in Java own less than 5 ha, this law is more important for some of the Outer 
Islands, where landlordism prevails, or where there is still land belonging to local 
communities, the so-called 'marga land'. The question whether the sizes mentioned 
above are sufficient, or too small for efficient farming, cannot be answered precisely 
485
 Central Bureau of Statistics, Agricultural census 1963, p. 1. 
838
 For the complete law see: Ministry of Agrarian Affairs, Peraturan dasarpokok-pokok agraria. 
Djakarta, 1962. 
23
' The Crop-sharing Tenancy Law was enacted before the Basic Agrarian Law. 
238
 At the end of 1963, there were already 25,345 contracts in 182 of the 259 regencies in the whole of 
Indonesia (see MPRS-Report, Ringkasan Ichtisar Tahunan tentang Pelaksanaan Ketetapan MPRS 
No. II/MPRSI1960 jang berkenaan dengan Tahunan Pelaksanaan Pembangunan 1963, mimeographed 
Report, Djakarta, 1964, p. 20). 
23
» Ibid. The expropiated land was first estimated at 178,000 ha in Java, Madura, Bali, Lombok and 
Sumbawa, but after a more careful investigation, it amounted only about 74,000 ha of which about 
40,700 ha was already redistributed at the end of 1963. See also O. SCHILLER, Agrarstruktur und 
Agrarreform in den Landern Sud- und Sudostasiens, Hamburg and Berlin, 1964, p. 125. 
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without careful investigations.240 
In other densely settled areas in the world, like e.g. Japan the enlargement of farm 
size is not an absolute condition for increased agricultural production per hectare.241 
But the general feeling is that the average size of the Javanese farm as compared 
with the existing input factors, especially labour input, is too small. 
With respect to the existing small farm situation, where individual holdings are 
fragmented, a strong case is also made in the Basic Law for re-allotment, the redistri-
bution of land to reach larger units. But even if the redistribution of land is carried 
out in Java, every rural family cannot possibly be given a piece of land. Therefore, 
the landless are bound to take, and the larger landowners are bound to offer land 
under tenancy arrangement as stipulated by the government. This means that, in the 
short run, the only realistic policy is to recognize the inevitability of some form of 
tenancy and to legalize and promote the most efficient form of tenancy rather than 
to abandon it. 
9.3 Education and research 
9.3.1 Education 
Education has always received special attention from the Indonesian Parliament, and 
the government gives it high priority as can be seen from Tables 118 and 119. Their 
sustained efforts caused an unprecedented increase of pupil and student enrollments. 
The education in the field of agriculture kept abreast with this general development. 
This is indispensable to meet the needs of the expanding population and at the same 
time provide some improvement in the per capita food consumption. The necessary 
4 to 5 % annual increase in agricultural productivity can be reached only with improv-
ed technology, developed by education and research and applied by a large number of 
farmers. 
Agricultural education is supplied in vocational agricultural schools, agricultural 
high schools and agricultural colleges and universities.242 The latter are considered 
240
 Actually not one measure is adequate to satisfy all purposes. A more useful approach is to deter-
mine what combination of resources would be required under anticipated natural and economic 
conditions to provide a reasonable income for the farmers. Unfortunately, data on the optimum farm 
size in the various districts in Java are scanty. Besides, according to Professor JOOSTEN, it is question-
able whether there might be an optimum size of holding, since the prices of inputs and outputs are 
always changing. See G. R. SITTON, HOW to measure the size of farm business, in Farm managements. 
Documents presented at the fifth FAO development center on farm management for Asia and the Far 
East. Manilla and Los Banos, the Philippines, 3-21 October 1960, Manilla, 1961, pp. 28-29. 
241
 In Japan and Taiwan, productivity per hectare has been raised manyfold without any significant 
enlargement of farm size. 
242
 In 1966, the university level of agricultural education is still under the Ministry of Education. In 
addition this ministry has administrative authority over all other agricultural education, which also 
has shown a substantial development since World War II (see Tables 120-122). 
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by the government to be the most important, as they supply the highly trained people 
for leading functions in agriculture as well as the scientists for research and the 
staff for education on the two lower levels.243 
In 1964 the number of university graduates in agriculture in Java amounted to 800. 
Some of them had their education outside Indonesia, but most of them came from the 
State University Faculties in Bogor and Jogjakarta.244 The author has estimated that 
the minimum needed would be about 5000 persons245, which certainly is attainable 
within a reasonable period. 
As to the curriculum of the agricultural faculties, they should not be content merely 
with educating graduates who seek 'white collar jobs', but also with young people 
who are willing to get involved with the more practical aspects of agriculture, as 
encountered in agricultural enterprises and in the Extension Service. 
Further it should be noticed that, especially in the field of agriculture economics, 
teaching depends too heavily on textbooks. Students will not gain a clear picture of 
their own agriculture by theory alone; this will tend to remain unrealistic and irrele-
vant to them, as textbooks are illustrated largely with data from foreign regions and 
sometimes are not modified to suit the specific situation at home. 
Perhaps the government should also establish a specific department in one or more 
of the faculties to train the teaching staff of agricultural universities and high schools, 
bringing them in close contact with research findings, as at present the knowledge and 
skill of a great number of them is is not quite adequate. 
Some words could be said regarding the agricultural college in Tjiawi (near Bogor). 
It has a four years' training after high school and it was established by the Ministry 
of Agriculture to satisfy the need of adequately trained people in a relatively short 
time. This college will be abandoned as soon as there are enough graduates from the 
universities to fill the vacancies of the ministry. 
In 1958 there were 10 agricultural high schools in Indonesia, 3 of which were in 
Java. 
In 1960 Indonesia had about 2000 farmer training courses (chiefly in Java) meeting 
for two hours a week for a period of 6 to 12 months. Also there were 8 months' to 
2 years' duration vocational schools in agriculture for rural youth.246 
Despite the relatively rapid development of these schools and courses, the author 
feels that the training program for prospective farmers has only been partly met. 
"» C. W. CHANG, Present status of agricultural extension development in Asia and the Far East, FAO, 
Rome, 1961, pp. 28-29. 
244
 In 1964, the Agricultural Faculty in Bogor was included in the Institut Pertanian Bogor (the 
Institute of Agricultural Sciences), which is an autonomous university level educational institution 
directly under the Ministry of Higher Learning and Sciences. There are three other State Faculties. 
845
 The author's estimation of the need of 5000 university agricultural graduates is confirmed by the 
Report of the National Planning Council (see MPRS, Ichtisar Tahunan tentang Pelaksanaan Ketetapan 
MPRSNo. II, 1960, Djakarta, 1963, p. 10. 
S4
« CHANG, op. cit. {fn. 243). 
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Table 118. Number of schools and pupils in Indonesia, school year 1960/61. 
Primary schools1 
Lower and upper general secondary schools 
Vocational schools: 
teacher training schools 
technical and home economic schools 
commercial schools 
other schools 
Total vocational schools 
Faculties 
Number of schools 
41,280 
4,241 
282 
748 
260 
20 
1,310 
59 
Number of pupils 
in 1000 
9,167 
542 
35 
98 
51 
2.5 
186 
29 
1
 Including 1,826 pre-primary schools with 107,000 pupils. 
Source: Statisticalpocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 29-31. 
Table 119. Total number of schools and pupils (in thousands) in Indonesia for the years 1937-1938 to 
1939-1940 and 1955-1956 to 1960-1961. 
1937- 1938- 1939- 1955- 1956- 1957- 1958- 1959- 1960-
1938 1939 1940 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
Schools 21.0 21.4 22.3 31.2 33.5 32.3 41.7 44.1 46.9 
Pupils 2,192 2,324 2,415 6,361 6,620 6,404 7,948 8,991 9,925 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 29-31. 
Table 120. Courses and colleges integrated in the College of Agricultural Science, Bogor (Tjiawi), 1958. 
College of Forestry 
Sea fishery course 
Sea fishery extension course 
College of agricultural extension 
College of biological sciences 
Source: State Planning Bureau, Laporan pelaksaanan rentjana pembanguan lima tahun 1956-1960, 
Table 106. 
Table 121. State College of Sugar Industry Science (established in Jogjakarta, 1950). 
Number of graduates up till 1955 44 
Number of graduates in 1956 45 
Total 89 
Source: See Table 120. 
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Established 
1949 
1951 
1952 
1952 
1955 
Number of j 
80 
12 
29 
54 
-
Table 122. Main data on agricultural education, Indonesia, 1956-1958. 
Agric. junior high school1 
Agric, senior high school2 
School for peasant agriculture 
Course for peasants 
Course for peasants' organization 
Educational centre for village life 
Forestry 'police' school 
Number of schools 
1956 
2 
10 
19 
4098 
3558 
328 
3 
1957 
1 
10 
23 
3314 
4871 
335 
3 
1958 
1 
10 
27 
1753 
5000 
336 
3 
Number of pupils 
1956 1957 1958 
82 35 16 
1,914 2,192 2,508 
521 648 800 
113,542 82,011 48,635 
368,114 386,799 400,000 
_ 
103 139 116 
1
 Suspended in 1959. 
1
 Cumulative number of graduates. 
Source: State Planning Bureau, Laporan pelaksaanan rentjana pembangunan lima tahun 
1959-1960, Table 107. 
The reason is that many teachers of these schools, who are graduates from the agricul-
tural high schools, are neither sufficiently trained in practical agriculture, nor well-
equipped in general agricultural science subjects. Moreover, the salaries are low, and 
most of the alumni of the high schools prefer to work in private enterprises where 
they can earn more. 
The development of a rational agricultural school system requires a certain ratio 
between the number of pupils in the three educational levels mentioned above. This 
means that, ultimately, the number of people with a vocational training has to be 
considerably larger than that with a high school education, and that the agricultural 
high schools have to supply considerably more trainees than the universities. At pre-
sent Java has five universities in which agriculture is teached as against three agricul-
tural high schools. Is this not an indication that the development in these two levels 
is not properly adjusted? 
Can Indonesia afford to support so many agricultural universities? Could the same 
achievements not be got at less cost? For instance in just locating the agricultural 
universities in two places like Bogor and Jogjakarta, with their adequate facilities and 
teaching staffs? Is there any sense in building new universities which will not be run 
efficiently in terms of the expected cost? This seems to be a point worth-.while cosidera-
tion by the government. 
9.3.2 Research 
The development of the agricultural research institutes at Bogor started in the past 
century.247 Later on several stations were added, mainly private ones working in the 
847
 The private research institutions dealing with research of non-farm agriculture will not be dis-
cussed in this section. They are already treated in Chapter 3. 
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field of commercial crops. After 1950, the Indonesian government continued to 
strenghten them. 
In 1964, agricultural research was carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture (and 
Agrarian Affairs), the Ministry of Higher Learning and Science, the Ministry of 
National Research and the Ministry of Health.248 
Most research institutes are organized by the Ministry of Agriculture, either on 
subject matter basis (e.g. plant pathology and entomology) or on a commodity base 
(e.g. rice).249 
In view of the many institutes and the various ministries involved, the necessity 
of coordination became evident. Within the Ministry of Agriculture this has been 
realized in the Bureau of Research Coordination. The coordination of research ac-
tivities between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Agricultural and Veterinary Scien-
ce Faculties is carried out by the 'Dewan Kerdja Sama antara Lembaga-lembaga dan 
Fakultas-fakultas' (the Coordinating Council of Agricultural Research between In-
stitutes and Faculties.250 The Ministry of National Research, through its various 
research councils, has attempted to coordinate agricultural research where coopera-
tion of more than two ministries is required. 
As to the responsibilities of the other Ministries mentioned above, the dividing 
line is not always clear. For instance, it has been specified that the Ministry of National 
Research will be primarily concerned with those branches of agriculture where in-
dustrial application has already progressed (food canning, and wood preservation), 
whereas the institutes of the Ministry of Agriculture should carry out the more specific 
agricultural research. The consistency of this division seems questionable. 
Further, it is gradually realized that agricultural research costs money and requires 
skilled manpower, two things which the government at present has in short supply.251 
The research organizations have to be rationalized. A central body, placed under the 
248
 The Institute of Nutrition is under this Ministry. 
219
 The agricultural research institutes in Indonesia are: the Central Agricultural Research Institute 
(Bogor) with 5 divisions (rice, soil, agricultural, botanical and plant pathology and entomology 
research institutes); the People's Rubber Research Institute (Bogor); the Central Rubber Fund (Bogor); 
the Horticultural Research (Bogor); the Central Animal Husbandry Research Institute (Bogor) with 
7 divisions (animal industry research, chemical investigation in animal husbandry, animal nutrition 
research, livestock breeding, mixed farm research, animal husbandry research and poultry breeding, 
institutes); the Central Veterinary Institute (Bogor) with 7 divisions (acutely contagious diseases, 
serology and chronically contagious diseases, sera and vaccine, virus, bacteriological, pathology and 
parasitology and micrological institutes); the Institute for Food and Mouth Disease Research (Sura-
baja); the Central Forestry Research Institute (Bogor) with 4 divisions (forest research, forest product 
research, chemical technology of forests and forest working techniques institutes); Aerial Survey 
Section (Bogor); Office for Land Utilization (Bogor); the Institute for Inland Fishery (Bogor) and the 
Research Institute for Food Technology (Pasar Minggu). In addition, there are related research 
institutes such as those for estate crops. (C. W. CHANG, Present status of agricultural research develop-
ment in Asia and the Far East, FAO1964, pp. 27-48). 
250
 The Head of the Bureau of Research Coordination is usually not the leader of the team of the 
officials of the Ministry of Agriculture in this Coordinating Council. 
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Ministry of Agriculture, should be created to coordinate the work of all agricultural 
research organization. 
Priorities should be given to research in agricultural economics. Many Indonesian 
agricultural officials feel that, even with the existing technical knowledge available at 
the agricultural experiment stations, a substantial increase in agricultural production 
can be reached only on the base of economic data. This absence hampers the drafting 
of accurate and detailed agricultural development plans.252 
A good start in this direction was the establishment of the Agro Economic Survey 
of Indonesia (AEI), a project which started in early 1965. The objectives of survey 
are to increase efficiency in the execution of the first National Overall Development 
Planning (1961-1969) in the field of agriculture and agrarian affairs, and to establish 
the foundations for the following stages of the National Development Planning 
(1969-1977).253 
Perhaps the Faculties of Agriculture, which are now under the Ministry of Higher 
Learning and Sciences, should be put under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
so that teaching, research and extension are united. Only along such lines it can be 
expected that the research institutes and the agencies in charge of agricultural devel-
opment can tackle the massive problem of stagnation and low productivity in Java's 
agriculture.254 
9.4 Organizing agricultural development 
The development of physical, economic and educational factors as explained above 
are not sufficient to get agriculture moving: the package of knowledge has to be 
brought from the ministry and the research stations to the fanners. Or, as stated on 
the Conference on Productivity and Innovation in the Underdeveloped Countries: 
"Without this factor our package is incomplete and the other factors will remain 
barren. The factor of organization is perhaps the least tangible and least clearly under-
stood of all the factors which go into the 'system problem' of agricultural develop-
ment".255 
251
 For instance, most of the agricultural research institutes do not work efficiently due to shortage 
of qualified people, who are discouraged to join these agencies because of the low salary and low 
prestige among the officials in the public service. There is also a shortage of laboratory equipment. 
452
 MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, Agro-economic survey in Indonesia project, (mimeographed), Dja-
karta, 1965. The author will not suggest that non-agricultural economic research should be neglected, 
but due to lack of funds and skill, priorities should be given to agricultural economics. 
253
 Ibid. 
2Sa
 WHARTON has given some research priorities in agricultural economics in South East Asia, some 
of which is applicable for Java. (Economic and non-economic factors in the agricultural development 
of South-East Asia, some research priorities, ADC paper, August 1962, revised June 1963). 
254
 In 1966, the Faculties of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, and the Institute of Agricultural 
Science were not yet included in the Ministry of Agriculture. But there are plans to accomplish this. 
865
 Conference Report, p. 111. See also p. 119 of this study. 
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For instance in Java, despite the weakness in the research structure, far more in the 
field of technology is known than is used. The problems now are how to make these 
techniques viable to the farmers in a form they can use and how to create an envi-
ronment which makes it possible to adopt innovations. This means that the aid of 
the extension services, the credit institutions, the cooperatives, the public administra-
tion and especially the village administration have to be called in. In addition trans-
port facilities have to be developed. These subjects will be treated in the following 
sections. 
9.4.1 Agricultural extension services 
Agricultural extension in Indonesia started as early as 1911. Its central agency is the 
Agricultural Extension Service of the Ministry of Agriculture, located at Pasar Minggu 
near Djakarta. At present it is organized at national, regional and local levels. 
The agency carrying out the extension work is the provincial government. In 1960, 
the total extension force in the country was about 6000 people, most of them with 
only six years of primary school training.256 One of the important tasks of the Exten-
sion Service is the close observation of the food situation and the production of food 
crops, so that measures can be taken in time if the situation threatens to become critical. 
Another task is to supply the farmers with implements, seeds of high yielding rice 
strains, planting material, fertilizers, and chemicals for combatting pests and diseases. 
It also operates a large number of farms where seed, supplied by the Central Agricultur-
al Research Station at Bogor, is multiplied and distributed among the farmers. Fur-
thermore, the extension service gives information on irrigation and irrigation schemes 
and stimulates the growing of rice and export crops. It also sets up training centers 
and supplies agricultural education through village education centers and farmers' 
training courses.257 
In 1960, about 250 village educational centers were established, each under the 
charge of an extension worker. They have at their disposal 0.8 to 2 ha of land for 
demonstration purposes and a building for meetings and exhibitions, and for storing 
seeds, tools and insecticides. Even a small library is present. Besides these centers are 
meeting grounds for the village community and they are used for social and educa-
tional purposes.258 In 1959 part of the work was transferred to so-called paddy cen-
tres, specialized in rice growing. 
It is amazing to note that before World War II Indonesia was one of the few coun-
256
 See footnote 243. 
2
" In 1960, there were three in-service training centers in Java: one in Lawang, East Java, for training 
in horticular crops, another in Pasar Minggu, near Djakarta, for farm mechanization and seed 
improvement, and one in Bandung in charge with village educational centers. Candidates with success-
ful records after a minimum of five years of extension service, are selected and sent to training centers 
for one year of practical education on government expenses. See CHANG, op. cit. (fn. 243). 
258
 CHANG, op. cit. (fn. 243). 
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tries where an effective extension service was established. It can be said that it was 
quite well organized. After the war, however, it had to face many problems, such as: 
(1) Shortage of trained personnel, notwithstanding the establishment of in-service 
training centres. There are now about 6,000 workers for the whole of Indonesia 
(about 4,000-5,000 in Java) to serve ten million farmers, or 20,000-25,000 farmers 
for every extension worker! 
(2) Inadequate payment and travel allowances for the workers. 
(3) Lack of adequate funds: the budget for the extension service is usually below 5 % 
of that of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
(4) Lack of clear understanding of extension concepts on the part of many agricultural 
administrators and policy makers. In many cases extension services are used as 
agencies to undertake whatever the Ministry of Agriculture wants to have enforc-
ed at village level, so that the extension workers cannot confine themselves to the 
task of teaching and advising. 
(5) Finally there is the problem of organization. If the various agencies engaged in 
extension work could be combined under one administration with agricultural 
research and other training this would lead to a more efficient use of staff mem-
bers, and a number of them could serve as specialists or as farm advisers.259 
Experience in other countries has shown that the expansion of extension work 
would not involve high costs as compared with other agricultural development pro-
jects. So in Kenya the improvement of the extension service has resulted in an consi-
derable increase of agricultural production as shown in Table 123. 
Table 123. Capital acquisition of smallholders production in Kenya (percentages). 
Return to 
invested capital 
60 
36 
25 
2-6 
Return to th< 
government 
21 
2 
10 
5 
Smallholders' tea growing 
Agricultural Extension 
Irrigation 
Low density resettlement 
Source: H. RUTHENBERG, Smallholder production development policy in Kenya. Berlin, 1966. 
9.4.2 Credit institutions 
The agencies which help farmers meet their credit needs can be classified as non-
institutional and institutional. As earlier explained, the non-institutional credit agen-
cies are primarily private moneylenders and the institutional ones chiefly government 
owned. 
' " S e e 9.3. 
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The principal agricultural credit institutions in Java and Madura are the Bank 
Koperasi Tani dan Nelajan (BKTN, Farmers' and Fishermen's Cooperative Banks), 
the Bank Desa (Village Bank), the Lumbung Desa (Village Paddy Banks), and the 
Pegadean Negeri (Government's pawnshops). 
There are other agricultural credit agencies established primarily for specific 
crops; among them are the Jajasan Tebu Rakjat (JATRA, Peasants' Sugarcane 
Foundation), the Jajasan Perkebunan Rakjat Indonesia (PERRIN, the Smallholders' 
Export Crop Foundation), primarily for tobacco, and the Jajasan Karet Rakjat 
(Smallholders' Rubber Foundation). 
The Farmers' and Fishermen's Cooperative Bank (BKTN) is a merger of the Bank Tani 
dan Nelajan (BTN, the Farmers' and Fishermen's Bank) and the Bank Rakjat 
Indonesia (BRI). It was founded in I960.260 
The BKTN lends somewhat larger amounts to landowners than the Village and 
Village Paddy Banks for periods up to twelve months.281 Its offices are usually 
located in the capitals of the regencies. The total loans supplied by it are given 
in Table 124, a substantial part was extended to the rural sphere, primarily for agri-
cultural needs, as illustrated in Table 125. 
It is very difficult to judge how much real profit the BKTN has gained from its 
operations, since it is not easy to select an appropriate deflator for the ever declining 
purchasing power of the rupiah. In money terms the BKTN did make a good profit, 
as it borrows money from the Central Bank (the Bank Indonesia) against the relatively 
low rate of 4% per annum and lends it out against 12% (a very moderate rate in times 
of heavy inflation) to the farmers.262 Since for the application of a loan from the 
BKTN collateral is required, the risk in extending loans is not great. Although the 
interest rate of 12 % is relatively low as compared with that of the private moneylender 
(some people say they charged 60 to 72% in 1958), there is still some criticism by 
the Indonesian politicians on the BKTN operations for charging too much interest. 
The considerable increase in both the number of depositors and the amount of 
the deposits of the BKTN after 1958 (which is shown in Table 126) is no proof of 
increased savings. 
"" The Algemene Volkscrediet Bank (AVB, General People's Credit Bank), established in 1934, was 
an offspring of the economic crisis in the thirties. It was an amalgation of old-established institutions 
for people's credit (BOEKE, op. cit. (fn. 185), p. 160). By Emergency Law, afterwards established as a 
law by Act no. 77 (Government Gazette 1958, No. 36), the BTN (Farmers' and Fishermen's Cooper-
ative Bank) was set up with a capital of Rp 100 million, provided by the government. Shares arc to be 
spread regionally, and finally to be transferred to cooperatives and comparable institutions. Priority 
shares remain in hands of the Autonomous Regional Government (Bank of Indonesia Report 19581 
1959, p. 120). 
m
 It is difficult to state the maximum amount which can be borrowed by one landowner because it 
changed several times due to inflation. 
" ' Usually the BKTN invests part of its profit in real estate like land and buildings. In the meantime the 
interest rate has been increased several times. In 1960 it was 15%. 
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Table 124. Loans supplied by the Bank Koperasi Tani dan Nelajan (Farmers' and Fishermen Coopera-
tive Bank), in Java and Madura, 1938-1940 and 1953-1962 (in million rupiahs). 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Advances 
21.6 
24.2 
22.5 
689.8 
656.7 
836.2 
1,265.8 
1,266.9 
1,831.-
2,338.8 
4,813.2 
2,940.3 
10,199.3 
Repayments 
18.8 
22.0 
23.4 
519.8 
638.6 
735.8 
1,135.8 
1,306.5 
1,716.2 
2,136.9 
3.952.4 
2,531.0 
8,150.7 
Outstanding 
loans1 
20.8 
22.7 
21.6 
376.3 
391.1 
488.3 
622.6 
598.8 
714.6 
907.7 
894.3 
1,241.1 
6,588.9 
Arrears 
1.7 
1.4 
1.2 
42.3 
62.2 ' 
69.3 
96.1 
94.6 
93.2 
91.6 
867.1 
118.6 
1,391.2 
Number of 
agencies 
68 
68 
68 
69 
69 
69 
69 
70 
70 
70 
70 
70 
70 
1
 At end of year. 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 232. 
Table 125. Loans in the rural sphere supplied by the Bank Koperasi Tani dan Nelajan (Farmers' and 
Fishermen Cooperative Bank), in million rupiahs (1938-1940,1953-1962), for Java and Madura. 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Advances 
9.6 
12.5 
12.0 
149.3 
146.0 
150.3 
133.0 
116.7 
229.8 
411.2 
483.5 
650.4 
4,690.1 
Repayments 
8.1 
10.7 
12.2 
139.0 
150.3 
139.1 
143.3 
128.0 
284.5 
" 397.4 
440.3 
520.3 
2,392.2 
Outstanding loans1 
8.5 
10.1 
9.7 
85.1 
80.8 
93.0 
82.9 
72.0 
162.7 
215.7 
258.7 
387.4 
4,663.7 
Arrears 
1.2 
1.0 
0.9 
12.0 
13.0 
13.9 
17.0 
12.4 
19.2 
19.1 
17.6 
29.5 
1,174.1 
1
 At end of year. 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 235. 
142 
Table 126. Number of depositors and amount of deposits in the Bank Rakjat Indonesia (People's 
Bank of Indonesia), 1956-1957. 
1956 1957 
Deposits at the end of the year 
Number of depositors 
Rp. 735,326,000 
167,943 
Rp. 1,252,736,000 
206,467 
Source: JACOBY, p. 77 (seefootnote 66). 
Table 127. Money loans in million rupiahs supplied by Village Banks and Village Paddy Banks in Java 
and Madura, 1938-1940 and 1953-1962. 
Number of 
banks 
Village Banks: 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
5,619 
6,753 
6,925 
4,373 
4,604 
4,660 
4,633 
4,589 
4,587 
4,515 
4,456 
4,464 
4,321 
Village Paddy Banks: 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
5,561 
5,512 
5,451 
3,635 
3,635 
3,604 
3,603 
3,602 
3,582 
3,325 
3,160 
2,993 
Outstan-
ding at be-
ginning of 
year 
3.1 
3.4 
3,5 
14.7 
49.2 
57.4 
65.1 
67.6 
69.0 
70.1 
74.4 
90.9 
121.7 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
3,0 
2.4 
1.7 
1.7 
1.6 
1.7 
1.3 
0.9 
1.3 
Advances 
19.2 
21.1 
21.7 
153.2 
200.2 
223.9 
232.9 
232.6 
241.7 
269.7 
328.9 
458.7 
631.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
3.5 
2.3 
2.8 
3.0 
3.0 
2.2 
1.8 
2.9 
2.3 
Repay-
ments 
18.9 
21.0 
21.6 
120.9 
191.9 
216.2 
230.4 
231.9 
239.6 
265.1 
312.4 
427.9 
597.8 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
4.2 
3.0 
2.8 
3.1 
2.8 
2.5 
2.2 
2.5 
2.7 
Outstan-
ding at end 
ofyear 
3.4 
3.5 
3.6 
49.2 
57.4 
65.1 
67.6 
68.2 
70.1 
74.4 
90.9 
121.7 
158.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
2.4 
1.7 
1.7 
1.6 
1.7 
1.3 
0.9 
1.3 
0.9 
Arrears at 
end of year 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.7 
3.8 
5.7 
8.4 
8.3 
7.1 
5.7 
4.9 
5.1 
3.7 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
— 
Number of 
loans grant-
ed (in 
thousands) 
1,017.6 
1,057.4 
1,069.4 
1,801.8 
1,942.2 
1,859.1 
1,778.0 
1,658.6 
1,591.4 
1,512.1 
1,553.7 
1,556.3 
12,580.1' 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
— 
1
 Including the number of farmers participating in the SSB campaign. 
Source: Statisticalpocketbook of Indonesia 1963. PP. 237-238. 
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Table 128. Paddy loans in million kg supplied by Village Paddy Banks in Java and Madura, 1938-1940 
and 1954-1962. 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Loans outstan-
ding at begin-
ning of year 
4.7 
5.0 
6.2 
71.8 
76.4 
80.0 
77.5 
78.2 
76.4 
70.6 
67.6 
69.5 
Advances 
108.8 
110.7 
110.0 
63.6 
60.7 
48.2 
47.8 
45.1 
41.6 
45.6 
43.4 
38.7 
Repayments 
108.5 
109.4 
112.1 
58.2 
55.4 
50.7 
47.0 
45.9 
45.0 
44.5 
39.8 
40.0 
Remitted 
0.0 
0.0 
0.1 
0.9 
1.7 
0.1 
0.1 
0.8 
2.4 
3.9 
1.6 
0.8 
Loans outstan-
ding at end 
of year 
5.0 
6.2 
4.0 
76.4 
80.0 
77.5 
78.2 
76.4 
70.5 
67.6 
69.5 
67.4 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 238. 
Table 129. Agricultural bank credits, 1957. 
People's Bank of Indonesia 
Village Banks 
Village Paddy Banks 
Total 
Bank for Farmers and Fishermen 
Total 
umber of debtors 
353,181 
1,658,473 
582,200 
2,593,854 
Total value (Rp) 
328,014,370 
232,563,000 
47,805,O001 
608,382,370 
33,058,140 
641,440,510 
1
 The loan is in the form of paddy totalling 47,805 tons at Rp. 1000 per ton. 
Source: JACOBY p. 78 (seefootnote 66). 
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Table 130. Pawnshops in Indonesia, 1938-1940 and 1953-1962. 
Year 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Number of 
pawnshops 
460 
462 
468 
397 
410 
414 
422 
430 
435 
440 
443 
443 
443 
issued 
85 
87 
88 
1,087 
1,217 
1,606 
1,967 
2,042 
2,398 
3,928 
8,953 
12,156 
24,670 
Loans in million Rp 
redeemed 
78 
83 
85 
952 
1,225 
1,388 
1,890 
2,082 
2,320 
3,239 
6,043 
10,971 
20,234 
outstanding 
33 
33 
33 
384 
377 
595 
•752 
711 
789 
1,482 
4,393 
5,578 
10,015 
Number of 
pledges in 
millions 
43.5 
46.0 
49.6 
36.2 
37.6 
42.0 
46.4 
46.3 
45.4 
39.9 
45.2 
48.6 
47.0 
Source: Statisticalpocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 239. 
Table 131. Credit requested by Perrin (for peasants' tobacco) in 1000 rupiahs, 1955-1959. 
Crop year 
Credits 
1955/1956 
49,250 
1956/1957 
52,350 
1957/1958 
58,050 
1958/1959 
63.750 
Source: State Planning Bureau, Laporan pelaksanaan rentianapembangunan lima tahun 1956-1960, 
Djakarta, 1960, p. 177. 
Table 132. Credit extended by Jatra (for peasant's sugarcane), 1955-1959. 
Crop year 
1955/56 
1956/57 
1957/58 
1958/59 
Extended credit 
(in 1000 Rp.) 
38,534 
33,339 
28,215 
18,600 
Planted area of 
'Jatra' cane (in ha) 
16,120 
9,381 
7,991 
5,000 
Production of 
'Jatra' cane (in 
tons of sugar) 
103,492 
90,062 
55,937 
n.a 
Total area of 
peasant's cane (in 
ha) 
26,225 
21,680 
20,000 
n.a. 
Source: See Table 131. 
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Table 133. Data on the various types of cooperatives in Indonesia (1940, 1958-1962). 
Central cooperatives 
Village cooperatives 
Credit cooperatives 
Paddy storage 
cooperatives 
Production cooperatives8 
Consumer cooperatives 
Other cooperatives 
1940 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1940 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
19621 
1940 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1940 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1940 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1940 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1940 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Nr. of so-
cieties 
15 
216 
246 
350 
289 
1,279 
53 
4,750 
5,390 
-
14,843 
18,818 
478 
5,526 
6,095 
6,347 
8,573 
10,986 
19 
531 
1,450 
1,993 
2,712 
3,927 
43 
2,048 
1,216 
1,144 
1,702 
2.747 
23 
805 
1,935 
6,461 
9,736 
13,419 
8 
270 
272 
329 
947 
1,540 
Nr. of 
members 
in 1000 
0.4 
9.5 
11.7 
19.7 
21.7 
32.4 
2.1 
1,108.9 
1,329.4 
2,767.1 
3,489.3 
4,854.5 
41.3 
689.2 
756.6 
871.5 
1,023.3 
1,276.2 
1.3 
56.3 
153.5 
199.7 
254.7 
374.1 
2.0 
168.3 
139.1 
122.3 
177.1 
263.6 
0.6 
113.1 
244.1 
1,259.4 
1,859.4 
2,961.1 
0.1 
53.2 
43.5 
36.6 
83.0 
161.6 
Deposits Reserves Creditors Debitors 
0.2 
343.5 
406.9 
159.0 
283.0 
550.8 
0.0 
80.4 
102.1 
210.2 
476.6 
587.9 
0.3 
171.8 
223.0 
317.1 
439.1 
765.0 
0.0 
2.5 
28.9 
69.9 
196.7 
246.9 
0.0 
280.2 
388.6 
570.2 
799.6 
1,395.3 
0.0 
19.4 
47.4 
118.3 
323.3 
690.3 
0.0 
10.6 
9.7 
17.6 
113.8 
138.8 
(in million rupiahs) 
0.0 
104.5 
33.6 
27.1 
38.6 
79.1 
0.0 
10.7 
13.2 
18.9 
21.3 
54.2 
0.0 
14.0 
19.0 
27.2 
28.5 
57.5 
0.0 
0.5 
7.1 
12.5 
23.6 
62.0 
0.0 
44.0 
55.2 
63.7 
76.2 
153.0 
0.0 
2.1 
3.3 
4.2 
30.0 
44.3 
0.0 
1.3 
0.7 
1.1 
2.8 
4.1 
0.0 
471.1 
503.3 
-
-
-
0.0 
24.1 
23.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
36.5 
46.5 
0.0 
-
-
0.0 
1.4 
19.8 
-
_ 
-
0.0 
165.1 
120.8 
_ 
_ 
-
0.0 
8.0 
8.5 
_ 
_ 
-
0.0 
4.4 
4.6 
_ 
_ 
_ 
0.1 
393.1 
-
-
-
-
0.0 
78.7 
-
-
-
-
1.2 
155.9 
-
-
-
-
0.0 
2.4 
-
-
-
-
0.0 
98.6 
-
-
-
-
0.0 
11.8 
-
-
_ 
-
0.0 
7.1 
_ 
_ 
_ 
-
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Table 133. 
Total 
(vervolg). 
1940 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Nr. of so-
cieties 
639 
14,146 
16,604 
27,652 
38,802 
52,716 
Nr.of 
members 
in 1000 
47.8 
2,198.5 
2,678.0 
5,276.3 
6,908.5 
9,923.5 
Deposits Reserves Creditors Debitors 
0.4 
908.4 
206.5 
1,462.3 
2,632.1 
4,374.3 
(in million rupiahs) 
0.0 0.1 
177.1 710.6 
132.0 726.6 
154.9 
221.1 
404.22 
1.3 
747.6 
-
-
-
-
1
 Multipurpose cooperatives. 
' Also covering cattle breeding, fishery and industry. Amounts in Straits J in the Riau Islands 
have been converted. 
Source: Statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, p. 241. 
JACOBY263 explains that the forced closing of many foreign banks, mostly Dutch, 
in December 1957 and thereafter, caused depositors to transfer their savings to the 
BKTN and likewise induced commercial companies to transfer a considerable part 
of their funds to this bank. But the primary objective of the banks is to assist the 
farmers, and this is not fully accomplished. On the other hand, the Village Banks 
and the Village Paddy Banks, which are administered by the BKTN are more appro-
priate to the needs of the farmers. The government provided an initial capital of Rp 
150 million.264 Unfortunately their number is not adequate to furnish the farmers' 
need. 
The Village Banks are small money banks set up by the local authorities to furnish 
small loans to the farmers, redeemable in weekly installments.265 Their number has 
decreased since 1955, as can be seen from Table 127. Before the war, these Village 
Banks played an important role; after the war, some of them were abolished and 
some were taken over by the BKTN. 
The Village Paddy Banks, rice barns, also supervised by local authorities, have 
been established to grant credit in paddy. The number of them in operation has also 
decreased since 1954 as is illustrated by Table 128. 
These banks are important in assisting the farmers to overcome the difficult 'patjek-
lik', the period between planting and harvest. They are very old institutions in the 
Javanese society. The value of the paddy is fixed at a certain price; the debt can be 
repaid either with paddy or in money, with interest. Certainly, these village banks are 
great help for the farmers and it is to be regretted that their number has declined.266 
283
 JACOBY, op. cit. (fn. 66), p. 77. 
294
 In what year is not mentioned. 
285
 JACOBY, op. cit. (fn. 66), p. 77. 
288
 Ibid. 
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In 1958, the BRI charged an interest of 12% per annum, the Village Banks 1% per 
week. Rice loans were supplied at 40% per six months. These were the official rates 
and they certainly were very high, but due to the shortage of capital and inflation, 
they could not be reduced.267 But as compared with private moneylenders and shop-
keepers who asked for 5 to 6% per month for money loans and 100% per 6 months 
for rice loans, the official rates were moderate.268 On the other hand, as said before, 
moneylenders' credit is easier and much more convenient to get. 
To give an idea about the credit granted by the principal credit institutions, some 
data for the year 1957 have been mentioned in Table 129. 
In addition to the three kinds of banks discussed above, the pawnshops are an im-
portant source of agricultural credit, although not all loans are extended for this pur-
pose. They are organized as a government monopoly. Table 130 gives an idea of their 
importance. 
There are other government credit institutions supporting special agricultural ac-
tivities, as, for example, for the cultivation of sugarcane, tabacco, copra and kapok. 
The results, up to 1958, can be seen in Tables 131 and 132. The agricultural credit 
cooperatives will be treated in the section regarding cooperatives. 
9.4.3 Cooperatives 
After World War lithe cooperative system was rehabilitated and energetically extended, 
as illustrated by the data in Table 133. Credit and consumption cooperatives dominate. 
This rapid growth is primarily due to the full assistance and guidance of the govern-
ment which is well aware of their importance and has accepted cooperatives as the 
ultimate goal for the distributive system in the economic process. But its success 
cannot be judged by numbers only. Shortcomings in organization, unfamiliarity 
with cooperative working methods, lack of business knowledge on the part of the 
directors, insufficient control, etc., caused that not all attempts met the government's 
expectations. Up to now there are only 6174 production cooperatives, including the 
lumbung (paddy storage) cooperatives, or only 12% of the total number of coopera-
tives (see Table 133).269 
The Ministry of Cooperatives, in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, 
has made many efforts to get the idea of cooperatives accepted by the farmers. To 
accomplish this, it is necessary to make the farmers understand better the underlying 
ideas. But their mental adjustment, necessary to distinguish between expenses for 
consumptive and those for farm business, is far from easy. 
Perhaps, if the credit cooperatives want to succeed in assisting low-income farmers, 
they must be organized in the same way as the producers' cooperatives. The author 
s
" Ibid. The rates charged by the BKTN were increased to 15 % in 1960 as earlier explained. 
2
«
8
 Ibid. 
*" Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia 1963, pp. 240-241. The figures given for the cooperatives are 
actually for the whole of Indonesia. The Java figure is estimated to be about 80 % of the Indonesian. 
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would like to add that one of the means to reach this goal is to adopt the supervised 
credit approach.270 However, before this approach can be carried out on a large scale, 
first the educational level of the farmer should be raised and the operations of the 
Agricultural Extension Service should be improved and extended. But, as explained 
under 9.4.1, this Service has a severe shortage of trained personnel. 
9.4.4 Public administration program 
In the present situation in Java public leadership and coordination of effort must 
play a large part in agricultural development. Therefore, the government has attempt-
ed to design local organizations to bring the various elements of the public admini-
stration program into direct contact with the farmers. These elements include credit 
dissemination or information, marketing, input supply, additional irrigation and 
local government. The operating units have to complement one another at the village 
level and preferably also throughout the administrative organization. But up till now 
the results have not been up to expectations. 
A sufficient knowledge of the principal types of social structure in the villages is a 
prerequisite for designing an effective development program, and to identify the best 
point in the village community on which to build such a program. Should it be the 
cooperatives, the community development organizations, or some new form of or-
ganizations?271 
At the national level, the interdependence of the different elements in a program 
to increase agricultural output is so great that an organization must be designed to 
ensure that each element is to be carried out on net output. At present, most of these 
elements are ineffective (credit institutions, cooperatives, extension, etc.). The agricul-
tural bureaucracy does not have the capacity to execute such a complex program at 
the farm level. 
Input interactions or measures of the spectrum of factors must be accounted for 
in designing farm planning and land reform, etc. These factors require efficient organi-
zation, careful selection of personnel, in-service training and, above all, the capacity 
to lead, to communicate and to improvise. 
Finally it is necessary to find ways to make it more attractive for government workers 
to serve agricultural development. This relates to the general administration as much 
as it does to the technical departments which are more directly concerned with agri-
culture. For, becoming a professional agricultural research or extension worker, 
2,0
 This supervised credit was developed by the Farm Security Administration (FSA) before World 
War II in the United States. It consists primarily in farm and home planning, the provision of credit 
to meet the essential family and farm expenses by the timely release of loan funds on the basis of 
operational needs and the extension of technical assistance to the farmers and the housewives. This 
supervised credit approach has been adopted in the rehabilitation of low-income farm groups all over 
the United States with encouraging results, particularly in the southern states. 
271
 Community development will be discussed later in this study. 
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it is rather unsatisfactory to stand near the bottom in prestige among officials in the 
public service. It is possible that, to accomplish these ends, the government's admini-
strative structure should be changed. But at present, efforts should be directed prima-
rily at drafting a program to promote agricultural development in the present admini-
strative organization. 
9.4.5 Community development 
The government of Indonesia is aware of the importance of community development 
as a policy for economic progress in general and agricultural progress in particular. 
Community development has many definitions, but the author tends to agree with 
OTHMAN who has given the following: "Community development means the creation 
in villages of favourable attitudes towards general improvement, the coordination of 
the various services from the government reaching the villages and uniting all the 
efforts of the people to help themselves in development."272 
HIGGINS273 remarked that there is a close relation between community development 
as an approach to economic development and the "up by the bootstraps" approach. 
He explains that the governments of several underdeveloped countries, discouraged by 
the magnitudes of the capital requirements suggested by calculations, have seized 
upon community development as an easier path. 
One of the considerations for community development projects is that the rural 
districts of Java contain immense reserves of potential human energy and initiatives. 
These resources are largely dormant and will not develop at their own accord. There-
fore, they must be actively stimulated by arousing hope of a better future and the de-
sire to work and cooperate energetically for local and ultimately national improvement. 
A second consideration is that rural problems in Java are so multiple and complex 
in nature, that providing the many services required by each village is beyond the 
means of the government. Community development aims at overcoming these diffi-
culties by helping the rural people to utilize effectively the available outside help. 
In Java community development movements have been able to build on traditional 
forms of communal cooperation such as the custom of 'tolong menolong' and 'gotong 
rojong'.274 
The establishment of a Ministry of Community Development in 1963 initially 
raised high hopes. Although considerable difficulties are involved in attempting to 
measure the achievements of community development programs, it seems generally 
true that they have contributed something to the future growth of productivity 
"* A. D. OTHMAN, Community Development, Agricultural planning studies no. 3, Lecture on agri-
cultural planning, FAO-publication, Rome 1963, p. 219. 
™ B. HIGGINS, Economic development. Problems, principles and policies, London, 1959, p. 679. 
271
 'Tolong menolong' means to help each other in time of needs and 'gotong rojong' means to 
accomplish something by mutual efforts, whereby each member of the community contributes his 
share according to his capability. 
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through their emphasis on human development, especially through improved health 
and education. But there is also some feeling that community development has not 
lived up to these high hopes. This may be partly due to the fact that too much was 
expected too soon from programs that are of quite recent origin.275 
9.4.6 Transport and communication facilities 
Although it can be said that Java has good transportation and communication facili-
ties as compared with the Outer Islands, yet they are far from adequate. Overaged 
railroad equipment must be rehabilitated. High priority should be given to the opera-
tion of the harbours to speed up export and facilitate deliveries. The system of combin-
ed railroad and ferries between Java and some of the Outer Islands must be expanded. 
The maintenance of the existing roads and the construction of new ones are urgent. 
Inefficiency of transport facilities are factors hampering the marketing services. Its de-
lays and serious damages and losses of products, add to their cost (as, for example, 
the fluctuation of the food prices in Djakarta indicates). This will also create social 
unrest. 
Statistics for 1962 show that the railroads in Java suffered from shortage of spare-
parts and maintenance of existing material. Casual observation also suggests that road 
transport equipment is used in an inefficient way. The organization of trucking and 
public transportation is usually poor. Besides, there appears to be an excessive im-
port of passenger cars as compared with that of trucks and buses. Also maldistribu-
tion of trucks between different regions on Java adds to the inadequancy of transport 
facilities. 
Thus improvement of transport systems is one of the most important requirements 
to agricultural development in general and agricultural marketing in particular. As 
shown above, a substantial part of the differences in prices is due to the chronic defect 
in transport facilities. 
9.5 Concluding remarks 
In conclusion it can be stated that the government has seriously attempted to increase 
productivity in peasant agriculture. But it is obvious that the cooperation of the far-
mers is essential. The best way to accomplish this is to give the peasants the remunera-
tion they are entitled to for their share in the production process. But the government s 
policy could be motivated by other considerations, without properly assessing the 
economic loss involved. The Three Years Rice Program 1959-1962, could illustrate 
this point. 
'' The program started in 1955. 
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9.5.1 The setup of the Three Years' Program 
Rice is by far the most important crop and it is also the economic foundation of peas-
ant's agriculture in Java. 
In 1959, the government launched a three year program to be self-sufficient in rice, 
as seen in Chapter 4. In cooperation with the Ministry of Public Works, existing 
irrigation works were repaired and new ones built to irrigate more land. Silos were 
constructed and paddy-centres established. Also the use of chemical fertilizers, better 
farm implements and technical assistance by services and agencies of the Department 
of Agriculture were improved. A special organization like the Badan Pimpinan Umum 
(BPU) Pertani (the Board of Directors of the Agricultural State Enterprises) is en-
trusted with the major share in carrying out of the program. The Ministry of Agricul-
ture established 500 paddy centres for the distribution of high yield rice seed, fertili-
zers, insecticides, farm tools and information about making the best use of the com-
modities. Cash loans were available for the farmers for buying implements to increase 
production. 
At that year the paddy centres controlled 3,000,000 ha sawah and, including the 
second crop rice in the dry season, 4,010,500 ha276. In areas not served by paddy cen-
tres, or where the BPU Pertani did not have organized units, the Agricultural Exten-
sion Service was responsible for carrying out the program. 
9.5.2 Evaluation of the Three Years' Program 
For a number of reasons (organization, administration) the program to raise domestic 
rice production was only partly successful. An increase of 25 % was expected in too 
short a period (3 years), whereas past experiences showed that this increase could only 
be achieved in 9 years. Then the government thought that results would come quicker 
by creating an organization on a military base, the KOGM (Welfare Operation 
Command). The farmers were instructed to use fertilizers, improved seeds, etc. But 
this rigid measure only tended to foster a passive resistance from the side of the far-
mers. 
Obviously the rapid pace for these innovations put too great a strain on the farmers. 
The time available to master new skills (for example, the application of fertilizers), 
to learn the proper use of credit and sometimes even to accept unsettling changes in 
their traditional environment (for example in the operations of the KOGM) was too 
short. 
But all these shortcomings cannot be attributed to the fanners alone. The govern-
ment too had its shortcomings. For instance, as mentioned before, the distribution 
and storage facilities for the necessary inputs were not adequate, and the government 
did not provide enough to supply sufficient improved seed. These circumstances also 
"« See 4.3 and 6.2.3. 
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prevented moving the program on a larger scale. 
The primary and the secondary canals for irrigation are attended to by the govern-
ment, but the farmers are responsible for the tertiary canals. Yet the government 
should also have a look after the latter, for fertilizers will be partly wasted if this 
kind of canals does not operate well. 
A program to combat pests and plant diseases is necessary to match the other tech-
nological improvements, but it is reported that the results of the researches at Bogor 
do not reach on a sufficient scale the worker in the field, primarily due to lack of funds 
and personnel. 
Credit must be extended to the farmer in proportion to his needs and not to his 
status. Uneconomic loans are selfdefeating, poor repayment and heavy overdues have 
occurred. In the SSB campaign, repayment was expected to be in kind. 
Since this proved to be difficult, cash was required instead, but heavy inflationary 
pressure did not solve the problem. 
The government cannot always get the needed persons in accordance with its pro-
gram. For example, in the case of the paddy-centers', the program did not work well 
because, among others, of lack of suitable persons for that kind of work. Government 
officials involved with the program must actually be an agent of change: in the form 
of extension officer, cooperative organizer or local official he must bring innovation 
to the farmers and win their confidence. The encounter between farmers and bureau-
crat is a crucial point in the process of agricultural development. 
Thus we have seen that the farmer and the government are the key factors in cat-
alyzing agricultural development. 
Governmental price policy is very important to increase agricultural production. 
For example, the government distributes rice at prices well below market prices. 
Thus it makes consumption and hence production targets higher than would be dictat-
ed by normal criteria. On the other hand, as it pays a low rice price to the farmers, 
it discourages them to increase their production. With the result that rice still has to 
be imported from abroad, subsidy costs increase and inflation accelerates. Then the 
government decided to direct its subsidies to purchased inputs, like ferilizers, improv-
ed seeds, pesticides, etc., rather than raising the rice prices. It has also considered that 
the cost of the subsidy program is directly related to the utilization of practices, 
which will increase the productivity. Another thing is that, by inducing this kind of 
policy, the government thought it could avoid the political consequences of raising 
food prices. 
In contrast with the above, the government thought that higher rice prices added to 
the income of both non-innovators and innovators.277 It considered also that this 
windfall income, generated by the higher prices, may to some extent decrease the 
incentives of some fanners to raise their production, as they could permit themselves 
to have more leisure. However, as shown earlier, a low rice price does not give enough 
stimulus to the farmers to raise their productivity. 
2
" Innovators are farmers who like to use fertilizers and other improved agricultural inputs. 
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Judging these arguments, the author is of the opinion that a higher rice price will 
give more incentive to the farmers in increasing the production. But at the same time 
it is desirable that price fixing, or the provision of subsidies, should be applied to 
important inputs, about the value of which the farmer may be sceptical, like fertilizer 
and improved seeds. 
Of course, this subsidy program will cost the government much money, but perhaps 
it can be partly recovered by higher tax revenues resulting from a reorganization of 
the present landtax system.278 
While the government intervenes directly in the fixation of prices, it may also take 
steps to improve prices in other ways, e.g. with more ample credit facilities to remove 
the need for hasty sales, in strengthening the bargaining power of the farmer by the 
establishment of cooperatives. 
More of this increasing productivity of peasant agriculture, especially in the rice 
program, will be discussed in Chapters 10 and 11.279 
278
 Within the rural sector, some areas of taxable capacity are now practically free from taxations. The 
present tax system does not fully tap the resources available in the rural sector. For instance, the land 
tax is levied at low nominal rates and valuations existing in the period when there was no heavy 
inflation but is not adjusted to the new situation. 
4
"> The government has launched a new program to increase food production known as the 'Bimas' 
(Bimbingan Massal, Guidance on Mass Scale) extension program. It originated from the Bogor 
Institute of Agriculture in the 1962/1963 rice season in Java and was expanded on a national scale in 
1964/1965. Most of the Bima's extension workers are students. The program tries to achieve self-
sufficiency in food production in a longer time span than the SSB campaign. The first results seem to 
prove that Indonesian farmers will respond well to agricultural extension if there are adequate supplies 
of fertilizer, insecticides and agricultural implements. (See D. H. PENNY and DAHLAN, THALIB, 
Survey of Recent Developments, Bull. Indon. Econ. Stud. 6, February 1967, p. 26. 
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10 Appraisal of the results of past plans and policies 
10.1 Why has agricultural development not been successful? 
The first thing to do in the appraisal of the results of past plans, policies and actions, 
is to review the criteria to be applied in the evaluation of the government's attempted 
measures to alleviate the deteriorating economic situation in Java. These criteria 
depend on the objectives of the successive agricultural plans (see Chapter 6). 
Special problems confronting the Indonesian government, as already explained 
earlier, are: (1) insufficient food production (Chapter 9), (2) the need to expand export 
(Chapter 8) and (3) the population pressure on land in Java (Chapter 7). Thus a program 
has been set up to find a solution to those problems. But it appeared that the govern-
ment failed in fulfilling its objectives, and the question remains why the agricultural 
development in Java has not been accelerated. 
The causes of the failure of the agrarian policy as regards overall agricultural de-
velopment may now be listed as follows: (1) the lack of political stability and continui-
ty, (2) the multitude and inconsistency of the government's objectives in pursuing 
agricultural development, and (3) the absence of any clear-cut doctrinal concept of 
the government's agrarian policy as to the political attitude towards the peasants. 
A successful development program requires at least some degree of political stabili-
ty and continuity. In Indonesia the rapid changing of cabinets in the fifties, the various 
uprisings, the dispute about West-Irian, the confrontation with Malaysia and the 
attempted coup in 1965, reflect the political instability of the country. They all in-
volved high costs, particularly in the economic sphere, as too many resources had 
to be committed for non-economic purposes. In addition, the inefficiency of manage-
ment and corruption have brought the country into a very difficult situation. This 
economic deterioration again results in further political instability. 
Although it is understandable that the government's efforts have been devoted 
mainly to building a sense of nationhood and unity in search of a workable structure 
and governmental administration, the political ends should not interfere with good 
management of the economy. Economic development and political stability are, in 
fact, two sides of the same coin. No government can let economic development wait 
too long while it manoeuvres to keep in power, especially where the realization of 
agricultural development programs require the active participation of a very large 
number of peasants, and the modernization of a traditional agriculture requires time 
horizons of some decades. 
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10.2 Multitude and inconsistency of government's objectives 
Formulating the objectives of the agricultural development program is the responsi-
bility of the government. But the government wants to have the majority support of 
the political leaders in providing directives. Therefore it has the tendency to start a 
multitude of objectives simultaneously, which all too often appeared inconsistent. 
For instance, in the case of the resettlement program, there may be a difference in 
medium and longer term objectives. On the short run, the resttlement projects should 
alleviate as much as possible the population pressure on land in Java by transferring a 
large number of peasants to the less populated areas of the Outer Provinces, especially 
Sumatra. By doing this, the government would like to achieve also longer term politi-
cal objectives, e.i.in creating a more homogenous Indonesian nation and in the mean-
time to enable the settlers to improve their standard of living as compared with the 
past. But this plan could give the impression that the government favours the resettled 
Javanese above the autochthonous population. On the other hand, if the resettled 
peasants are not helped effectively, the government could be blamed for transplant-
ing poverty from one part of Indonesia to another and the resettlement project will 
miss its main objective. 
Another example is the case of settlement in Borneo. The government wanted to 
have a large number of young men, if possible with military training, in such a strategic 
location. From the point of view of defense, this settlement may be considered impor-
tant, but from the economic point of view it is far from efficient, as it will cost more 
than moving people to south Sumatra. 
The question arises, what is the primary objective of the resttlement program? As 
made clear in Chapter 7, it is the alleviation of the population pressure in Java. To 
achieve that, one of the methods is placing a large number of active persons in the 
Outer Provinces, with ample land resources. Economically speaking, this should be 
achieved at the lowest possible cost, as capital resources are very scarce. Thus the 
mixing of wider objectives with the settlers may be inconsistent with economic consi-
derations. However, to make resettlement attractive, the settlers should be given the 
opportunity to better their economic position, but not to such an extent that the pro-
gram would absorb too much personnel and money. This means that much effort 
of the settlers themselves should be incorporated in the planning of the settlements. 
Inconsistency of objectives can also be demonstrated in the case of the rehabilitation 
of the sugar factories in Java. The main objective of rehabilitation is to earn more fo-
reign exchange and simultaneously raise the agricultural income of the sugar peasants. 
But as the government likes to secure a cheap supply of sugar, it intervenes with the 
prices. Hence these peasants are more or less discouraged in their efforts to increase 
production. The result is that the increased productivity of sugar could not be realized; 
production even declined. 
The same conflict arises in the attempt to increase rice production. To save foreign 
exchange and to raise the economic situation (especially for the poor peasants) the 
government wants such an increase. But to avoid political repercussions through higher 
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food prices, an upper limit has been set for the price of rice, so that the peasants get 
a low price for their product. Thus the farmer will not expand production by costly 
inputs, and domestic production did not improve. 
With such a multitude of cross-purposes, the government cannot implement any 
effective program. The result would have been different, if it could single out one 
objective; but as this could not be achieved politically, the problem is how to harmo-
nize the various objectives and to combine them in an acceptable way. 
The economists and other experts charged with planning agricultural development 
must guide the government by assessing the problems facing the economy, the re-
sources likely to be available in different eventualities, and to stipulate the ways open 
for development. It is up to the politicians to chose between these alternatives on a 
rational basis. 
10.3 Absence of clear-cut doctrinal concept 
The most important objection against the government's agrarian policy is the absence 
of any clear-cut doctrinal concept as regards the political attitude towards the 
peasants. This can be explained as follows. 
As earlier stated, the success of any agricultural development plan depends on the 
cooperation of the peasants. Although it is true that the Indonesian government 
undertakes some farm production directly, either by establishing state farms or by 
taking over the management of farms and estates formerly privately owned, in most 
cases agricultural development is still basically the outcome of production decisions by 
the great number of farmers. Nevertheless, the government's action will be a decisive 
point in promoting and facilitating production and productivity increases by the 
farmers on their farms. 
The range of measures available to the government to influence the progress of 
agriculture could have its roots in two alternative doctrinal concepts: 
(1) The government's agrarian policy is directed towards the achievement of specified 
objectives. In that case instruction, sometimes even with harsh and distasteful 
methods, have to be used to compel the farmers to do the things the government 
wants. This does not mean that any development in agriculture will be counteract-
ed: such measures, especially when applied with skill, whereby different elements 
of the rural society are used to destroy the old structure and to develop qualities of 
leadership and a new attitude of mind, can substantially increase the production. 
But its achievements can only be accomplished through political authoritarianism. 
In this concept, the government will decide how to combine land, labour, capital 
and technical knowledge. The status of the peasant in this case is just that of a 
labourer simply taking orders from the government. 
(2) The other concept is based on the individual freedom of choice in economic activ-
ity and of personal decisions. "People make the choice they do in farming as 
they do in all other things, on the basis of the satisfaction they derive from them. 
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This satisfaction includes approval by their families, by their friend and by their 
society. It includes economic gain, it includes a personal achievement, it includes 
the feeling of being of service to their fellow men and to their country.280 By 
this concept the government tries to induce the peasants to employ improved 
methods not by using force but by using educational methods (extension). This 
means that the government places full faith in the individual fanner as the producer 
and manager of his own farm and its services rendered are only for helping the 
farmer to improve his farm management. 
The author would not like to give his comment on the question which concept is 
economically the better, because according to him the choice is a political rather than 
an economic one. But for the success of any agricultural development, one or the 
other concept should be applied consistently. 
If we examine the government's measures in the past, they reflect rather a mixture 
of both concepts.281 A few cases will briefly illustrate the point. 
As to the agrarian policy in the use of improved physical inputs, the government 
enforces the farmers to use more fertilizers, seeds, and pesticides to meet its objectives 
to self sufficiency in rice production. This frustrates the efforts of the Ministry of 
Agriculture to mobilize the autoactivity of the farmers by convincing them through 
the Extension Service that the use of fertilizers and improved seeds is profitable. 
In the case of plant protection, the government hesitates to apply planting time 
regulations, as it is afraid that this might create the impression of limiting the peas-
ant's freedom. But on the other hand, it enforces the peasants to use more chemicals 
through the Welfare Operation Commend (KOGAM). 
In order to induce the farmers to increase their rice production, the government, 
disregarding its low price policy for foodstuffs, from time to time attempted to en-
courage the peasants to increase their production by creating an economic environ-
ment which was more in line with the 'liberal' concept: by paying the peasants a 
price which was meant to give them incentives to produce more. In doing so the gov-
ernment action did not contribute to a clear understanding of its policy. 
As regards the credit policy, on the one hand the government provided credit faci-
lities which aimed to educate the peasants in the efficient use of credit to get them to 
adopt sound farming practices, but on the other hand, they were forced to accept 
credit regardless of their need, only so that they would join the Self Sufficiency in 
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 This mixture of two doctrinal concepts in the political attitude of the government towards the 
peasants should not be confused with the mixed system of economic organization, where the govern-
ment aims for the cooperation of private initiative in certain sectors of the economy. This mixed 
system of economic organization is based on the philosophy that, wherever private initiative can do 
the job, the government should sponsor it, and that when private initiative is lacking, the government 
should do the job itself. It is highly unlikely that in most developing countries private initiative alone 
will be able to develop the country. Such development demands a favourable industrial climate which 
is usually lacking in those countries. Therefore, the author's critisism is not against a mixed system of 
economic organization, but against the ambiguity and inconsistency of the government's measures 
which find its roots in the application of a mixture of two doctrinal concepts. 
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Rice Production (SSB) Campaign. Again a mixture of two concepts: the first is to 
strengthen the development of the individual peasant as a producer and manager on 
his farm, and the second more to consider the peasant as a labourer only to have the 
government accomplish its objectives, e.g. to reach selfsufficiency in rice production at 
all costs. 
Considering land policy, we have seen that the government adopted the Basic 
Agrarian Law of 1960, which put a ceiling on the size of peasant holdings. More or 
less in contradiction to that, the government, as stated in the same law, began a policy 
of recognizing individual ownership of the land in order to strengthen the economic 
position of individual private peasants. It may be that in this concept the ceiling is 
put at too low a level (as in Japan): "Like the suit once fitted to a rapidly growing child 
becoming too tight, the land tenure system aimed at the establishment of owner 
farmers has become unsuitable to the present agricultural situation.282 
It is evident that agricultural instruction is designed to achieve the objectives for 
which the educational and training institutions are established. If one examines the 
curricula of the government agricultural educational institutions, one sees again a 
mixture of two concepts: the stepping-up of education is combined with political 
education, especially since 1959. This will help the government to carry out its politi-
cal education, e.g. to strengthen the concept of 'guided democracy and economy'. This 
sounds like an enforcement policy to be applied on the peasants ('printah alus'). 
But on the other hand, the government is not to teach the 'what and how', but also 
the 'why' of its measures. This seems to indicate its opinion that the ultimate effective-
ness of any agricultural development program depends on the ability of the individual 
peasant. He has to make sound decisions, based on an understanding of the alterna-
tives open to him and in appraising their consequences. 
As in the case of education, and in the operation of the research institutes, too, 
if one tried to introduce the policy of guided economy, this would mean, that the 
capable and promising young agriculturists would be forced to join the agricultural 
research institutes. However, the government gave freedom to this people to choose 
their own job within the various government organizations (banks, agricultural en-
terprises and the like). Only a few went into the research institutes, the mean reason 
was low payment. 
As regards the institutional programs taken by the government the following could 
be said. In developing a strong agricultural extension service the conclusion could 
be drawn that the government is inclined to consider the individual peasant as pro-
ducer and manager of his own farm. But in this case, too, it contradicts itself by ac-
cepting the other concept, namely by forming the KOGAM which enforces the peas-
ants into doing certain things to meet its objectives. 
In the case of establishing credit institution, the government's activities are direct-
ed towards setting up agencies which encourage the use of agricultural credit associat-
ed with the widespread adoption of sound, improved farm management practices. 
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But it mingles this case with the second concept. The created paddy centers, are among 
others (as explained earlier), designed to provide each farm with a credit regardless 
its need. 
The government has taken great efforts to encourage the establishment of agricultur-
al producers' cooperatives. This could be explained as a first step to collectivize peas-
ant agriculture through partial collective ownership of means of production. But in 
the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960, private ownership of the land is guaranteed, which 
seems to indicate that the government also encourages the concept of individual peas-
ants ownership. Again a mixture of two concepts. 
The non-existence of a clear-cut concept of the government's agrarian policies as 
regards its political attitude towards the peasants is not limited to the rice growers 
just mentioned. It also includes government measures to increase sugar production, 
and the organization of agricultural settlement in the Outer Provinces as well. 
There were times when peasants were not subjected to governmental regulations in 
planting and selling of sugarcane and sugar. But as the sugar factories did not produce 
cane themselves, the government intervened in this matter. The peasants are compell-
ed to plant or sell cane to sugar factories for a relatively low price to insure the gov-
ernment of a cheap supply of sugar for domestic as well as for export purposes. Again 
an example of a mixture of two concepts. 
The government has great hopes for agricultural resettlement-projects to relieve 
the population pressure on Java. But as it has no clear-cut concept as regards the 
political attitude towards the resettled peasants, the execution of these projects has 
been one of trial and error. Consequently, no consistency could be seen in the organiza-
tion of the agricultural resettlement projects, the acreage per settler and the conditions 
of tenure in the government's agricultural resettlement schemes. 
10.4 Concluding remarks 
The lessons to be learned from these examples of non-existence of any clear-cut con-
cepts is that the government has failed to imbue the peasants with a sense of confidence 
and purposefulness in the execution of agricultural programs. As long as the govern-
ment's agrarian policy does not succeed in fulfilling cherished objectives of the peas-
ants, any agricultural development will be a failure. Thus it is necessary that there has to 
be an identity of purpose and a common responsibility for the government and the peas-
ants to reach with greater security than up till now a joint achievement of purposes. 
Only then will the potential energy of the peasants be actually released. 
This kind of problem is a basic one not only faced by the Indonesian government 
but also by many developing countries in the world today. Although it is understand-
able that the Indonesian government hestitates to make a choice between the two 
concepts, due to circumstances explained in the section on political instability, yet 
there is no other way out than to accept one clear-cut concept for the execution of its 
program. 
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In summarizing we can conclude that there are still many obstacles to overcome 
before Java can launch rapid agricultural development on a large scale. But, it has 
to be realized that even if Java can achieve rapid agricultural development, it still will 
not solve its ultimate problems. Java must be industrialized. But industrialization in 
Java alone will be more difficult if it is not integrated in the economic development 
for the whole of Indonesia. Java and the Outer Islands have historically developed 
in such a way that both are vital and necessary components of one symbiotic econo-
mic system. How this system could be the best developed will be briefly discussed in 
Chapter 11. 
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11 Prospects for the future 
11.1 The inability of peasant agriculture in Java to absorb the 
population increase 
Planning agricultural development is more or less a matter of speculation. But one 
thing is quite clear: in Java this development is dominated by the problem of popula-
tion growth. 
As already stated, since about 1840 until 1930 the agricultural sector was able 
to absorb 1% of the total population growth or 1,5% of the growth of the 
agricultural population. That agricultural expansion kept up with this 1.5% has been 
possible by the increase in arable land, the intensified use of the land through double 
cropping (irrigation), the introduction of new crops, and the establishment of large-
scale agricultural enterprises. Although the peasants' economic position during that 
period did not deteriorate (even a slight improvement between 1900 and 1930 has 
been reported) yet the resources for further expansion became more and more ex-
hausted. 
Next it must be pointed out that during that period agricultural and non-agricultur-
al employment developed along parallel lines, both showing an annual employment 
increase of 1.5%. 
In the period between 1930 and 1953, the percentage of agricultural population in 
Java decreased from 68.1 to 60.5 %. This was partly due to factors like war, revolution 
and agricultural resettlement in the Outer Provinces, but mainly to the expansion of 
petty trading, government jobs and manufacturing industries: in absolute figures 
1.7, 1.3 and 1.8 millions, respectively (see Table 134). This favourable structural 
change did not continue and the percentage of agricultural population has increased 
again to 71.9 %in 1961. This demonstrates that since 1953 non-agricultural employment 
did not expand in proportion with the population growth and that agricultural resttle-
ment in the Outer Provinces had not been able to cause a substantial relief in the 
population pressure in Java. 
Political instability and the declining economic situation during the last decade have 
reversed the favourable trend of the previous period. This induced a process of re-
ruralization, the 'trek' to the rural area, as people hoped to find a living by falling 
back on the traditional village and family ties. If the level of living of the peasants in 
Java at least should be kept constant, then the natural agricultural population increase 
of 2.3% (or about 1 million people annually) as indicated by the last figure of the 
Central Bureau of Statistics, requires the creation of additional employment for 235,000 
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families per year. 
All these calculations are based on the assumption that in the short run, counting 
on results of direct demographic policies as birth control (which the government has 
not yet found necessary to pursue in an all out and effective manner, anyhow) is 
unrealistic. 
But is must be realized that the absorptive capacity of the agricultural sector with 
the present combination of factors of production has already surpassed its limit. Even 
different proportions in the allocation of the agricultural resources will have no im-
mediate significant effect. To show this, various measures have to be considered; they 
may be listed as follows: 
(1) To increase the area of arable land in Java. 
(2) To raise the productivity of the arable land by increasing the rate of double crop-
ping in constructing new irrigation works. 
(3) To improve the existing irrigation works. 
(4) To intensify the cultivation of existing farms by means of inputs other than improv-
ed irrigation. 
(5) To change the cropping pattern from less labour intensive to more intensive crops, 
e.g. conversion of lowland large-scale enterprises to peasant agriculture. 
(6) To decrease the average landholding. 
(7) To rehabilitate the estates. 
As to the expansion of arable landin Java, a study of the State Planning Bureau estimat-
ed that the island can still supply about 200,000 ha of new arable land, at most enough 
to absorb the agricultural population increase of one year. But it will be technically 
Table 134. Employment structure by industries in 1930 and 1953. 
Agriculture 
Non-agriculture: 
mining 
manufacturing 
communications and transport 
trade 
free professions 
government 
other employment 
total non-agriculture 
Total 
Millions of 
employed 
persons 
1930 
14.3 
0.1 
2.2 
0.3 
1.3 
0.2 
0.5 
2.0 
6.6 
20.9 
1953 
19.1 
0.1 
4.0 
0.8 
3.0 
0.2 
1.8 
2.0 
11.9 
31.0 
% of total 
employed 
persons 
1930 
68.6 
0.3 
10.5 
1.5 
6.2 
1.0 
2.4 
9.5 
31.9 
100.0 
1953 
60.5 
0.2 
13.3 
2.7 
10.0 
0.7 
6.0 
6.6 
39.5 
100.0 
Increase (+) or 
decrease (-) 
i n%of 
total em-
in % of sec-
toral em-
ployment ployment 
-8.1 
-0.1 
+2.8 
+1.2 
+3.8 
-0.3 
+3.6 
-2.9 
+7.6 
+ 33.6 
0.0 
+ 81.8 
+166.7 
+130.7 
0.0 
+260.0 
0.0 
+ 80.3 
Source: State Planning Bureau (see Table 120), p. 69. 
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very difficult to realize this expansion and the costs will be extremely high, so that 
it is doubtful if this measure is economically advisable. 
The possibilities of extending the area of irrigated fields by new irrigation works are 
practically exhausted as the economically more favourable areas are already occupied 
by sawahs. But it could still be possible to build more large irrigation works, eventual-
ly as multipurpose projects. It has been estimated that by this measure about 500,000 
ha of peasant agricultural land can be brought under irrigation, which would make 
possible the growing of more than one crop per year. 
However, with regard to its practical implementation, the following reservations 
have to be made. The realization of the irrigation of these 500,000 ha depends for an 
important part on the speeding up of the execution of the multipurpose projects, and 
it is the power generation part which may economically justify the execution of these 
expensive projects, so that irrigation purposes plays a less important role. In addition 
the improvement of the irrigation will be spread over a rather long period. 
It should further be understood, that these multipurpose projects present a number of 
difficulties which have to be solved. They will be encountered in the mutual adjustment 
of agricultural and non-agricultural interests, such as the use of the water for irriga-
tion, the demand for a regular water stream for power generation, the supply to cities 
and industries and the need of flood control. Further, as much foreign exchange is 
needed for these projects, it will be difficult for the government to finance them, un-
less foreign assistance can be found. 
It is to be expected that only about 180,000 ha can be brought under irrigation by 
the completion of the Djatiluhur project in 1967. The other two multipurpose projects 
are still in the surveying stage as shown under 9.1.2 and it will take many years before 
they will be finished, even if sufficient funds can be found. 
It should be kept in mind, that this measure will not add any significant employment 
opportunity to the men on this land. But the farmer who tills this land now will 
benefit and the agricultural production will increase. 
The improvement of existing irrigation works will enable the peasants to make fuller 
use of their land and their labour. However, this improvement will not provide addi-
tional agricultural employment as the farms in Java are already overcrowded. Given 
this restriction, these measures will solely improve the economic position of the people 
already on farms and increase their buying capacity for industrial products and 
services. 
The possibility of increasing yields by the introduction of other improved agricultural 
techniques, like seed selection, fertilization, combat of plant diseases and pests, still 
presents important opportunities. But neither this development will provide additional 
agricultural employment on the farms. Nevertheless all possible efforts should be 
made to improve the economic position of the present peasants, as this will add also 
to the improvement of the national economy. 
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It is obvious that the success of transformation of peasant agriculture needs the 
understanding and the cooperation of the farmers. Whatever the government plans 
to do in a short period, it is likely that the thorough transformation of peasant agri-
culture required to produce radically improved performances, will take much time. 
Yet in view of the pressure of population growth and the developing industrialization, 
it is obvious that peasant agriculture should be improved as soon as possible within 
the present economic organization. 
Thus, on the one hand the desperate urgency to increase agricultural production 
as quickly as possible and, on the other hand, the need for further study and experience 
(of the physical, economic, educational and organizational factors involved) before 
launching big agricultural projects, present a dilemma to the government. 
It hardly needs to be repeated that the accelerated expansion of food production is 
one of the most complex problems which Java has to face. It is not merely a question 
of greater investment in agriculture or of enlarging the supply of current inputs, such 
as fertilizers and improved seeds, but creating social and institutional conditions under 
which the peasant can develop adequate incentives to raise the productivity of his 
land is equally important. 
Under the present conditions, agriculture can largely be developed by activitating 
the peasants. For this purpose a well-organized extension service is essential, so that 
a better use of the existing resources will be realized without major capital investments. 
The cost of such a service can be estimated at only $ 2 per ha per year. As in this 
program about 8,000,000 ha of peasant land is involved, $ 16 million investment is 
needed annually. Because no figures are available it is not known exactly, what the 
benefits resulting from this investment will be in the short run. But in the long run, 
present efforts to increase productivity of peasant agriculture may prove to have been 
the right approach and may lead to an economic progress as experienced by other 
countries like Japan. 
The conversion of lowland estates into peasants agricultural land will be of limited 
value because it will create additional employment for only about 200,000 families. 
This is based on the following facts: 
(1) The acreage of lowland estates on Java is only 200,000 ha. 
(2) The average worker per ha lowland estate is 0.7 and that of peasant agricultural 
land is 2.5. 
(3) The number of workers per peasant family is 1.8. 
(4) On these converted lowland estates land the same average worker per ha (namely 
2.5 persons) can be employed as on the peasant agricultural land. 
This means that this conversion is perhaps just sufficient to absorb the agricultural 
population increase of one year. But it should be realized that the loss of the money 
income and foreign exchange earnings derived from those estates will probably be far 
more serious than the relief is helpful. 
Another possibility of course is a further reduction in the average size of landholding by 
redistributing the existing land. It is evident that this would result in a further decrease 
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in the standard of living in the rural areas which would cause a serious political and 
sociological impact on an already precarious situation. 
In the author's opinion the reverse is needed, i.e. the increase of the average size 
of the farms, as with the present size the Javanese farmer is actually a peasant with 
extremely limited opportunities. 
The prospects for the rehabilitation of estates are not favourable, as shown earlier in 
this study. Only rubber production showed an increase after World War II, but in the 
last years this product has declined too. 
Mainly political factors prevent the estates from making their full potential con-
tribution to economic development. Although most of them are nationalized, which 
eliminated the conflict between indigeneous labour and foreign capital, still some poli-
tical parties want to divide the estate land amongst the farmers, especially in the low-
lands. 
At the moment there are too many workers on the estates. To increase labour 
productivity, part of these workers should be dismissed, but this is forbidden by the 
present law. Moreover, also under pressure of labour unions, higher wages and welfare 
benefits are paid to the labourers than in the past, which substantially increased 
production costs. Unless all these political problems are solved, the rehabilitation of 
the estates will be very difficult. 
Summarizing it can be said, that the future economic position of the population of 
Java looks rather dark if it continues to increase at the present rate, and it is under-
standable that the government considers the solution of this problem to be of the 
utmost urgency. 
It is possible that increasing the productivity of the land could provide a living with-
in the sphere of the peasant community, for instance by means of workshanng for a 
certain number of persons and in the meantime could stabilize the standard of living 
in rural areas at the existing level. However, this would only absorb a relatively small 
number of people. While the process of increasing the productivity is a rather slow 
one, it is more realistic to base plans on the following figures. 
A solution of Java's population problem requires that the 1,600,000 persons or 
360,000 families added each year to the population should be absorbed elsewhere in 
the economy (the non-agricultural sector in Java and the Outer Provinces, and the 
agricultural resettlement projects and agricultural enterprises in the Outer Provinces) 
to avoid a further decline in the level of living. Finally, it should be important to 
explore if a direct demographic policy could be applied to slow down population 
growth. • r 
Some Indonesian development economists expect much from the expansion of non-
agricultural employment in Java while others have great hopes of an increased resettle-
ment of Javanese in the Outer Provinces. The author is of the opinion that both measu-
res should be simultaneously applied, because it will be technically impossible to 
absorb the great number of persons by only one method. 
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11.2 Expansion of non-agricultural employment 
Assumed that non-agricultural expansion, except in government jobs, could follow 
the same path as indicated by the development in the years 1930-1953, being about 
4% per year, with an ultimate number of 7.8 million workers, then their employment 
sources could absorb about 320,000 workers (about 205,000 families) per year assu-
ming that the number of workers per family is distributed as follows: 
Industrial enterprises 1.25 
Cottage industry 1.50 
Other non-agricultural employment 1.70 
The State Planning Bureau's employment survey indicated that 40 % of the expan-
sion of non-agricultural employment can be attributed to the manufacturing industry, 
the remaining 60 % to other non-agricultural employment. Then industrialization could 
absorb about 95,000 families. Assumed that the proportion of cottage industry is 60% 
of the total industrial employment (as indicated by the Bureau of Statistics), then 
57,000 families could find employment in cottage industry each year, and the other 
manufacturing industries could provide each year new employment for 38,000 
families. Thus distribution of possible employment in the non-agricultural sector 
could be as follows: 
Cottage industrial sector 57,000 families 
Other industrial sector 38,000 families 
Remaining non-agricultural sector 110,000 families 
Total 205,000 families 
This means that each year from 360,000 families added to the total number, about 
155,000 families must be employed outside Java. 
11.3 Resettlement in the Outer Provinces 
Assumed that indeed the resettlement in the Outer Provinces absorbs about 155,000 
families (650,000 persons) each year, then in the near future the population growth in 
Java would be limited to about 1,000,000 persons annually, though this number will 
substantially increase again later on. 
If younger couples, for instance families consisting of parents with one child, or 
even better young childless couples, could be transferred, the effect on the future 
growth of population in Java would be much greater, and it may then be realistic to 
assume that the annual population increase of 1,000,000 people will be maintained 
during a much longer period, say up till 1980. This would give the government a 
breathing spell to reconstruct the national economy in such a way that it would 
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create the necessary conditions for a rapid increase in farmers' income afterwards 
and also favourably affect future economic growth of the country. 
In 1966, according to DE VRIES, due to the deteriorating economic situation, the 
number of spontaneous migrants to the Outer Provinces increased considerably and 
reached a total number of about 250,000 persons in that year. This number, though 
encouraging, is still insufficient to solve Java's population problem and it is doubtful 
if it could be continued at the same rate. Ways must be found to resettle at least about 
650,000 persons annually to the Outer Islands, as indicated above. 
Thus it is obvious that, accepting these cold facts, resettlement in the Outer Provin-
ces cannot become a means to improve simultaneously the economic position of the 
Javanese settlers as compared with their present position. This has always been an 
addition goal of the resttlement policy up to now, but for the time being it can hardly 
be expected. Resettlement projects should be directed first of all to provide the maxi-
mum employment for the surplus population in Java. 
Assuming that 25,000 families could be absorbed by the non-agricultural sector 
of the Outer Provinces, then agricultural resttlement should absorb 130,000 families 
of average size. If agricultural resettlement is to be increased to such an number, 
spontaneous transmigration in particular should be encouraged to lower the cost, 
(which amounted to $ 200 for moving one family in 1953). 
In the author's opinion, this spontaneous transmigration should be the ultimate 
aim for all migration. However, it will be necessary to set up first of all nuclei in 
settlement areas to which the spontaneous transmigration should be directed. 
The task of the government would then be to demarcate the right areas, to develop 
the nuclei settlement areas with selected settlers, and to construct around these 
nuclei the necessary infrastructural works and to provide the required personnel 
and services to make the whole organization work effectively at lowest possible 
cost. 
For the demarcation of the areas for spontaneous transmigration it should be remember-
ed that, according to the State Planning Bureau (see Chapter 7), there are about 
4,500,000 ha of land available suitable for agricultural resettlement projects, scattered 
over the various islands of the Outer Provinces. If the government allocates 2 ha for 
each family, this is thus sufficient for 2,250,000 families, enough to cover the needs for 
about 20 years (calculated on 80 % of the settlers to be farmers). 
These lands should be opened first to settlement. Priorities should be given to areas 
which can be integrated into the overall development plans of the country, like those 
close to the Asahan Development Project in northern Sumatra and the Sumatra High-
way. Jn the meantime the government could look for other suitable areas. 
The development of the nuclei settlement areas has to be based on units of 100,000 ha, 
of which 10% or 10,000 ha could be cleared at the expense of the government, while 
the rest could be cleared by the settlers themselves. This 10,000 ha will be the nucleus 
of the resettlement project while the remaining 90,000 ha will be given to spontaneous 
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settlers, where the government could provide the necessary services to make farming 
a success. 
Within these 10,000 ha, about 3,000 ha may be cleared simultaneously with the 
opening up of the area with roads (which has to be done mechanically), while the 
remaining 7,000 ha can be carried out by the settlers of the nucleus area in paid labour. 
Since there are 4,500,000 ha land available, the government has to open 45 nuclei 
as soon as possible. 
Some resettlement areas are less suitable for food crops because of the edaphic or 
climatologic circumstances. Here the cultivation of perennial crops like oilpalms is 
suggested, and the possibility to establish agricultural enterprises in combination with 
resettlement should be explored. 
As to the selection of the settlers, especially for the nuclei, it is advisable to choose (as 
in most parts of the world where new soils have been brought into cultivation) people 
who possess the right pioneer spirit and are prepared to accept the hardships which 
go with the clearing of virgin land. The settlers of the nuclei should, if possible, be 
also experienced dry-land farmers. 
In the construction of the necessary infrastructural works the government agencies 
involved with the resettlement projects have the task to assist the spontaneous settler 
in the following subjects: 
(a) To make available land for agricultural settlement. The clearing of the land and 
building of houses should be done by the settlers themselves, with assistance of 
the government for some necessities. 
(b) To help with the transport of the settlers, especially by providing sufficient ship-
ping facilities. . . 
(c) To construct the infrastructure necessary for a smooth spontaneous settlement. 
As regards schools, hospitals, rural roads and the like, experience shows that the 
government can make a go with rudimentary facilities for a start which can be 
improved later when the returns of farming begin to come in. 
(d) To assist the settlers in their farming practice (by efficient extension services) and to 
ensure the necessary climate to make production attractive and succesful by provid 
ing seeds, tools, livestock and ready markets for their products. 
The cost of a 10,000 ha agricultural resettlement with the above mentioned setup in 
mind may be estimated as follows: 
Mechanical clearing 3000 ha of land including construction of 
the infrastructure $2,000,000 
Clearing 7,000 ha of land by the settlers themselves $ 210,000 
Transport and other costs for the settlers of the nucleus area $ 500,000 
Total $2,710,000 
If it is possible to open up in 3 years 45 nuclei areas totalling 450,000 ha, the cost up 
to 1970 will amount to about $ 120 million. This will create employment for 225,000 
families. But, based on the calculations given earlier in this chapter, it is necessary to 
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resettle 465,000 families in these three years. So ways must be found to expand non-
agricultural employment in Java, in addition to that required for the 615,000 families, 
for the balance of the 240,000 families. Afterwards, as soon as the nuclei areas are 
open, an influx of spontaneous settlers may be expected. If the cost of settling one 
family of spontaneous settlers is $ 120, then the cost of bringing the remaining 
4,050,000 ha of the 45 agricultural settlement areas into cultivation will amount to 
$ 243 million. So the total cost to open 4,500,000ha for agricultural resettlement pro-
jects will be $ 360 million in the coming 20 years. 
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12 Conclusions 
The present study reviews the main aspects of the agricultural development in Java. 
The main conclusions emerging from it are the following. 
1. Increasing productivity of peasant agriculture is of crucial importance in the initial 
period of economic growth of a country. 
2. Therefore, the central problem of agricultural development in Indonesia is how to 
get peasant agriculture moving in Java, where we face the problem of an already 
excessive yet still increasing agricultural population. The government has taken 
several measures to relieve this unfavourable situation, such as: 
(a) To transfer Javanese farmers to the sparsely populated Outer Islands. 
(b) To pay special attention to the rehabilitation of the sugar factories which are 
mostly under state management. 
(c) To increase the productivity of peasant agriculture by applying more fertilizers, 
better seeds and other improved agricultural techniques. 
But the results have not been up to expectations due to various factors, as will be 
explained in the following point. 
3. In Chapter 10 it is shown that agricultural development in Java has been retarded 
by the following three main causes: 
(a) The political instability of the country. 
(b) The multitude and inconsistency of government's objectives in pursuing agricul-
tural development. 
(c) The non-existence of any clear doctrinal concept in the government's agrarian 
policy as regards the political attitude towards the peasants. 
Other constraints on recent agricultural growth are: 
(a) The more rapid population growth after World War II. 
(b) The diversion of some economic resources for non-economic development 
purposes. 
(c) The weakness of the first attempts in comprehensive agricultural planning. 
4. It is evident from the study that increasing productivity of the peasant's agriculture 
on a revolutionary scale requires technical, economical, attitudinal and political 
transformation of the rural society that cannot be brought about quickly. The 
transformation of peasant agriculture requires a series of interlocking changes in 
so many different aspects of rural life that a perspective for a period considerably 
longer than the eight years anticipated in the Overall National Development Plan 
1961-1969 is required. 
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5. Next, an identity of purpose and common responsibility between the government 
and the peasants is necessary to accelerate agricultural development. 
6. Another important conclusion of the study, which is also stressed by JOOSTEN 
and others, is that expansion of the markets for the agricultural products is neces-
sary for agricultural development. 
Such an increase would certainly alleviate the situation of Javanese farmers for 
a time, but ultimately it would not solve their problem. Only if most of that increase 
can be siphoned off into industrial investment does it seem that the application of 
more and better agricultural inputs will really contribute something dynamic to 
the general economic situation. If it cannot be drawn off, it will merely further 
the process of 'involution', not just in agriculture now, but throughout the whole 
of the Javanese society. 
7. It is also shown that Java's rural economy is simply unable to absorb population 
growth without falling standards of living. In Chapter 11 it is illustrated that a 
solution of Java's problem requires that the 1,600,000 persons or 360,000 families 
added each year to its population should be absorbed elsewhere in the economy, 
into industries in Java or the Outer Islands, or into agriculture in the Outer Islands. 
Only an effective policy of agricultural resettlement to the Outer Provinces and 
industrialization could enable Java to provide employment for its annual popula-
tion increase. Such a policy, vigorously applied and accompanied by an adequate 
educational program, will give the government a breathing space to reconstruct 
the national economy. Then it might be obligatory for the government, in order 
to achieve rapid economic development, to persuade the population to stop looking 
on the maximum of babies as a 'bliss'. 
8. Looking at Indonesia from these perspectives, the final conclusion is that it is 
unwarranted to expect that economic (including agricultural) development occurs 
easily and quickly. Accordingly, economic development is a long-term goal and the 
program to carry it out must be equally long in term. 
However, natural and human resources, climate and location are such that, when 
the government does succeed to prepare the basis for the 'plane to take off' (to 
use the familiar metaphor of economic growth as introduced by ROSTOV), it 
has the potential 'to fligh high and fast'. 
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Samenvatting 
Na de tweede wereldoorlog hebben zich in Indonesie grote veranderingen voltrokken 
in de export en import van landbouwproducten. In dit verband dienen genoemd te 
worden de sterke toename van de rijstimport en de dalende betekenis van de uitvoer 
van andere landbouwproducten. Dit betreft in het bijzonder Java, dat met ongeveer 
65 % van de Indonesische bevolking slechts 15 % van de deviezen opbrengt maar daar-
van 65 % consumeert. Uiteraard heeft deze situatie allerlei politieke consequenties. 
Inmiddels blijft de bevolking op het reeds zeer dicht bevolkte Java gestaag toene-
men. Deze toename wordt op dit agrarische eiland voornamelijk opgevangen door 
de landbouw(of beter gezegd: op het platteland), wat een ernstige bedreiging vormt 
van het sociaal-economisch bestel en grote gevaren voor een verslechtering van de 
economie met zich mee brengt. 
Deze omstandigheden hebben de regering genoodzaakt tot het treffen van allerlei 
maatregelen. Er moet echter worden geconstateerd, dat de in de diverse plannen voor-
ziene ontwikkeling van de landbouw bij de gestelde doeleinden is achtergebleven en 
zelfs, dat de voortbrenging in verschillende sectoren van de landbouw stagneert. 
De onderhavige studie heeft tot doel, een analyse te geven van de overheidsmaat-
regelen om in deze situatie verbetering te brengen, en de oorzaken op te sporen voor 
het falen daarvan. Gehoopt wordt dat ze bij zal dragen tot de opstelling en uitvoering 
van nieuwe plannen voor de ontwikkeling van de landbouw in Indonesie, en speciaal 
op Java. 
Het betoog is verdeeld in 12 hoofdstukken, waarvan de beide eerste een inleidend 
karakter dragen. 
Hoofstuk 1 geeft een overzicht van de achtergronden, de doeleinden en de indeling 
van de studie. In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt in een korte theoretische beschouwing aangegeven 
waarom de landbouw tot verdere ontwikkeling dient te worden gebracht en hoe dit 
speciaal geldt voor de situatie in Indonesie. 
De volgende drie hoofdstukken (3, 4 en 5) geven een schets van de ontwikkeling 
van de landbouw in Indonesie vanaf 1815. Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt de ontwikkeling 
in Indonesie in het algemeen en die van de Buitengewesten in het bijzonder. Hoofdstuk 
4 belicht voornamelijk de ontwikkeling op Java en Hoofdstuk 5 de gevolgen van de 
bevolkingsdruk op de landbouw van dit eiland. 
De hoofdstukken 6 tot en met 9 illustreren de methode van aanpak, het beleid en 
de maatregelen van de regering om het hoofd te bieden aan de moeilijkheden die na 
de tweede wereldoorlog zijn gerezen. Hoofdstuk 6 behandelt in het kort de opeenvol-
gende plannen die door de regering zijn gelanceerd voor de ontwikkeling van de land-
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bouw. Hoofdstuk 7 bespreekt de maatregelen om de bevolkingsdruk op Java te ver-
lichten door projecten voor nieuwe landbouwvestigingen in de Buitengewesten. Hoofd-
stuk 8 beschrijft de pogingen van de regering om de export van agrarische produkten 
op te voeren, waarbij de rehabilitatie van de suikerfabrieken op Java als een voorbeeld 
wordt gegeven. Hoofdstuk 9 behandelt de maatregelen van de regering on de produk-
tiviteit van de bevolkingslandbouw op te voren, waarbij de nadruk valt om de rijst-
produktie. 
Hoofdstuk 10 analiseert het falen van het agrarisch beleid bij de landbouwontwik-
keling op Java, terwijl Hoofdstuk 11 het oog richt op de toekomst. 
De voornaamste conclusies kunnen als volgt worden samengevat (Hoofdstuk 12). 
1. Het is van vitaal belang, dat in de huidige fase van de economische ontwikkeling 
van Indonesie de produktiviteit van de bevolkingslandbouw wordt opgevoerd. 
2. Het centrale probleem daarbij is, op welke wijze men de landbouw op Java tot 
nieuwe initiatieven, en, hoe men daarin meer dynamiek kan brengen. De regering 
heeft verschillende maatregelen getroffen om dit te bereiken, zoals: 
(a) transmigratie van Javaanse boeren naar dun bevolkte streken van de Buiten-
gewesten om de bevolkingsdruk op Java te verlichten; 
(b) rehabilitatie van suikerfabrieken, die nu voornamelijk staatsbedrijven zijn; 
(c) verhoging van de produktiviteit van de bevolkingslandbouw door het gebruik 
van meer kunstmest, beter zaaizaad en andere verbeterde landbouwmethoden. 
De resultaten van deze maatregelen zijn echter beneden de verwachting gebleven 
door verschillende hierna te noemen factoren. 
3. Voornamelijk drie factoren hebben de landbouwontwikkeling op Java geremd: 
(a) de politieke labiliteit; 
(b) de verscheidenheid en tegenstrijdigheid van de doeleinden van de regering in 
het streven naar landbouwontwikkeling; 
(c) de afwezigheid van een duidelijke politieke houding tegenover de boeren in het 
agrarisch regeringsbeleid. 
Andere remmende factoren zijn geweest: 
(a) de onverwacht snelle groei van de bevolking na de tweede wereldoorlog; 
(b) het gebruik van sommige economische bronnen voor niet-economische ont-
wikkelingsdoeleinden; 
(c) tekortkomingen van de regering in haar eerste pogingen om een alomvattend 
en efficient plan voor de ontwikkeling van de landbouw op te stellen. 
4. De studie toont aan, dat de verhoging van de produktiviteit van de bevolkings-
landbouw op revolutionaire wijze een technische, economische, geestelijke en po-
litieke transformatie van de maatschappij op het platteland vereist. Zulke veran-
deringen, die in elkaar grijpen bij de verschillende aspecten van het levenspatroon, 
eisen een veel langere periode dan de acht jaar voorzien in het achtjarenplan 1961-
1969. 
5. Het is noodzakelijk te komen tot een identiteit van doeleinden en een gemeen-
schappelijke verantwoordelijkheid bij regering en boeren om de landbouwont-
176 
wikkeling te versnellen. 
6. Voor de ontwikkeling van de landbouw is een groeiende markt voor landbouw-
produkten noodzakelijk, waarop door JOOSTEN en anderen reeds met klem werd 
gewezen. Een verhoging van de produktie van de landbouw alleen zal zeker het 
probleem van de Javaanse boer voor korte tijd verlichten, maar niet op lange ter-
mijn. Slechts als het resultaat van deze verhoging gebruikt wordt voor industriele 
investeringen mag men een bijdrage van de landbouw verwachten tot een dyna-
mische ontwikkeling van de algemene economische situatie; zo niet, dan kan alleen 
een verdere teruggang worden verwacht, niet alleen in de landbouw, maar in de 
gehele Javaanse maatschappij. 
7. Tenslotte wordt aangetoond, dat de Javaanse boereneconomie eenvoudigweg niet 
in staat is om een verdere aanwas van de bevolking op te vangen zonder een voort-
schrijdende daling van de levensstandaard. Een oplossing van het Javaanse be-
bevolkingsvraagstuk vereist, datde ongeveer 1.600.000 personen (360.000 families) 
die elk jaar worden toegevoegd aan de tegenwoordige bevolking, ergens anders in 
de economie emplooi vinden: in de industrieen op Java of in de Buitengewesten, of 
in de landbouw in de Buitengewesten. Een daarop gericht, krachtig beleid, aan-
gevuld met een passend opvoedingsprogramma, zal de regering een adempauze 
moeten verschaffen om de nationale economie te reconstrueren. Daarbij zal het 
wellicht mettertijd noodzakelijk zijn, geboortebeperking bij de bevolking ingang 
te doen vinden. 
8. De eindconclusie is, dat het irreeel is te verwachten, dat in Indonesie' de economi-
sche (en dus ook de landbouwkundige) ontwikkeling gemakkelijk en vlug te ver-
wezenlijken is. Een essentiele verbetering kan slechts op lange termijn worden ver-
wacht, en om dit doel te bereiken moet dan ook ieder ontwikkelingsplan worden 
opgezet voor lange perioden. Daar staat tegenover, dat de natuurlijke en menselijke 
hulpbronnen in Indonesie zo rijk zijn dat, als de regering er in slaagt een basis te 
bouwen voor het "vliegtuig om op te stijgen" (ROSTOV), het land inderdaad de 
mogelijkheid heeft om "hoog en snel te vliegen". 
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